Latinos in Chicago: Reflections of an American Landscape

White Paper Series
June 2010
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LATINOS IN CHICAGO:
REFLECTIONS OF AN
AMERICAN LANDSCAPE

CHICAGO COMMUNITY TRUST LATINO RESEARCH COLLABORATIVE

WHITE PAPER SERIES
JUNE 2010
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INTRODUCTION

In the middle and late nineteenth century, when this country faced the challenge and necessity of transforming its economy from an agricultural base to an industrial base, Chicago led the way. By the early twentieth century the United States was the greatest industrial country in the world, and Chicago its greatest industrial city. Our nation and this city along with it are now faced with an even greater challenge that will once more require a reshaping of the economy, this time from an industrial base to a high-technology information and service base. Hopefully Chicago will once again lead the way.

This volume focuses on Latinos in metropolitan Chicago with the goal of locating them within Chicago’s economic, political, and educational context and understanding the critical role that they can play in enhancing the present and future well-being of the metropolitan area. Latinos are on the front line of a demographic revolution that in all likelihood will fundamentally transform the social and economic landscape of Chicago and the nation. By 2050 the US population is projected to be 55 percent Latino, African American, and Asian. In addition, the majority of K–12 students are expected to be Latino, African American, or Asian by 2020 and, as a result of a Latino baby boom, majority Latino by 2050. Therefore, the future of Latinos affects the future of us all as well as the social institutions that hold us together.

These statistics indicate that the Latino demographic revolution will have a significant impact on virtually every American institution. A complementary set of bullet points drawn from recent US Census Bureau and the Pew Hispanic Research Center work identifies some other significant numbers:

- If current trends continue, the population of the United States will rise to 438 million in 2050 from 296 million in 2005, and 82 percent of the increase will be
due to immigrants arriving between 2020 and 2050 and their US-born descendants.

- Of the 142 million people added, 76 million will be immigrants themselves and 50 million will be their children or grandchildren. The Latino population will triple in size between 2005 and 2050.

- Latinos will make up 29 percent of the US population in 2050, compared with 14 percent in 2005.

- After 2020 the Latino population is projected to add more people to the United States every year than would all other race/ethnic groups combined.

- From 2030 to 2050 the nation’s non-Hispanic white population will experience an absolute numerical decline.

Latinos and African Americans have long been marginalized educationally, economically, and politically. As they become a numeric majority their educational, occupational, and political liabilities shift from important to critical for this country’s future quality of life, prosperity, and global competitiveness.

To add to the complexity of this challenge, America’s ongoing demographic revolution is taking place at the same time the country is reeling from the impacts of the current recession and longer term globalization processes; adjusting to employment stresses related to de-industrialization and a new information, high-technology, and service economy; reconfiguring the physical and social order of its urban and suburban spaces—all of which is accompanied by loud public rumbling and outbursts of civic unrest. The country, its political leaders, and its institutional decision-makers are scrambling to understand what is happening, what to do, and how to commit resources.

Amid the uncertainty one thing is clear: this and coming generations of K–12 minority students are destined to be a significant component of the city’s and the country’s future labor force, citizenry, and leadership. If these minorities will be as educationally, economically, and politically marginalized in 2050 as they are in 2010 the economic and cultural divide in this country will intensify. They will be in no position to help maintain the
present status quo, let alone steer this country into a leadership position in the competitive global world of tomorrow.

The future of our minority communities is critical to the future of all and, as such, must become a matter of prime importance for policy-makers. Clearly, Chicago and the nation cannot meet the challenges of a global world if the energy and creative potential of over half of its population and labor force continue to be stifled educationally, occupationally, economically, and socially. The problem belongs to all of us. The solution is our shared responsibility. A recent report from the Brookings Institution, *The State of Metropolitan America*, speaks clearly and bluntly to the importance of a shared response to the stress of demographic change and growth:

> Failure to maximize shared responses to the inevitable challenges of change, and common ownership of the solutions, will only serve to sow the seeds of intergenerational, interracial, and inter-ethnic conflict.¹

For the sake of us all, Chicago and the nation need an aggressive program for minority educational and occupational advancement. The consequences of inaction are monumental, and time may be running out. Policy-makers, stakeholders, NGOs, and community organizations need to break down the barriers preventing minority mobility and unleash their energy, creativity, and ambition for the benefit of our entire society.

But how do we get there? Since there is no “silver bullet,” the solution needs to be found the old-fashioned way: clearly identify a goal, determine the appropriate path to achieve that goal, marshal the necessary resources, and then go to work.

The Institute for Latino Studies, with support from the Chicago Community Trust and the Arthur Foundation, has embarked on a policy research project aimed at increasing the long-term educational, economic, and civic prospects of metropolitan Chicago Latinos. Capitalizing on its primary area of expertise, policy-based research, the Institute has chosen four research areas deemed especially instrumental in enhancing the well-being of Chicago Latinos: 1) urban change, 2) education, 3) work and the economy, and 4) civic participation.

The research project funded by this collaborative has established four interdisciplinary research teams with researchers from four partner institutions in

metropolitan Chicago: the University of Illinois at Chicago, DePaul University, Roosevelt University, and National-Louis University. The research teams provide specialized knowledge and research expertise in the four topic areas.

The white papers in this volume constitute a survey of the existing state of knowledge, theoretical and factual, about Latinos in metropolitan Chicago, each focusing on one of our four research topics. They are designed to be a starting point for decision-makers, stakeholders, CBOs, and other parties interested in digesting the information, understanding its implications, and using it to frame effective policies that incorporate the present reality and future prospects of Latinos within the American landscape.

John P. Koval, Editor
Chicago, June 2010
Chapter 1: Urban Change

Latinos and Neo-Regionalism in Metropolitan Chicago

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INTRODUCTION

Urban analysis in the United States traditionally characterized central cities as "ports of entry" for new immigrants. Yet, increasingly, immigrants to American metropolitan areas settle in towns and communities that may be many miles from the most proximate central city. This is certainly true of the Chicago metropolitan area’s Latino population, whose numerical majority now resides, not in the city of Chicago, but in adjoining Cook County and the six “collar counties” beyond Cook, a demographic shift with major implications for regional policymaking.

After a brief historical overview, this white paper addresses an emergent regionalist philosophy and associated policy recommendations that have been advanced by leading Chicago-area civic organizations in recent years. The paper goes on to examine demographic, economic, and political indicators that provide a context for interpreting the contemporary situation of the Latino population in the Chicago metropolitan area. As the Latino presence in the area continues to grow, forward-thinking civic leaders have begun to reconceptualize how metropolitan growth in general can be both promoted and more effectively directed. Chicago’s contemporary regionalists typically propose policy innovations involving multiple governments or public sector-private sector collaboration. These initiatives seek to improve the overall economic competitiveness of the Chicago region while reducing local disparities in the quality of public services, enhancing the convenience and sustainability of development patterns, and providing better occupational and residential opportunities for all Chicagoans.

Advocates of “neo-regionalism” recognize that Chicago’s Latino population, while currently disadvantaged in some significant respects, represents great economic and civic potential, which must not be squandered if the region as a whole is to prosper.

The paper concludes by proposing future lines of inquiry that will assist policymakers by monitoring Latinos’ progress in the region.
CHICAGO REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL TRENDS

The Chicago metropolitan area—or, as it is often called by television and radio announcers, merchants, and trade associations, Chicagoland—is generally acknowledged as the United States’ third most populous urban region, following New York and Los Angeles, though in all three cases definitions of just what constitutes the region vary quite substantially. The Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (CMAP), mandated by the Illinois General Assembly in 2005 through the merger of two predecessor planning agencies, the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission and the Chicago Area Transportation Study, defines the Chicago metropolitan region as encompassing the seven Illinois counties of Cook, DuPage, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, and Will (CMAP 2007). By far the most populous of these is Cook, with over 5.2 million residents, more than half of whom live in the city of Chicago. In 2007 the population of all seven counties was slightly more than 8.5 million; their area in square miles totaled 4,071.

The federal government’s Office of Management and Budget recognizes a larger Chicago region, a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) that adds the two northwestern Indiana counties of Lake and Porter, Wisconsin’s southeasternmost county, Kenosha, and three more Illinois counties, Kankakee, Grundy, and DeKalb (on the southern and western margins of the region), to the metropolitan area. The current population estimate for this greater Chicagoland approaches 9.6 million. The following pair of distances communicate a sense of the scale of the CMSA: from Kenosha, Wisconsin, on the north, to Gary, Indiana, on the south, 73 miles; and from Chicago to the municipality of DeKalb, Illinois, at the western edge of the CMSA, still adjoined by expansive corn fields, 57 miles.

Until 1950 the metropolitan population total was dominated by the city of Chicago. However, it is important to bear in mind that even in the era before mass suburbanization, the greater Chicago region was dotted with outlying cities such as Gary, Indiana, and Joliet, Elgin, and Waukegan, Illinois, each sporting substantial industries or functioning as a subregional railway hub (Lindstrom 1998). The Chicago region that emerged by the beginning of the twentieth century had as its commercial hub downtown Chicago, but already major industrial facilities had migrated to the city’s far South Side and near western suburbs. To the southeast, across the Illinois/Indiana border, US Steel built a huge steel-
manufacturing complex in Gary. The “exterior highway” map that is presented in The Plan of Chicago (Burnham and Bennett 1993 [1909], 40ff.) also encompasses the lakeside resort communities at the southern end of Lake Michigan. To the north of the city a band of affluent residential suburbs was emerging. Indeed, car enthusiast and Plan of Chicago author Daniel Burnham, traveling from his home in Evanston, was one of the first automobile commuters to the Loop.

This greater Chicago flourished in the latter decades of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth century as the US population moved westward. The metropolitan region’s continental centrality made it a key transshipment point for finished goods manufactured from the raw materials of the mid-continent and the West, then carried by rail cars bound for markets and consumers in the metropolitan regions to the east (Cronon 1991). Following World War II conditions shifted decisively. As population surged on the West Coast and in the “Sunbelt,” many manufacturers decentralized their operations from the older metropolises of the East Coast and Upper Midwest. And with the passage of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 truckers began to cut into the national rail network’s previous monopoly of long distance-commercial hauling.

Beginning in the 1950s, the city of Chicago—like other eastern and mid-western central cities—experienced two major centrifugal forces: first, the movement of residents and businesses to adjoining suburban communities, and second, the broader re-sorting of economic functions as regional population movement and, ultimately, global economic forces relocated factories and corporate headquarters, giving rise to new urban centers both within and beyond the boundaries of the United States. In the 1950s and 1960s Chicago’s central city leadership used federal funding for interstate highway construction and urban renewal as the principal weapons in a largely futile campaign to stem the more evident of these de-centering forces, suburbanization (Bennett 1989; Rast 1999, 22–46).

It was not until the 1980s that the broader dimensions of the central city’s and, indeed, the region’s economic challenges were more comprehensively assessed (Bennett 2006). Even as the suburban “collar” counties of DuPage, Kane, and Lake grew rapidly during the post-war period—seemingly at the expense of the city of Chicago, which lost more than 20 percent of its population between 1950 and 1990—the sectoral composition of the regional economy was changing. In particular, “large firms and long production lines,”
Chicagoland’s longstanding mainstay (Warner 1972, 92)—characteristically manufacturers, but also mail-order retailers such as Sears and Montgomery Ward and a wide array of processed-food producers—were employing fewer and fewer workers. Nor was population loss limited to the region’s core city. Suburban growth was itself an uneven process, as outlying industrial communities such as Gary, Joliet, Elgin, and Waukegan experienced a slowing of population growth or even population loss during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Gary’s loss of residents has been especially dramatic: from 178,000 residents, which ranked it as Indiana’s second most populous city in 1960, US Steel’s “company town” dropped to 102,000 residents in 2000. Nevertheless, the diversity of the older regional economy—unlike industrial Detroit, industrial Chicago was never a single-industry metropolis—and rising sectors such as tourism/convention and trade-show hosting, business services (legal counsel, accounting, advertising), and intermodal freight handling have allowed Chicago and its region to make a marked if uneven shift to a postindustrial metropolitan economy. In the words of retired University of Illinois-Chicago economist John F. McDonald (2008, 279), Chicago represented “an unambiguous case of urban rebirth in the 1990s.” Elsewhere in his recently published and very detailed examination of social and economic indicators in 31 US metropolitan areas McDonald comments: “The employment data show that both New York and Chicago [have] made economic transitions involving growth in finance, insurance, and real estate that are consistent with the global cities idea” (2008, 265).

**Contemporary Chicago Regionalism**

The notion that American cities were growing on a scale that required a regional approach to planning—one that would “result in a symbiotic rather than a parasitic relationship between city and country, and a satisfactory regional distribution of population, resources, and institutions” (Lubove 1963, 90)—emerged in the early twentieth century. A pioneering and highly controversial effort to plan at the metropolitan level was the Russell Sage Foundation–financed Regional Plan of New York, an eight-volume series of reports that was produced between 1922 and 1929 (Lubove 1963, 115–22; Fishman 1992). In the two decades following World War II, progressive-minded governmental and civic leaders in many US metropolitan areas pressed for “regional government” schemes in order to plan
more rationally, increase government efficiencies, and balance local tax bases (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000). In this early postwar period regional government typically involved merging a central city municipal government with the surrounding county government. Two substantial problems impeded the achievement of regional government via “city-county consolidation”: 1) when given the opportunity to vote on such proposals, metropolitan electorates usually rejected them; and 2) even if city-county consolidation was actually approved, it was often overtaken by ongoing metropolitan expansion, yielding a more geographically expansive central municipality that was still surrounded by populous counties and municipalities and frequently complicated by special-purpose governments such as school districts (Stephens and Wikstrom 2000, 68–87).

While discussions of regionalism in the sense of the “symbiotic relationship between city and country” have a long history in Chicago, proposals for regional government have never gotten very far: in part due to the recognition that the multi-county Chicago region defies even the weak logic of city-county consolidation and, possibly of greater import, because suburbanites and their local governmental representatives have long been wary of the Democratic Party-dominated city of Chicago (Weir 2000, 144–46). Nevertheless, as the Chicago region’s business and civic leadership engaged with the economic shifts besetting the city and region from the mid-1960s onward, an updated version of regionalism began to circulate and take hold in Chicago civic discourse.

During the 1990s what is sometimes termed “neo-regionalism” emerged as a hot topic among urban policy elites. As articulated by early advocates such as former Albuquerque mayor David Rusk (1999) and Minnesota state legislator Myron Orfield (2002), regional cooperation, rather than metropolitan government, was the way to link the fates of central cities and their suburbs and to identify pragmatic solutions to metropolitan-scale problems such as local tax base and public service disparities, spiraling commuting times, and environmental degradation. The neo-regionalist program has been codified in a book by Peter Dreier, John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom, entitled *Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century* (2001). Orfield’s pragmatic version of neo-regionalism—calling for political alliances between “low tax base” central cities and inner-ring suburbs—has particular salience for Latinos and other racial/ethnic minorities. In effect, Orfield’s vision of metropolitan cooperation presupposes that a principal objective of such alliances is to reduce
public service and quality of life disparities resulting from race- and class-segregative patterns of residential development and local government formation.

Neo-regionalism’s emergence in Chicago can be dated to 1996, when a venerable civic organization, the Commercial Club, lent its support to a planning exercise headed by former General Motors executive Elmer Johnson. Over the next several years Johnson worked with a group of subcommittees to produce a stream of preliminary documents, culminating in the publication of Chicago Metropolis 2020: The Chicago Plan for the Twenty-first Century (Johnson 2001), a beautifully illustrated and willfully metropolitan portrait of Chicago. In addition to sponsoring Johnson et al.’s Chicago Metropolis 2020 planning work, the Commercial Club’s leaders also founded an eponymous organization, Chicago Metropolis 2020 (CM 2020), to promote local regionalist thinking and policy action.

Since its founding in 1999, CM 2020 has sponsored planning workshops aimed at enhancing public understanding of regional issues, released a series of reports on topics ranging from regional planning and land use to modernization of the Chicago area’s commercial freight-handling infrastructure, issued scores of press releases, and lobbied extensively for regionalist legislation before the Illinois General Assembly. The core aim of CM 2020 is summed up by Johnson in the 2001 book: to solidify the Chicago region’s position as “one of the ten or fifteen great metropolitan centers of the world economic order that is emerging” (Johnson 2001, 72). In practical terms, among its many initiatives CM 2020 has sponsored local planning exercises in Aurora, Libertyville, and Oak Forest, Illinois, intended to guide affordable housing development over the coming two decades—with senior citizens and Latinos identified as key target populations (CM 2020 and the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus 2005, 2007); promoted the commitment of $1.5 billion dollars in support of the CREATE program of rail infrastructure improvements (CM 2020 2004); and supported the 2005 state legislation authorizing the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning.

CM 2020 frequently collaborates with the Metropolitan Planning Council (MPC), an older civic organization that in the early post-World War II era focused on central city housing and neighborhood redevelopment issues. (In those years it was known as the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council.) Over the course of the last two decades MPC has increasingly turned its attention to questions of regional development. For example, in
1998 MPC spun off a sister organization, the Campaign for Sensible Growth (which was disbanded in 2007), whose aims were succinctly communicated via the “guiding principles” presented in its 2004 publication “Sensible Tools for Healthy Communities”: “1) mix land uses, 2) strengthen and direct development toward existing communities, 3) create a range of housing opportunities and choices, 4) create walkable neighborhoods, 5) foster distinctive, attractive places with a strong sense of place, 6) take advantage of compact building design, 7) preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas, 8) provide a variety of transportation choices, 9) make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective, and 10) encourage community and stakeholder collaboration” (Porter 2004, v). Like CM 2020, MPC and its affiliate Campaign for Sensible Growth have frequently worked with individual Chicago-area municipalities (and city of Chicago neighborhoods) to promote inclusive housing plans, neighborhood commercial redevelopment, and the like. CM 2020 and MPC also share leadership; MPC’s current vice-chairs, King Harris and George A. Ranney Jr., have been prominent participants in CM 2020 activities.

A more surprising and somewhat eccentric advocate of Chicago regionalism is the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA). CCGA, like MPC, is a civic organization that has undergone an institutional rebranding (having dropped its longstanding designation, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, in 2006). In just the last year via its Global Chicago unit, CCGA launched the Global Midwest Initiative, a project aiming to “stimulate regional discussion among policymakers, business and civic leaders, and experts ... and put forward recommendations for how to best position the Midwest region in the era of globalization” (Global Chicago 2009). The eccentricity of CCGA’s regional vision rests in its scope: a multi-state region with Chicago as its business and cultural capital. CCGA has devoted particular attention to the regional role of Mexican Americans, in both the conventional and the more expansive senses of the region. In 2006 CCGA released a Task Force report entitled “A Shared Future: The Economic Engagement of Greater Chicago and Its Mexican Community” (CCGA 2006) that advocates a lengthy menu of initiatives to increase Mexican American economic mobility, educational attainment, civic engagement, and access to improved health and social services. The Heartland Papers series, another CCGA project, more recently issued Rob Paral’s “Mexican Immigration in the Midwest” (Paral 2009), an assessment of the demographic impact of Mexican settlement in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Each of these CCGA-sponsored reports speaks to an emergent line of thinking shared by many local business, governmental, and civic leaders: that Latinos have become a crucial component of the Chicago “community” and that the overall well-being of the Chicago region will depend, to a considerable degree, on the future prosperity and ongoing integration of Latinos within metropolitan Chicago’s corporate, political, and nonprofit sectors.

This overview of the ongoing work of Chicago Metropolis 2020, the Metropolitan Planning Council, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in no way captures the breadth of the contemporary Chicago regional advocacy. We have not, for instance, touched on public sector groups such as the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus (MMC), an alliance of elected municipal leaders that has also promoted cooperative approaches to planning, fiscal, and other public policy issues whose impacts cross local jurisdictional lines. MMC has partnered with both CM 2020 and MPC on collaborative initiatives.

The purpose of this overview has been to sketch out the main components of contemporary Chicago regionalism. The prevailing line of thinking emphasizes cooperation—between private sector and public sector actors—as opposed to “regional government.” While the city of Chicago is seen as the anchor of a larger region, the assumption is that much of the governmental impetus for metropolitan reform will derive from State of Illinois initiatives. This recognizes both constitutional and political realities: it is within the Illinois General Assembly that all the relevant parties—municipal leaders from the City of Chicago, central city-oriented business and civic leaders, and suburban politicians—can assert their particular interests. Ultimately, contemporary Chicago regionalists propose that these various groups and their constituencies share an overarching collective interest in a globally competitive metropolitan region characterized by social harmony, universal access to good jobs and affordable housing, efficient government operations, and up-to-date infrastructure. And the situation of Chicago’s growing Latino population figures with increasing prominence in the thinking of these regional visionaries.

The emergence of progressive voices seeking regional solutions to Chicago’s most pressing problems is a welcome development. Nevertheless, there remain many barriers to both implementing plans and achieving the content of the contemporary Chicago regionalists’ vision. Among US metropolitan areas, Chicago contains a notably large number
of local jurisdictions. Although cross-jurisdictional cooperation is clearly on the upswing, with over 250 municipalities (just to note the most visible of the more than 1,000 jurisdictions dotting the metropolitan area), accomplishing broad goals via local cooperation is a difficult course of action. For instance, Illinois’ school funding regime permits tremendous per-pupil spending variations across local school districts, but very few are the political or civic leaders willing to advocate aggressive measures to equalize school district spending. Within the Chicago metropolitan area, the poorest school districts typically serve substantial Latino or African American student populations. Nor is the track record of the metropolitan area’s existing “regional” jurisdictions especially encouraging. To note the most grievous example, the Regional Transit Authority’s coordination of the Chicago Transit Authority, Metra, and Pace systems continues to be, at best, rudimentary (Hilkevitch 2009).

The gravity of a number of Chicago’s regional challenges is striking: extreme economic polarization, especially that dividing South and West Side city of Chicago neighborhoods and several southerly inner-ring suburbs from wealthy districts within the city and in the far north and western suburbs; aging transportation infrastructure, including both mass transit systems and railway facilities crucial in the movement of commercial goods through the Chicago region; and even the prospect of water shortages in the coming decades (Dziegielewski and Chowdhury 2008).

**Current Regional Trends**

Contemporary Chicago’s regionalist thinking emerged in the 1990s. Leaders of CM 2020 and MPC plugged into the emerging view of metropolitan development as articulated by pioneering advocates such as David Rusk and Myron Orfield, additionally basing their “shared interest” viewpoint on the locally favorable economic climate of that time. As noted in the Executive Summary to the *Chicago Metropolis 2020* plan:

> This is an exciting time to be making big plans. As global competition heightens every region’s need to deliver a high quality of life, the Chicago metropolis is building on a great legacy. Its parks, universities, art institutions, transportation systems and rich ethnic
and racial diversity give it a head start in any race for prosperity. Its economic base is broad and deep. (Johnson 1998, 3)

The Executive Summary elsewhere refers to Chicago’s “thriving” downtown, and “vibrant ‘edge cities.”’ The 1990s marked a period of resurgent growth in the Chicago region. Most notably, the city of Chicago gained residents for the first time since the 1940–50 census decade. Figure 1 below presents median household income trends for the Chicago metropolitan area, categorized by the four major racial/ethnic groupings (white, black, Latino, and Asian). The 1990s pattern is striking in one particular way: median household income increased for each group.

![Figure 1. Median Household Income, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1979 - 2008](image)

Although local regionalists’ generally optimistic rhetoric has persisted into the 2000s, in a variety of respects—and even before the housing and financial market collapses of 2008—the 2000s have been less kind to Chicagoans. An analysis of metropolitan employment trends released in mid-2008 by the US Conference of Mayors reports that the Chicago metropolitan economy actually lost jobs in the expansionary economic cycle running from
the first quarter of 2001 until the first quarter of 2008 (Global Insight 2008, Table 8). It should be noted that the US Conference of Mayors figures pertain to the Chicago CMSA—that is, the seven-county metropolitan area plus the six outlying Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois counties, which may bring the totals down. Nevertheless, Chicago’s situation as a metropolitan region whose work force continues to rely heavily on industrial employment represents a crucial vulnerability both in reference to cyclical and more fundamental economic trends.

Since 2000 the city of Chicago has lost population, and the areas within the region that have experienced substantial growth are Kendall and Grundy Counties on the southern and western fringes of the longstanding suburban growth belt. Indeed, the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission observed in a 2006 press release: “Population growth in DuPage County, one of the nation’s fastest-growing counties a quarter century ago, has flattened out… [it] has joined Cook County in having more migrants who move out than move in.” Recent growth on the southern and western fringe of the Chicago region may well reflect the same kind of highly leveraged residential investment that has brought ruin to greater Phoenix and south Florida, local economies in which “development came from…development itself” (Florida 2009, 54).

Persistent Racial and Economic Polarization, Central City and Suburban Spatial Reordering

Within the city of Chicago racial segregation and economic polarization are circumstances of long duration. The segregation index for Chicago was 92.1 in 1950, 92.6 in 1960, and 88.8 in 1970. Compared to 17 other cities in the northeast United States, Chicago’s segregation index ranked second, first, and third at these three census points. Among these 17 metropolitan areas Chicago was also notable for the small percentage of African Americans residing in its suburbs. For instance, in 1970 90 percent of Chicago-area African Americans lived in the central city; many of the city’s 77 community areas, including a large number that in 1950 had had virtually no racial minority residents, were principally occupied by African Americans (McDonald 2008, 108, 111-17). These areas were hit
especially hard by declining economic opportunity caused by manufacturing decline and high rates of unemployment.

In Chicago’s suburbs the situation was very different. Not only was population growth explosive, but jobs were plentiful. Retailers left the city, and many corporations positioned themselves closer to their labor force. Profitable operations in the service economy required a specialized work force possessing higher education, in particular, advanced training in technology, finance, management, and accounting. In his landmark depiction of the new suburbia, *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier* (1991), Joel Garreau documented this change by pointing to emerging suburban areas that combined office buildings, retail malls, and planned residential communities. Garreau’s definition of a suburban “edge city” specifies a minimum of 5 million square feet of leasable office space and 600,000 square feet of leasable retail space. Given these criteria, four Chicago suburban nodes qualify as edge cities. The Schaumburg edge city includes Hoffman Estates and the Woodfield Mall. The O’Hare Airport area showcases an extensive office space infrastructure in Rosemont and Des Plaines. The Illinois Research and Development corridor in the western suburbs houses corporate headquarters in Oak Brook, Lisle, Naperville, Aurora, and along the East-West Tollway. Finally, along the Lake Shore corridor to the north, adjoining the Edens Expressway and the Tri-State Tollway, one can find major insurance and health care research corporations between Northbrook and the Wisconsin border.

The postwar suburban economic boom only reinforced racial segmentation and, if anything, increased economic polarization. Between 1979 and 1999 white households in the Chicago metropolitan area experienced a larger gain in absolute household income than either African American or Latino households (Figure 1). African American households’ relative income gain slightly exceeded that of whites (13.5 percent versus 12.5 percent), and Latinos (9.9 percent) lagged behind both whites and African Americans. In terms of cyclical economic movements, the upswing trajectory tends to be greater for whites while the declines are more pronounced for blacks and Latinos. The economic recession earlier this decade impacted minorities in just such a fashion. Whites saw their median household income drop from $75,105 in 1999 to $72,236 in 2008 (in 2008 inflation-adjusted dollars), a 3.8 percent decrease. On the other hand, for Latinos during that same period median household income declined by 9.5 percent and for African Americans by 13.5 percent.
An examination of the median household income of municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area reveals that the ten highest ranked municipalities are overwhelmingly white (Lake Forest, Wilmette, Northbrook, Highland Park, Libertyville, etc.), while the ten poorest municipalities are predominantly black or Latino (Chicago Heights, Melrose Park, Harvey, Cicero, North Chicago, etc.). Figure 2 also reveals a distinct spatial pattern. South of the city of Chicago is a concentration of heavily African American communities including Calumet, Chicago Heights, and Harvey, which are at the bottom of median household income ranking. At the northeastern corner of the metropolitan areas are Waukegan and North Chicago, each with large Latino populations. Just south of Waukegan and North Chicago are five of the metropolitan region’s ten richest municipalities, lying adjacent to one another along the historically prosperous North Shore (Lake Forest, Wilmette, Highland Park, Northbrook, and Glenview). A second trio of largely white, high-income, and more recently built-up communities, Plainfield, Naperville, and Homer Glen, cluster in southern DuPage and northern Will counties.
Figure 2. Chicago Metropolitan Area Municipalities
Top and Bottom Median Household Income
2005 - 2007

Legend
Median Household Income
$37,932 - $47,652
$44,586 - $150,970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>1 Lake Forest</th>
<th>2 Wilmette</th>
<th>3 Northbrook</th>
<th>4 Highland Park</th>
<th>5 Libertyville</th>
<th>6 Plainfield</th>
<th>7 Lake Zurich</th>
<th>8 Glenview</th>
<th>9 Naperville</th>
<th>10 Homer Glen</th>
<th>111 Blue Island</th>
<th>112 Waukegan</th>
<th>113 Calumet</th>
<th>114 Chicago</th>
<th>115 Zion</th>
<th>116 North Chicago</th>
<th>117 Cicero</th>
<th>118 Harvey</th>
<th>119 Melrose Park</th>
<th>120 Chicago Heights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: ACS 2005-2007  Refers to the 120 Municipalities with over 20,000 population
Municipalities’ median household income rankings result from long-term social and economic trends. There is, likewise, a distinctly racial and geographic patterning to the impact of short-term economic shocks. Figure 3 identifies the Chicago-area municipalities experiencing the greatest number of home foreclosures in the first quarter of 2009. Heading this list is Aurora (545 foreclosures) which is 37.8 percent Latino, followed by Joliet (375 foreclosures) with a 25.5 percent Latino population and Elgin (319 foreclosures) whose population is 41.5 percent Latino. Fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-ranked Waukegan, Cicero, and Berwyn are 52.7 percent, 83.8 percent, and 52.7 percent Latino respectively, the three municipalities in the metropolitan area with the highest concentrations of Latino residents in 2007. These figures reflect not only concentrations of less-affluent Latino families but also the upsurge in Latino home-purchasing that occurred during the last decade (CMAP n.d., 12).
Figure 3.
A number of interrelated processes have produced the contemporary spatial patterning of the Chicago metropolitan region. For example, residential and commercial gentrification has redefined the city of Chicago’s near-Loop and adjoining neighborhoods. In the latter years of the 1990s and into the 2000s the pace of residential development accelerated, and the socioeconomic status of local residents moved in parallel fashion. This is particularly visible in the Loop, the Near West Side, and the Near South Side. Table 1 tracks recent residential investment in the Near West Side. An increasing number of loans have infused the neighborhood with expensive, newly constructed townhouses and condominiums. For example, in 2005 the average figure for a residential loan in the city of Chicago was $198,000; in the Near West Side the comparable figure was $236,000. Additionally, nearly two-thirds of the loans between 2000 and 2003 were received by residents with incomes over $82,000. The Near West Side’s new residents are prosperous and for the most part white.

Table 1.
Recent Residential Investment
Community Area 28—Near West Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Loans</th>
<th>% of Loans to Whites</th>
<th>Total Dollar Amount ($1,000) of Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>1,245 (68.8% of total)</td>
<td>$348,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>2,397 (69.6%)</td>
<td>$724,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>2,655 (75.9%)</td>
<td>$881,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5,346</td>
<td>3,660 (68.5%)</td>
<td>$1,224,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3,633</td>
<td>2,395 (65.9%)</td>
<td>$859,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,635</td>
<td>2,385 (65.6%)</td>
<td>$861,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>2,774 (62.8%)</td>
<td>$998,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,884</td>
<td>2,473 (63.8%)</td>
<td>$951,547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The gentrification of the central city has clear consequences for racial minority populations. These include residential displacement and, often, increased vulnerability to crime and reduced access to public and social services. Since the 1990s many African Americans—including several thousand public housing families—have moved from near-Loop areas such as the Near West and Near South Sides to areas farther south and west of Chicago’s downtown (Bennett, Smith, and Wright 2006). In the case of Latinos, within the city of Chicago the Near Northwest Side Puerto Rican enclave of Humboldt Park and the eastern edge of largely Mexican Pilsen have experienced gentrification pressures (Lutton 1999; “Gentrification in West Town” 2001). The past 20 years have also witnessed a dual process of suburbanization by former central-city residents and initial settlement in the suburbs by new immigrants. The demographic impacts of these processes have been extraordinary. From 1980 to 2007 DuPage County’s Latino population growth rate was 3,463 percent. During the same span of years Kane County’s Latino population increased by 421 percent, while in Kendall County the number of Latino residents grew by a factor of ten. Yet, just as in the city of Chicago, Latino household income in Chicago suburbs lags behind white income, in some cases by nearly half (Table 2).

Table 2.
2007 White and Latino Household Income in Selected Suburban Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percent Latino in 2007</th>
<th>Latino HH Income</th>
<th>White HH Income</th>
<th>Difference in Dollars between White and Latino HH Income</th>
<th>Latino HH Income as Percentage of White HH Income</th>
<th>Median HH Income in the Past 12 Months (in 2007 inflation-adjusted dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addison</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>51,521</td>
<td>67,647</td>
<td>16,126</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>62,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>47,116</td>
<td>73,803</td>
<td>26,687</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>59,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentersville</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>49,193</td>
<td>64,169</td>
<td>14,976</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>57,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Heights</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>30,078</td>
<td>47,973</td>
<td>17,895</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
<td>37,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elgin</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>45,892</td>
<td>61,885</td>
<td>15,993</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>53,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanover Park</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>47,328</td>
<td>68,420</td>
<td>21,092</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>62,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mundelein</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>44,914</td>
<td>87,066</td>
<td>42,152</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>80,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palatine</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>47,426</td>
<td>74,547</td>
<td>27,121</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>69,336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Institute for Latino Studies, University of Notre Dame.
In the last decade another source of reorganized land uses and rebranded community identities has been the concerted effort by many suburban municipalities to use “cultural redevelopment” to bring new life to their old downtown cores. Suburban communities have engaged in a wide-ranging menu of strategies aimed at redirecting and growing their local economies. Many are endeavoring to erase longstanding community identities—as railroad hubs or specialized manufacturing nodes—through the construction of new facilities emphasizing leisure activities and tourism. Museums, sports stadiums, theater districts, convention centers, urban beautification programs, and street festivals are some of the tools used to attract both visitors and permanent residents. The latter are typically drawn to medium-density residential developments adjoining commercial districts or within walking distance of Metra commuter stations.

Aurora, Joliet, Waukegan, and Elgin (Spirou 2006)—among other Chicago suburbs—have turned to these strategies and managed to substantially upgrade their historic commercial centers. Riverboat gambling, waterfront beautification, and downtown residential investment are among their signature development initiatives, which in turn have fueled the local growth of entertainment/hospitality-oriented employment. Latinos comprise a large portion of the workers in this sector, but such employment niches are low-paying and frequently seasonal. There is the prospect that suburban community downtown redevelopment might offer better economic opportunities for Latinos. But if this is to occur, new approaches to redevelopment that emphasize permanent, good-paying employment growth will need to be identified.

**LATINOS: A METROPOLITAN CHICAGO POPULATION**

Latinos currently constitute one-fifth of the seven-county Chicago metropolitan population. By far the largest share (nearly 80 percent) of the region’s Latino population is Mexican descended and if the Mexican- and Puerto Rican-descended population figures are combined, nearly nine in ten Chicago Latinos are included. No other nationality group amounts as much as 2 per cent of the overall Latino figure. Metropolitan Chicago Latinos are a notably young demographic group. Thirty-five percent of the Latino population are under the age of 18; the comparable figures for local whites and African Americans are 22 percent
and 30 percent, respectively. The vast majority, that is, approximately 90 percent, of Latinos under 18 were born in the United States, in contrast to fewer than 40 percent of those older than 18. Most Chicago-area Latinos, 69 percent, are US citizens. These and many additional demographic attributes of Chicago Latinos can be found in *The Latino Landscape* (Alejo 2008, 7–20) and *The State of Latino Chicago* (Ready and Brown-Gort 2005, 6–19). In the remainder of this section of our analysis, we discuss some of the most notable dimensions of the contemporary Latino experience as a Chicago metropolitan population.

**The Geography of Current Chicago Population Trends**

The Chicago metropolitan region experienced nearly 20 percent population growth from 1980 to 2007. While this figure is impressive, by disaggregating the metropolitan area into the following subcategories, 1) the city of Chicago, 2) the inner suburban ring defined by Cook County and its municipalities (excluding Chicago), and 3) the outer suburban ring of municipalities and unincorporated areas in Lake, McHenry, DuPage, Kane, Will, and Kendall Counties, a more complex picture of recent population change is revealed (see Figure 4). From 1980 to 2007 the city of Chicago actually experienced an 8.9 percent population loss. During that same time period the remainder of Cook County registered a population gain of 13.3 percent. The 1980–2007 population trend line was radically different for the six outer-ring suburban counties, which added 71 percent to their population and, as such, accounted for nearly all the population growth in metropolitan Chicago. Figure 4 also demonstrates how this quarter-century of population evolution fundamentally altered the demographic shape of the Chicago metropolitan region. In 1980 the city of Chicago was the most populous of these three geographic areas, followed by Cook County (excluding Chicago), and the outer-ring counties. By 2007 the outer-ring suburban counties ranked first in aggregate population, the city of Chicago ranked second, and inner-ring Cook County ranked third.
The upsurge of immigration since the 1990s has once more made Chicago an international metropolis, although its contemporary international flavor is dominated by Asians and Latinos, with an exceptionally steep numeric tilt toward Latinos. In fact, this numeric tilt is such that Latino immigrants outnumber the combined figure for the region’s next ten largest immigrant groups. The great majority of Chicago-area whites as well as six of the seven largest racial/ethnic categories live in the suburbs. African Americans are the only exception (see Table 3). Although within the city of Chicago there remain two very large Latino enclaves—adjoining Pilsen and Little Village—the majority of Latinos are also suburbanites. Yet this statistic is in its own way misleading. The Cook County suburbs of Cicero and Berwyn, moderately dense residential communities just west of the city of Chicago, are, in effect, extensions of Pilsen and Little Village. If they were reallocated from
the suburban to urban count of Latinos, the majority of metropolitan Chicago’s Latinos would not be suburban.

Table 3.
Central City and Suburban Chicago: Racial/Ethnic Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Suburban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latino White</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: American Community Survey, 2005-07.

Latinos are not randomly distributed throughout the nearly 300 municipalities of suburban Chicago, just as they are not equally distributed throughout Chicago’s neighborhoods. The local Latino population percentage ranges from a high in Cicero, 84 percent, to lows in communities like Wilmette, 1.1 percent, and Northbrook, 1.8 percent (see Figure 5). Of the seven largest suburban municipalities in metropolitan Chicago, four also lead the metropolitan area in concentration of Latinos: Aurora, 37.8 percent; Elgin, 41.5 percent; Waukegan, 52.7 percent, and Cicero, 83.8 percent. In turn, small numbers of Latinos are found in the still agricultural portions of western McHenry, Kane, and Kendall counties as well as the southern portions of Will County.
Figure 5.

The Twenty-Five Metropolitan Chicago Municipalities
With the Highest Proportion of Latinos
American Community Survey: 2006-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>LATINO</th>
<th>LATINO (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cicero</td>
<td>83,149</td>
<td>69,646</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Waukegan</td>
<td>85,072</td>
<td>44,810</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Berwyn</td>
<td>54,180</td>
<td>29,956</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Carpentersville</td>
<td>38,377</td>
<td>18,856</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Round Lake Beach</td>
<td>23,845</td>
<td>12,892</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Orland Park</td>
<td>109,034</td>
<td>41,381</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>175,413</td>
<td>66,678</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Addison</td>
<td>37,087</td>
<td>13,724</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Harbord Park</td>
<td>38,230</td>
<td>12,684</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Streamwood</td>
<td>41,258</td>
<td>12,788</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chicago Heights</td>
<td>31,681</td>
<td>9,606</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mundelein</td>
<td>31,189</td>
<td>9,582</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>North Chicago</td>
<td>28,559</td>
<td>8,355</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>2,740,234</td>
<td>769,028</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ziai</td>
<td>24,399</td>
<td>6,817</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Romeoville</td>
<td>36,388</td>
<td>10,514</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Joliet</td>
<td>136,057</td>
<td>31,271</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Wheaton</td>
<td>36,718</td>
<td>9,062</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Glendale Heights</td>
<td>33,588</td>
<td>8,094</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Bolingbrook</td>
<td>69,681</td>
<td>13,318</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Rolling Meadows</td>
<td>31,301</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Woodstock</td>
<td>22,642</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Palatine</td>
<td>68,172</td>
<td>11,018</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mount Prospect</td>
<td>55,315</td>
<td>5,890</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Des Plaines</td>
<td>59,518</td>
<td>8,523</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The presence of large numbers of Latinos in the more populous suburban municipalities is not surprising. These are the major growth communities in metropolitan Chicago, and where there is growth there are opportunities and jobs. For example, the three broad sectors in which the largest numbers of Latinos work are manufacturing, construction, and service. Population growth affects two of these directly: it brings construction as new housing is built; it likewise produces an increase in service jobs.

Figure 5 identifies the 25 suburban municipalities with the highest proportion of Latinos while also plotting the location of all 93 collar county municipalities with 20,000 or more residents (with estimates of their Latino proportions). Heavy concentrations of Latinos can be seen in the west-central suburbs as well as in the northern Cook County suburbs. There are five identifiable Latino growth poles in the Chicago metropolitan region (see Figure 6). The first can be found just west of the city of Chicago in Cook County, centered by Berwyn (Oak Park, Cicero, Burbank, Maywood, and Elmwood Park). The second growth pole, in northwestern Cook County, surrounds O’Hare International Airport and includes Palatine, Wheeling, Elk Grove Village, Des Plaines, Mount Prospect, and Schaumburg. The third is formed around Elgin and extends east into northwestern Cook County (Streamwood, Hoffman Estates, and Hanover Park) as well as into northeastern Kane and southeastern McHenry counties (Crystal Lake, Algonquin, and Carpentersville). It should be noted that this pair of growth centers forms a larger interconnected stretch of municipalities extending from Cook to Kane counties. A fourth concentration of Latino population growth can be found in southern DuPage, northern Will, and eastern Kendall counties, where major community hubs such as Aurora and Joliet are connected by Naperville, Bolingbrook, Romeoville, and Crest Hill. All of these municipalities experienced significant increases in their Latino population between 1990 and 2007. Finally in the central and northeastern part of Lake County another growth cluster can be observed. This one is comprised of Mundelein, Waukegan, North Chicago, Zion, and Gurnee.
Figure 6.

Chicago Metropolitan Area Municipalities
Latino Population Percentage Change
1990 - 2007

Legend

Latino Percentage Change
- 40.0% - 150.0% (N= 7)
- 150.1% - 200.0% (N= 11)
- 200.1% - 300.0% (N= 6)
- 300.1% + (N= 18)

Source: 1990 Census, 2007 ACS
The Socioeconomic Landscape of Latinos in Metropolitan Chicago

There is a significant urban/suburban economic gap that divides members of each of Chicago’s main racial or ethnic groups. Table 4 offers a comparison between urban and suburban median household income among various racial/ethnic populations. The “urban” category includes residents of the city of Chicago; the suburban category includes Cook County beyond the Chicago city limits and the six outlying collar counties.

Table 4.
Median Household Income: Urban vs. Suburban by Race/Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Suburban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latino White</td>
<td>$64,915</td>
<td>$75,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>$30,294</td>
<td>$46,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>$56,911</td>
<td>$84,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>$55,502</td>
<td>$72,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>$70,324</td>
<td>$103,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>$54,096</td>
<td>$54,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>$40,031</td>
<td>$57,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>$53,879</td>
<td>$72,857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chicago’s suburban Latinos do not correspond to the socioeconomic profile of traditional suburbanites, or even of other suburban immigrant groups. Nor do they precisely match the economic profile of their Latino co-ethnics living within the central city. White suburbanites are distinguished from urban dwellers by virtue of their generally greater education, white-collar occupations, and higher incomes. Suburban Latinos rank lower in each of these attributes when compared to urban white residents, let alone suburban whites. And, while they do not differ from their urban co-ethnics with respect to education and occupation, their median household income is markedly higher (by 43 percent).
Nevertheless, the incomes of suburban Latinos lag well behind the incomes of most other suburbanites.

While household income varies significantly by race and ethnicity in both the suburbs and the city, the one constant is that within each racial/ethnic category, suburbanites have higher household incomes than urbanites. Generally, this pattern can be viewed as reflecting the larger fund of human capital possessed by suburbanites versus urbanites, in particular, greater educational attainment and higher occupational status. This is much less the case for Latinos. The human capital possessed by urban and suburban Latinos is quite similar. In all likelihood, English language facility, the density of social and work networks, and the optimizing of their educational and occupational skill levels are principal contributors to the greater household incomes of Latino suburbanites.

Probably the most striking attribute of Latinos as members of the Chicago-area labor force is the number of hours per week that they work. As Table 5 demonstrates, Latinos, both US and foreign born, work more hours than their non-Latino, white counterparts. This is especially notable among foreign-born Latinos living in suburban communities. These households average a remarkable 81 hours per week. It is also undoubtedly the case—in light of the human capital equivalence between city of Chicago-residing versus suburb-residing Latinos—that the greater household incomes of suburban Latinos is also an outgrowth of their working significantly more hours per week. Also note in Table 6 the foreign-born versus US-born income gaps distinguishing both urban and suburban Latinos. Among city of Chicago-residing Latinos the foreign born manage to earn roughly equivalent incomes by working more hours. Among suburban Latinos, although the disparity between hours worked per week by the US born and foreign born is nearly the same as that between their city-dwelling co-ethnics, the US-born households are substantially more prosperous.
Table 5.
Average Number of Hours Worked in Household by Race/Ethnicity, Urban vs. Suburban, and US Born vs. Foreign Born

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latino White</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finally, even with the large number of hours worked by both urban and suburban Latinos, Latino household income falls below household income for most of the metropolitan area’s other major racial/ethnic groupings.

Table 6.
Median Household Income by Race/Ethnicity, Urban vs. Suburban, and US Born vs. Foreign Born

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latino White</td>
<td>$64,915</td>
<td>$45,012</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>$30,294</td>
<td>$29,644</td>
<td>$46,563</td>
<td>$55,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>$56,911</td>
<td>$35,123</td>
<td>$84,899</td>
<td>$89,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>$55,502</td>
<td>$62,751</td>
<td>$72,432</td>
<td>$88,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>$70,324</td>
<td>$68,161</td>
<td>$103,474</td>
<td>$88,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>$54,096</td>
<td>$35,619</td>
<td>$54,841</td>
<td>$72,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>$40,031</td>
<td>$39,464</td>
<td>$57,341</td>
<td>$49,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>$53,879</td>
<td>$41,410</td>
<td>$72,857</td>
<td>$59,505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Latinos and Occupations

Chicago Latinos tend to possess limited human capital resources relative to other local racial/ethnic groups, but there are significant variations depending on nativity and
gender. In effect, there are four distinct Latino labor forces. US-born Latino males, for example, although still underrepresented in professional, technical, executive, and higher level administrative jobs, increasingly find employment in skilled blue-collar and service jobs. Exceptionally large numbers of foreign-born Latino males, whether urban or suburban dwellers, work in food service, construction, unskilled manufacturing jobs, gardening/grounds-keeping, and truck delivery services. The largest numbers of foreign-born Latinas, whether urban or suburban, work in light industrial jobs, housekeeping or childcare, and food service jobs. The US-born Latinas’ occupational world is quite different. They engage in a host of white-collar occupations: as secretaries, receptionists, cashiers, retail sales clerks, and customer service reps (see Tables 7-A–D).

Table 7-A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburban</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooks, variously defined</td>
<td>Cooks, variously defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers</td>
<td>Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardeners and groundskeepers</td>
<td>Construction laborers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction laborers</td>
<td>Janitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators, n.e.c.</td>
<td>Machine operators, n.e.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitors</td>
<td>Laborers, outside construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood lathe, routing, and planing machine</td>
<td>Gardeners and groundskeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, outside construction</td>
<td>Carpenters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>Wood lathe, routing, and planing machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assemblers of electrical equipment</td>
<td>Assemblers of electrical equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 15,248                                        | 11,70                                      |
| 14,783                                        | 8,791                                      |
| 11,347                                        | 8,524                                      |
| 10,822                                        | 8,192                                      |
| 9,691                                         | 7,777                                      |
| 9,086                                         | 5,523                                      |
| 7,046                                         | 5,075                                      |
| 6,853                                         | 4,904                                      |
| 5,368                                         | 4,701                                      |
| 4,687                                         | 4,361                                      |
### Table 7-B.
**Top 10 US-Born Male Latino Occupations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburban</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers</td>
<td>Truck, delivery, and tractor drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>4,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, outside construction</td>
<td>Janitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,332</td>
<td>3,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock and inventory clerks</td>
<td>Laborers, outside construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>3,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors and proprietors of sales job</td>
<td>Stock and inventory clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,233</td>
<td>2,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers and administrators, n.e.c.</td>
<td>Retail sales clerks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>2,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashiers</td>
<td>Customer service reps, investigators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>2,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators, n.e.c.</td>
<td>Construction laborers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,855</td>
<td>2,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction laborers</td>
<td>Supervisors and proprietors of sales job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,705</td>
<td>2,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks, variously defined</td>
<td>Guards, watchmen, doorkeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>2,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>Cooks, variously defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>2,096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7-C.
**Top 10 Foreign-Born Female Latino Occupations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburban</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assemblers of electrical equipment</td>
<td>Packers, fillers, and wrappers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,921</td>
<td>5,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeepers, maids, butlers, stewards</td>
<td>Housekeepers, maids, butlers, stewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,650</td>
<td>5,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine operators, n.e.c.</td>
<td>Packers and packagers by hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,458</td>
<td>5,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packers and packagers by hand</td>
<td>Cashiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,262</td>
<td>4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janitors</td>
<td>Assemblers of electrical equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,721</td>
<td>4,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashiers</td>
<td>Machine operators, n.e.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,105</td>
<td>3,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks, variously defined</td>
<td>Cooks, variously defined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,734</td>
<td>3,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood lathe, routing, and planing machine</td>
<td>Janitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,444</td>
<td>3,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packers, fillers, and wrappers</td>
<td>Childcare workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,904</td>
<td>2,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graders and sorters in manufacturing</td>
<td>Misc. food prep workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>2,155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the early years of the past decade some new trends in Latino occupational patterns were becoming evident. For example, fewer Latino men worked in manufacturing and an increased number worked in construction. This sectoral “job migration,” of course, coincided with the real estate boom during those years. Among women, US-born Latinas increasingly worked in educational and health and social services occupations. This latter trend is likely to persist, irrespective of economic boom or bust.

**Latinos and Education**

Latinos’ access to high quality primary and secondary as well as advanced education presents a number of challenges for Chicago-area policymakers. In recent years the accelerating suburbanization of Latinos has recast the demographic make-up of many school districts. Twenty-one high school districts across the metropolitan region report Latino enrollment concentrations in excess of 50 percent. These districts cluster in Cook County, around Cicero and Berwyn, and in the vicinity of O’Hare International Airport. Substantial...
Latino student enrollments are also found in outlying population centers such as Aurora and Waukegan. The Harvard, Illinois, school district (CUSD 50) in northwest McHenry County serves the families of agricultural workers (see Figure 7).

Figure 7.
Among the major racial groupings in the Chicago metropolitan region, Latinos have the lowest rates of educational attainment (Figure 8). Only 7.6 percent of Chicago-area Latinos have earned a bachelor’s degree. In comparison to other groups, far fewer Latinos have taken some coursework beyond high school; 29.5 percent of Latinos report having completed some college classes, compared to half of the African-American population (51.3 percent), two-thirds of whites (66.6 percent), and over three-quarters of Asians (76.8 percent).

Figure 8.

![Educational Attainment for the Population 25 and over by Race/Ethnicity, Six County Chicago Metropolitan Area, 2005-2007](chart)

Chicago Latinos’ limited access to higher education is a reflection of gaps in their primary and secondary educational training. For example, 2008 Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) scores by school district across the seven-county metropolitan region reveal some serious academic disparities. Fourth grade math and reading scores in
many of the districts with large Latino student populations are well below the identified standard. Similarly, 2008 ISAT scores in math and reading for 8th grade Latino students are generally poor, placing many of them between 20 and 40 percent below state-wide standards. Despite the “classic” model of suburbanization, which, among other things, presumes that when families settle in outlying communities they can expect to access sound elementary and high schools, suburban Latino children have not so far flourished in suburban school districts. This may be, in part, a function of school funding shortfalls in some districts; in other instances suburban school districts may be lagging in the development of programs that “reach” many of their new student populations.

**Latinos and Health Insurance**

Figure 9 reports the number of individuals in the Chicago metropolitan area lacking health insurance, grouped by the four major racial/ethnic categories. Latinos are disproportionately represented among the uninsured. This statistical point is the expression of a complicated chain of economic and social causality. To a considerable degree, the large number of uninsured Latinos is attributable to a pair of factors: first, the many Chicago Latinos who are not US citizens, and second, the sectoral concentrations of Latino workers (noncitizens and citizens alike). As part-time or temporary employees, gardeners, restaurant workers, manual laborers in construction, and the like, many Latinos work for employers that do not provide health insurance. The resulting pattern of behaviors—notably, the deferral of medical treatment—means that many of these workers risk loss of wages or even their jobs due to unexplained or lengthy absences from work. In addition, members of their families will also take ill, and for the younger people, frequent school absences or generally subpar academic performance will inhibit their chances of attending college or securing better paying, more stable occupations than those of their parents. In effect, Latinos’ health insurance coverage gap is both a function of their often marginal work force status and, in addition, inhibits their mobility into better jobs, including those that will provide better health care benefits for them and their families.
Latinos in the Civic and Political Life of Chicago

The 2008 edition of *Latino Landscape* (Alejo 2008) identifies 205 Latino-led or mainly Latino-serving nonprofit organizations in the Chicago metropolitan area. These organizations pursue a multitude of agendas and serve diverse constituencies. They include the National Museum of Mexican Art, a Pilsen-based arts organization whose exhibitions and other programs reach audiences well beyond Chicago. Another prominent organization to be found in the *Latino Landscape* directory is the Illinois Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, whose member firms number 1,200. The Chamber’s estimate of the total number of Latino-owned businesses in Illinois is 4,500. Many community organizations, social service agencies, and arts groups serve particular Latino nationalities, principally Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. The *Latino Landscape*’s roster also includes century-old social service
organizations with roots in the settlement house movement such as Association House on Chicago’s Near Northwest Side. *Latino Landscape* estimates that, in addition to the 205 organizations represented in its directory, across the metropolitan area there are 250 hometown associations bringing together immigrants from particular Mexican communities (as well as additional hometown associations serving the other Latino nationalities).

In the next few pages, we profile three Chicago-area Latino-led nonprofit organizations. Our aim is to communicate some sense of the varied agendas and organizational models adopted by local Latino civic activists.

**Little Village Environmental Justice Organization**

The Little Village Environmental Justice Organization (LVEJO) dates back to 1994 when a group of parents, students, clergy, and neighborhood residents pressed the Chicago Public Schools to relocate a neighborhood elementary school whose site was subject to excessive air pollution. Aided by a $20,000 grant from the US Environmental Justice Organization, the Gary School Environmental Justice Project (GSEJP) was formed in 1995. The Gary School’s staff, students, and parents were subsequently trained to implement a lead prevention and reduction program. The Gary School was also the first Chicago public school to conduct a comprehensive survey of internal toxic risks. In 1997 the GSEJP rechristened itself LVEJO and has become a vigorous advocate for local environmental remediation, improved public transportation services, and community gardening (LVEJO 2009).

Among LVEJO’s current priorities is a campaign to persuade the Chicago Transit Authority to authorize a 31st Street bus route, which would significantly improve access to the Near Southwest and West Sides of Chicago (Mandou 2009). In addition to its direct advocacy, LVEJO also seeks to increase general community awareness among Pilsen and Little Village residents and, in turn, build their capacity for effective involvement in a variety of neighborhood-level and city-wide public policy discussions. LVEJO especially promotes activism among local young people. Its Youth Activists Organizing as Today’s Leaders (YAOTL) project, for example, has conducted a neighborhood mapping exercise to identify environmental and toxic hazards and highlight their threat to local public health.
LVEJO’s best known initiative is its Toxic Tours of local industrial sites. As described in a recent Chicago Tribune article (Douglas 2009): “Volunteers guide residents on a walking tour of chemical sites, manufacturing and plastics plants and brownfields to heighten awareness of environmental hazards and provide tools for keeping governmental officials accountable for monitoring and cleaning up dangerous emissions, deposits, and more.” Among the prominent sites visited by toxic tourists are two coal-burning power plants, the only two such facilities in the city of Chicago. Although LVEJO focuses on the many environmental threats posed by Pilsen/Little Village’s proximity to the Eisenhower Expressway/Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal industrial corridor, the organization’s vision transcends local problems. Toxic tours of the sort offered by LVEJO are available in several US cities, and LVEJO regularly partners with advocacy groups representing other Chicago neighborhoods. Thus, while LVEJO’s organizing is local, its analysis of the sources of environmental hazard connects the particular toxic threats to Pilsen and Little Village with the broader agenda of the environmental justice movement.

Family Focus Aurora

Family Focus, founded in 1976, is a social service organization aiming to support families by developing and delivering relevant social services and outreach activities. The agency operates seven service centers in the Chicago metropolitan area. Three of these are in the city of Chicago and four are in the outlying communities of Aurora, Cicero, Highland Park, and Evanston. The Evanston Family Focus was the first of the suburban units to open, in 1979. Employing a community-based strategy, Family Focus centers emphasize family well-being. While primary responsibility for the welfare of children is presumed to rest with the family, society also must provide support through relevant and effective services. Family Focus employs comprehensive outreach that extends not only to parents but also to grandparents. Family Focus embraces the cultural, racial, and linguistic identity of its members even as it offers programs to enable them to function effectively within a culturally diverse society. There are 13,000 individuals actively enrolled in the support services offered by Family Focus, and Family Focus centers receive approximately 16,000 emergency referrals annually. More than 70 percent of the Family Focus service population live in households
whose annual earnings fall below the federal government-defined poverty line, and 60 percent are under 18 years of age. In terms of race/ethnicity, 41 percent are African Americans, and 55 percent are Latinos (Family Focus 2009).

Family Focus Aurora opened in 1983. Evan Harris, head of the Pittway Corporation, founded the agency as a social support mechanism for his workers and their families. In subsequent years, as the demography of Aurora shifted with the arrival of several thousand Latino families, Family Focus Aurora adjusted to serve those residents. According to Gonzalo Arroyo (2009), who has been with the organization for thirteen years and currently serves as Family Focus Aurora’s executive director:

There have been many changes. In 1980, for example, ten percent of the students in School District 131 were Latino. Now, that same school district is 90 percent Latino. As a result, 85 percent of our current staff is bilingual. Back then, more than 40 percent of our funding came from private sources. Today, that source of funding is only ten percent. The rest comes from federal, state, and foundation contributions. The current State of Illinois financial troubles resulted in the loss of four staff members. Four of them continue to work with us as volunteers, and that says a lot about the organization. Currently, we have 30 professional staff and more than 200 volunteers. Now we have to do our own fundraising to support our work: sponsor 5K runs, banquets, car washes.

Family Focus Aurora serves more than 3,500 local residents. Arroyo emphasizes that the services are comprehensive and the population served by his agency is stable, with very few walk-ins. A number of general programs are offered, with child development and after-school activities at the core of the center’s outreach efforts. There are also more focused initiatives, such as Heart to Heart, which involves parenting education classes for young mothers and fathers. This 10-week program also encourages interaction between families in informal sessions held at various social settings. HomeFocus is funded by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and assists adoptive and legal guardianship families (Family Focus Aurora 2009).
Because of the large immigrant population in Aurora, Family Focus also operates Outreach Interpretation, which informs recent immigrants about the availability of public benefits. In addition, the staff help these newcomers with application processes and often initiate referrals. The New Americans Initiative is one of the most popular programs at Family Focus Aurora. Funded by the State of Illinois and in partnership with the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, this project supports immigrants in their efforts to win US citizenship. In Arroyo’s (2009) view:

This is a great program and we are very engaged in this area. It allows participants to become citizens and fully engage in civic affairs. They can understand their rights and responsibilities and protect their families. Some legislators didn’t like it because it was viewed as a voter registration effort. Now they are accepting it more.

In conjunction with the New Americans Initiative, Family Focus Aurora is expanding its community outreach. By cultivating collaborative arrangements with nonprofit organizations in adjoining communities, Family Focus Aurora is moving beyond its home community to serve Elgin, Joliet, and West Chicago, all of which possess sizable Latino populations. Family Focus Aurora began as a fairly standard nonprofit social service agency. As the demography of its service area changed, Family Focus shifted its programming accordingly, and in the future its work on citizenship assistance and civic education—by expanding the political participation of the area’s rapidly growing Latino population—is likely to have a significant impact on the political landscape of Chicago’s western suburbs.

United Neighborhood Organization

The United Neighborhood Organization (UNO) emerged in the early 1980s. In those first years community organizer Mary Gonzalez was the group’s leading figure. UNO’s constituents were mainly working-class and poor Mexican Americans; the group organized in four Chicago neighborhoods, the Southeast Side, Back-of-the-Yards, Pilsen, and Little Village. UNO’s approach to community organizing drew on the experience of groups such as San Antonio, Texas, Communities Organized for Public Services (COPS), whose founder,
Ernesto Cortes, was a protégé of the renowned Saul Alinsky. In its early years UNO was consciously Alinskyite in its aggressive community advocacy:

Influential public officials are regularly invited to UNO’s neighborhood meetings to hear the community messages and demands on specific issues... Anywhere from 300 to 3,500 people attend these meetings, applauding loudly when public officials concede to their demands or booing wildly when they do not. If the meetings fail to win issues, UNO members intensify the confrontation tactics—demonstrating and picketing at the offices and homes of public officials and holding sit-ins, call-ins, etc.—to press their case. (Cruz 1990, 15)

In the late 1980s UNO’s leadership fractured. Mary Gonzalez and her husband Gregory Galluzzo, who was also a community organizer, cut their ties with the organization, and Executive Director Danny Solis emerged as the group’s dominant figure. In the words of UNO’s current chief executive officer, Juan Rangel, his group “is still challenging the status quo” (Sanchez 2006, 9), but since the 1990s UNO has devoted much of its organizational energy to service provision: for example, providing assistance to immigrants seeking naturalization; sponsoring cultural enrichment activities such as group trips to the Field Museum and Chicago Symphony Orchestra performances; and, more recently, as the manager of eight charter schools. Politically speaking, UNO has become a reliable ally of Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley. In 1996 Daley appointed Danny Solis to fill a vacated city council seat. As alderman representing the 25th ward—whose boundaries substantially overlap with Pilsen—Solis has been closely allied with pro-development real estate interests. He was also a principal in the founding of the Hispanic Democratic Organization (HDO), an electoral operation whose members have canvassed constituents and delivered voters to the polls in the city’s heavily Latino neighborhoods, invariably supporting Mayor Daley and his preferred candidates in contests for aldermanic and state legislative seats (Cruz 1993; Sanchez 2006).

UNO’s transformation from mobilizer and gadfly to service provider and power broker was dramatically illustrated by an early 2006 Chicago Tribune editorial section essay
authored by Juan Rangel. In the preceding two years the local press had uncovered a series of city government hiring and contracting improprieties, several of these involving HDO members. Rangel’s essay was entitled “On Power: In Defense of Patronage and HDO.” Within the span of its 12 paragraphs, Rangel linked HDO both to previous generations of “immigrants … arriving in Chicago from around the world as have-nots seeking a foothold in American opportunity” and the progressive politics of the late Mayor Harold Washington who “created alliances by awarding allies with patronage. US Representative Luis Gutierrez (D-Ill.) and former State Sen. Jesus Garcia were early beneficiaries of Washington’s political largesse through appointments to government posts.” There is a pointed irony in the second of these observations: over the years Gutierrez and Garcia have been frequent critics of HDO and UNO.

In spite of the close association between UNO and the now-defunct HDO, the former remains a very influential organization. In the summer of 2009 UNO won a $98 million grant from the State of Illinois to open eight new charter schools. Former UNO staff members and graduates of its Metropolitan Leadership Institute (MLI) hold a range of important local government posts (Mihalopoulos and Ahmed 2009). These individuals include Manny Flores, First Ward alderman (until his resignation in early 2010 and move to the administration of Illinois Governor Pat Quinn); Juan Ochoa, Chief Executive Officer of the Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority; and Richard Rodriguez, President of the Chicago Transit Authority. Another MLI graduate, attorney Homero Tristan, stepped down as Mayor Daley’s Commissioner of Human Resources in July 2009. UNO’s current prominence and organizational stance are aptly defined by the following summary of its fundamental aims (as posted at its website): “a combination of neighborhood base-building and pragmatic power politics” (UNO 2009).

Latinos and Public Office

The growing political weight of Latino voters, as well as the growing political influence exercised by office-holders such as Alderman Solis and Congressman Gutierrez, aptly speak to the expanding role of Latinos in Chicago’s civic and political life. Further evidence of Latinos’ increased prominence in the public life of the metropolitan area is
offered by Table 8 which reports on the growth of Latino public office-holders across Illinois. Even so, many Chicago-area Latinos cannot participate in the electoral process in any direct fashion: as of 2006 two-fifths of the region’s adult Latinos were ineligible to vote (Alejo 2008, 17–18).

Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of Congress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statewide Officials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Legislators</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Officials</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Local school councils are not included in this table.


Although Latinos have made great progress in public office-holding, for the most part they continue to be outsiders from the standpoint of the metropolitan area’s leading civic and philanthropic organizations. We examined the websites of several leading Chicago civic, cultural, and philanthropic organizations. Not surprisingly, the National Museum of Mexican Art’s Board of Trustees is dominated by Latinos, who comprise three-quarters of its 35 members. Among the remaining groups whose leadership ranks we reviewed, Chicago United’s 19% (three of sixteen board members) Latino leadership participation ratio was the greatest. Several major organizations have no Latino board members. Latino representation on even the large and recently constituted (approximately 300 members, mainly recruited in 2007 and 2008) Chicago 2016 Committee—the organization that sponsored the Chicago bid for the 2016 Summer Olympics—was less than ten percent.
MONITORING LATINO PROGRESS IN THE CHICAGO REGION

Summary

The situation of Latinos in contemporary Chicago is complicated to the point of defying easy summary. As the most rapidly increasing racial/ethnic group in the metropolitan area, Latinos anchor two large city enclaves, Pilsen and Little Village, as well as the adjoining Cook County municipalities of Cicero and Berwyn. In addition, three of the outlying metropolitan counties, DuPage, Kane, and Lake, have Latino populations exceeding 100,000. Many Chicago-area Latinos are small proprietors or work in construction, light manufacturing, hospitality services, or landscaping, but among US-born Latinas upward mobility into professional and managerial careers has become commonplace. The number of Latino officeholders across Illinois is growing rapidly, but for the most part, Chicago’s top civic organizations have not invited Latinos to join their leadership ranks. And yet, as we have reported, leading civic groups such as Chicago Metropolis 2020 and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs—as they have begun to articulate a new vision of Chicago as a globally competitive urban region—have devoted considerable energy to examining how Latinos will fit socially, economically, and politically into the Chicago of the future.

Lines of Inquiry for the Future

We conclude this report by sketching out two distinct lines of inquiry regarding the future circumstances of Latinos in Chicago.

Policy Implementation

The first of these lines of inquiry focuses on the processes and outcomes of policy implementation. Both governmental and civic actors in the Chicago region have begun to initiate planning strategies that aim to promote environmentally sustainable development that is also socially inclusive.
**Housing Distribution**

Among these initiatives is the Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeals Act (2003), a state law that seeks to distribute affordable housing more equitably across the region (BPPI n.d.). We have previously noted the voluntary collaboration among Chicago Metropolis 2020, the Metropolitan Mayors Conference, and the suburban municipalities of Aurora, Libertyville, and Oak Forest to plan for housing development that is accessible to workplaces, shopping, and public transportation and is within the economic reach of Latino families and senior citizens. These and other innovative approaches to community development should be carefully monitored with the aim of refining private development models and governmental strategies that can join affordable housing production to workplace accessibility and broader environmental sustainability.

**Inter-ethnic Relations**

Although it is our sense that interethnic tensions in the contemporary Chicago region are not especially aggravated and management of local interethnic conflict typically represents reactive rather than prescriptive public policy, in recent years there have been various incidents of Latino-directed racial/ethnic hostility (Probably the most notable case involved northwest suburban Carpentersville, whose village government passed an English-only ordinance in 2007; see Kotlowitz 2007). A useful prospective research exercise would involve monitoring such community conflicts in reference to their sources, the forms of public conflict that ensued, and their outcomes. Especially welcome would be research that could determine if there are practical, replicable techniques available to resolve such conflicts, and further, if such techniques can be used to build more truly inclusive communities over the long run.

**Monitoring Statistical Indicators of Latino Progress**

The second line of inquiry for future research involves identifying a set of statistical indicators that, over time, can be used to ascertain Latino social gains, broadly defined. We suggest using the following measures, which we have divided into three categories:
1) Socioeconomic metrics:

- for the seven-county metropolitan area: the percentage of the Latino workforce holding full-time employment
- for the seven-county metropolitan area: the percentage of Latinos enrolled in private health insurance plans
- in the ten metropolitan school districts with the highest percentage of Latino students: the high-school completion rate

2) Municipal-level residential integration/segregation:

- for the ten metropolitan-area municipalities with the largest (absolute number) Latino populations: computation of the segregation index for Latinos

3) Civic/political involvement

- for the seven-county metropolitan area: the percentage of Latinos registered to vote
- for the seven-county metropolitan area: the number of Latino public officeholders
- for a group of ten leading Chicago-area civic/philanthropic organizations: the percentages of Latino Board members

The above indicators, and if monitored collectively over time, will offer a wide-ranging view of the progress of Latinos in Chicago social, economic, and political life.
REFERENCES


Chapter 2: Education

Latinos and Education in the Chicago Metropolitan Area

Jose Soltero, DePaul University
Sonia Soltero, DePaul University
with
Elizabeth Robbins, DePaul University
INTRODUCTION

This white paper examines current literature related to the state of Latinos and education in the United States with a focus on the Chicago metropolitan area. The analysis is contextualized within local and national historical, demographic, political, legal, economic, theoretical, and pedagogical dimensions. The review considers current conditions and factors that influence the educational circumstances and academic outcomes of Latinos. The paper concludes by considering implications for policy change and action as well as recommendations for further research.

Despite significant advances over the past several decades in meeting the needs of Latino students, educational reforms have not succeeded in eradicating their chronic underachievement. This persistent underachievement has been compounded by the rapid growth of the Latino population due to increases in immigration and high Latino birth rates over the past twenty years. In 2007 Latinos represented 15.1 percent of the population, a 28.7 percent increase from 2000 (Current Population Survey 2007). One fifth of K–12 students are of Latino descent (20.5 percent) and one-third of the total Latino population is enrolled in schools (32.1 percent). This dramatic population growth has heightened the urgency of understanding the complex factors affecting the academic performance of Latino students as well as the need to reevaluate existing practices and policies that serve this student population.

The challenges for educators and policy-makers are complex and multilayered because the Latino population has a wide variety of demographic characteristics that includes differences in race and ethnicity, income levels, nativity and generation, language proficiencies, education background, occupation, religion, and political affiliation. Other factors that amplify the complexity of addressing the academic needs of Latinos are whether they are: migrants vs. permanent residents, US born vs. foreign born, of rural vs. urban origin, of rural vs. urban US residence, documented vs. undocumented.

The first section of this paper presents a synthesis of the most relevant theoretical perspectives on the education of Latinos in the United States, including sociocultural, constructivist, language acquisition, and education theories. In addition, theories that attempt to explain the academic underachievement of Latinos are discussed: theories of
deficit, resistance, social reproduction, cultural mismatch, among others. An analysis of each theory’s shortcomings in explaining Latino students’ academic outcomes is followed by a review of contextual-interaction theories that offer a more accurate explanation. A contextual-interactionist paradigm suggests that several factors interact to influence the academic success or failure of ethnically and linguistically diverse students. This model takes into account the effects of both school structural factors and elements outside the educational setting on the schools’ contexts and processes, such as school funding practices and educational policies. Theoretical foundations of language policy and second language acquisition are presented and contextualized within the history of bilingual education, legislation, and policy.

The empirical demographic section analyzes demographic data associated with the state of Latino education in the Chicago metropolitan area. A synthesis of US and Chicago metropolitan demographic data on Latinos’ national origin, age, residency status, geographic US and Chicago-area residency, language, educational attainment and background, income and poverty is presented. An analysis of Latinos and early childhood education, high school dropout rates, English language learners (ELLs), higher education, education workforce, and teacher preparation is followed by a discussion of the state of Latino education in metropolitan Chicago, with an emphasis on Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and suburban area districts. The effects of school funding formulas on Latino students in Illinois as well as Chicago metropolitan area segregation trends are analyzed.

The final section of the paper presents research-based recommendations for improving Latinos’ academic outcomes and reducing the chronic achievement gap that Latinos continue to experience in comparison to other groups in the United States. The paper concludes by proposing key future research questions and topics of study focusing on improving the education of ELLs, increasing Latino children’s participation in early childhood education, diminishing Latino high school dropout rates, and facilitating Latinos’ successful participation in and completion of higher education degrees.
Terminology

The US Census Bureau defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race,” thus including those having ancestry from Spain. Although those originating from the Dominican Republic are not mentioned in the US Census Bureau definition, they are considered Latinos. Because Latinos can be of any race, ancestry, or country of origin, how people choose to identify themselves varies widely according to where they are from. According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2009) “some 99% of all immigrants from Mexico call themselves Latino. But just 87% of immigrants from Venezuela adopt this label, as do 86% of immigrants from Argentina, 70% of immigrants from Spain, and only 67% from Panama. As for race, 54% of all Latinos in the US self-identify as white, 1.5% self-identify as black, 40% do not identify with any race and 3.8% identify as being two or more races.”

A survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in 2006 found that 48 percent of Latino adults describe themselves by their country of origin first, 26 percent use the terms “Latino” or “Hispanic” first, and 24 percent call themselves “American” first. A 2008 Pew Hispanic Center survey found that 36 percent of respondents prefer the term “Hispanic,” 21 percent prefer the term “Latino,” and the rest have no preference. Additionally, many who opt to use the term “Latino” also stress the difference in gender and often use the combined term “Latino/Latina” given that “Latino” is of masculine gender in the Spanish language. The term “Latino” tends to imply a community-based orientation that distances itself from Spanish colonial roots. Both “Hispanic” and “Latino” are used by the US Census Bureau. In this review, the term “Latino” is used to refer to those of Latin American Spanish-speaking ancestry.

There are several terms used to refer to PK-12 students who are not yet proficient in English. Since the enactment of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 the federal government has used the term Limited English Proficient (LEP). This term has come under scrutiny by the academic and educational community given the negative connotation of the label regarding the perceived “limitations” of students who are not yet proficient in English. The more commonly used term among educators and researchers is English Language Learner (ELL) and is the term used in this paper. Additionally, the term “bilingual students” was used in the past mainly by the bilingual teaching community to refer to ELLs. This term is no
longer used because technically “bilingual students” are those who are already proficient in two languages. The term “immigrant students” is sometimes used incorrectly to refer to all ELLs. More than a third of ELLs in PK to 5th grade and over half of ELLs in grades 6 to 12 are US born so they are not immigrants (Capps et al. 2005). The term “language minority” refers to those who come from homes where a language other than English is or was spoken. Language minorities range from those who are not yet proficient in English to those who are monolingual in English and no longer speak the heritage language.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Deficit Theories

For many years the predominant and accepted means of explaining the educational underperformance of certain minority groups, particularly Latinos and African Americans, has been in the context of deficit theories, based on notions of cultural deprivation and genetic inferiority (Hernstein and Murray 1994; Dunn 1987). According to Nieto and Bode (2008), “Deficit theories assume that some children, because of genetic, cultural or experiential differences, are inferior to other children—that is, that they have deficits that must be overcome if they are to learn” (15). Deficit ideologies perpetuate the notion that some minority students experience school failure due to “limited educability, poor motivation, and inadequate familial socialization for academic competence” (San Miguel and Valencia 1998, 368). Dunn (1987) claims that “the major source for overcoming the lack of school success of Latinos rests squarely with the people themselves, and more specifically, with the parents. In my view, none of my suggested strategies or any others, for that matter, will succeed unless there are dramatic changes in the child-rearing practices of Latino mothers and fathers” (80). This perspective implies the often-used “blame the victim” (Ryan 1976) approach while dismissing any consideration of how schools are structured to prevent students from learning.

According to Bartolomé (2002) the deficit model has the longest history of any model discussed in the education literature. She cites Valencia (1986) who traces its evolution over three centuries and defines the ideology as follows: “Also known in the literature as the
social pathology model or the cultural deprivation model, the deficit approach explains disproportionate academic problems among low status students largely being due to pathologies or deficits in their sociocultural background (e.g., cognitive and linguistic deficiencies, low self esteem, poor motivation)” (415).

Research studies reveal the kinds of critical thinking and inference-making that culturally and linguistically diverse students exercise and express given the opportunity and motivation. They also show how the same motivation that deficit theories claim are lacking in minority students need only be activated by a transformative and culturally responsive pedagogy that incorporates the topics that are most relevant to students’ lives. Freire (2000) argues that students will only acquire real ownership of their learning when they are invited to ask their own questions on subjects that are important to them. Linguistically and culturally diverse students who come from low educational and income backgrounds and who speak English as a second language have been systematically identified, categorized, and labeled as “at risk.” The label offers an expedient rationale to explain away the difficulties Latinos experience in school. However, Flores, Cousin, and Diaz (1991) argue that this term is seldom viewed from the social, political, and economic context in which it was created. They add that when the inequities of class, race, and ethnicity are not considered, deficit theories and terms such as “at risk” become misleading “ideological diversions” (370). The educational outcomes of culturally and linguistically diverse students are meaningful and successful only when the assumptions behind deficit ideologies are challenged and replaced by culturally responsive pedagogical perspectives and sound education policies.

**Resistance Theories**

The resistance paradigm contends that minorities and other marginalized groups actively or passively resist and reject the implicit and explicit messages disseminated in schools that undermine their ethnic identities (Erickson 1987). Resistance by minority students to the types of marginalizing and subjugating education practices is also an attempt to protect their ethnic identities and to cope with their subordinated social position. According to Abowitz (2000) “resistance theorists have tried to explain why the opposition of some groups against others is politically and morally necessary in social institutions
where mainstream ideologies dominate to discipline participants and social norms” (878). She argues that resistance by minority students as a counteraction to the status quo in education encompasses more than opposition to authority. The act of resistance weakens “the reproduction of oppressive social structures and social relations” (Walker 1985, 65; as cited in Abowitz 2000) and advances “progressive transformation of the environment.”

A growing number of detractors of resistance theories believe that the use of these theories to explain the underachievement of certain marginalized groups is dangerously close to deficit ideologies. Students’ resistance responses may be interpreted as an inherent desire by minority students not only to fail but also to justify their failure. “Either students don’t work hard enough to resist their own oppression, or they work too hard to resist the teacher’s efforts to liberate or change them” (Abowitz 2000, 878). According to Nieto and Bode (2008), resistance theory sheds light on students’ “agency in refusing to participate in the status quo” that can result in academic success or failure in a variety of ways. Nieto and Bode speak to the “ethic of care” proposing that teachers can make a significant difference in their students’ achievement that translates into high, but achievable expectations and a genuine concern for the well being of the student. Nieto and Bode point to the need to consider the “personal, cultural, familial, interactive, political, relational and societal issues” when attempting to understand student academic achievement.

Based on findings from her study on schooling orientation and academic achievement among Mexican youth, Valenzuela (1999) concludes that high school students oppose school practices that disrespect them, not education itself. She adds that schools are organized “formally and informally in ways that fracture students’ cultural and ethnic identities, creating social, linguistic, and cultural divisions among the students and between the students and the staff” (5). As a result of these divisions, she argues, relationships between students and educators are “often fragile, incomplete, or nonexistent.”

**Social Reproduction Theories**

During the early 1970s there was a resurgence of theories based on the notion that schools replicate the economic and social relations of society and therefore serve the interests of the dominant classes (Bourdieu 1973; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). The role of the
education system, according to this theory, was to keep the underclass in its place by teaching its members proper attitudes and basic skills for becoming good workers, and to keep the dominant classes in power by teaching them skills of management and control that would maintain the status quo (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Willis 1981).

The different functions of schools serving the subordinate and the dominant classes are manifested in areas from their physical structures to their curriculum and instruction. The schools of the poor are reminiscent of factory-like institutions with many controlling factors, a dominant-dominated relationship between students and teachers, and a curriculum based on rote learning and memorization of facts. In contrast, the schools of the wealthy are less structured and restricted environments where students have more autonomy and creative range, the teacher-student relationships are based on mutual respect, and the curriculum is guided by problem-solving and higher-order thinking levels of engagement (Lipman 2003).

Nieto and Bode (2008) point out that although social reproduction theorists present a compelling argument, the explanation of school failure and success becomes mechanistic and simplistic in view of these theories. That is, the analysis presented by this perspective “assumes that schooling is always imposed from above and accepted from below” (196). In recent years researchers have modified social control theories to more accurately reflect subordinate groups’ conflicts and struggles that have resulted in reforms and policy changes. Cummins (1984; 2001b) proposes a theoretical framework that accommodates “empowerment” or “disabling” factors in the interactions between students and educators. Cummins, Baker, and Hornberger (2001) contend that the disproportionate academic failure of subordinate groups is a direct outcome of “educational structures that exert increased hierarchical control over the interactions between educators and students” (274) and further argue, “The content of instruction is prepackaged, the options for gaining access to and interpreting information is predetermined, and the possibilities for critical thinking and transformative action are stifled. In addition, educational success and upward mobility for members of subordinated groups is extended only to those who bring their identity into conformity with the dominant group prescriptions” (274).
Cultural Mismatch Theories

Educational underachievement among Latino students has also been explained as a result of cultural incompatibilities. That is, the school culture and home culture are in discord because each holds different values, objectives, and customs, thus, leading to a “cultural clash” resulting in school failure. These theories stress the differing and opposing micro-level cultural features such as interpersonal norms, social values, and communication styles among other elements that impact minority groups’ academic achievement. According to Delgado-Gaitan and Trueba (1991) “antagonistic conditions determined by social institutions such as schools, force minority children to abandon their native values and adopt mainstream norms . . . creating cultural alienation” (26). The notion that those who come from culturally diverse backgrounds must become assimilated in order to function in society places formidable demands on immigrant groups to make major adjustments when they enter school.

However, Nieto and Bode (2008) caution that the fact that some students enter school without competence in English or come from a different culture is not, in itself, an adequate explanation for school failure. They illustrate this point by presenting Gibson’s (1987) ethnographic research that documents Punjabi students’ academic success in spite of what may be considered serious limitations: most of the students come from non-English speaking homes, working class backgrounds, and illiterate families; many had to become English proficient without bilingual education or English as a second language (ESL) instruction; and they have experienced discrimination by peers and teachers. In view of the cultural mismatch theories, the Punjabi students’ cultural and socio-economic backgrounds predispose them to school failure, yet they succeed academically.

Macrostructural Theories

The discrepancies in educational outcomes of different ethnic groups are explained by Ogbu (1987) in terms of a socio-historical perspective. Ogbu classifies ethnic groups in three ways: 1) autonomous, 2) immigrant or voluntary, 3) and castelike or involuntary. He differentiates between the experiences of castelike or involuntary minorities and those of immigrant minorities. Those who immigrate voluntarily, or under refugee conditions,
perceive their situation in a new country as a vehicle for a better life. Thus, immigrant minorities are more willing to adopt and conform to the dominant group to partake of the educational and employment opportunities of the host country. Conversely, castelike minorities (those who have been conquered or enslaved), such as African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans, have endured a history of subjugation, exploitation, and deceit under the dominant group. Ogbu suggests that this history of oppression has been internalized by castelike minority groups, resulting in extreme skepticism about educational achievement as a means toward economic and social upward mobility. This often results in resistance to acquiring the values or objectives of the group in power that correlates to the aforementioned resistance theories.

Ogbu’s cultural-ecological theories that attempt to explain why certain groups underachieve academically have come under scrutiny as incomplete because they divert attention from structural societal factors that cause underachievement among minority students. His conceptualization of the reasons for group academic underachievement also adds to the rhetoric of harmful stereotypes about the traits of specific groups as predetermined. Ogbu’s secondary cultural discontinuity theories point to students’ homes, their families, their economic status, and/or their ethnic group as the origins of their underachievement and consequently removes any responsibility from policy-makers, school systems, government, and other societal structures. It is important to note that race, ethnicity, social class, and language do not cause school failure. Rather, as Nieto and Bode (2008) point out, when students’ culture, language, and class are perceived by the schools as “inadequate and negative,” the school failure of this population is more accurately explained. Similarly, Delgado-Gaitan and Trueba (1991) argue that the conflict between the largely white or mainstream teachers/principals and the culturally diverse body of students and parents results in problems in communication, misinterpretation and clash of cultural values, and the eventual academic underachievement of students. The nature of this “inter-ethnic” conflict is grounded in cultural differences and is often analyzed in terms of deficit approaches in explaining Latino student population achievement. Such analyses are guided by assumptions that ethnic minority students, in particular those from impoverished backgrounds, have serious handicaps and limitations that make it almost impossible for the education system to teach them successfully.
Context-free explanations for minority groups’ school failure, such as genetic inferiority, cultural deficit, and cultural mismatch, are assumed to fit all situations and all students. The major flaw in these context-free interpretations of school success or failure is that they are single-cause rationales that apply to a variety of situations. The analyses of context-specific determinants, on the other hand, lead directly to solutions on specific problems.

**Contextual-Interaction Theories**

A contextual-interactionist paradigm suggests that several factors interact to influence the academic success or failure of ethnic and linguistic diverse students. This model takes into account both the effects of factors directly connected to school and the influence of elements outside the educational setting on the schools’ contexts and processes. For example, the stigmatization of a language has profound effects on the speakers of that language and the knowledge the users feel they have about that language, and even influences the learning of the mother tongue. Negative attitudes about a “minority” language may cause the speakers to devalue their own language, reject it, and restrict their children from learning it (Meyer 2009). That is, the interaction of pedagogical factors such as attitudes, curriculum, instructional methodologies, school policies and educational theories, and students’ sociocultural frameworks such as knowledge, self-image, and motivation, combined with societal forces, lead to more comprehensive explanations for the success or failure of Latino students.

Similarly, Cummins (2001b) argues that the underachievement of some groups can be directly attributed to the specific kinds of interactions between teachers and students and their families. He further contends that these interactions are negotiated through the roles that educators assume in relation to four dimensions of school organization and the degree to which each is carried out:

1. Students’ culture and language are incorporated into the school agenda;
2. The school advocates community involvement as a crucial element for the students’ education;
3. Students are intrinsically motivated to use language for generating their own knowledge;

4. Educators involved in assessing academic outcomes promote and support minority students.

The role of the educator is set along a continuum in reference to these characteristics, with one end promoting empowerment and the other end fostering disabling attributes. Cummins (2001a) proposes an empowering vs. disabling framework for the academic outcomes of Latino students. That is, students who are empowered by their educational experiences develop a secure cultural identity, appropriate interactive structures, and a knowledge base that allows them to succeed academically. Empowered students are better equipped to tackle academic challenges because they are involved in an environment that nurtures their confidence and motivation to achieve in school. Conversely, students who are disabled by their school experiences do not develop an adequate cognitive and academic base or a solid social and emotional infrastructure.

Theoretical Foundations of ELL Education

Cummins’ (2001a) notion of coercive vs. collaborative relations of power, in which society’s micro- and macro-structures are configured by dominant-subordinated group relations, influence how educators define their roles, expectations, and assumptions in the education of Latino children. For ELLs, coercive relations of power are manifested in assimilationist practices that promote the rejection of the home culture and language as a necessary condition to succeed in the mainstream society. Conversely, collaborative relations of power value and recognize the sources of knowledge that minority students possess even though they are outside the dominant discourse of schools. For ELLs, the extent to which schools affirm and promote their language and cultural backgrounds advances either empowering or disabling educational frameworks.

Ruiz (1997) contends that native language instruction goes beyond the development of language proficiency and cognitive growth. He argues that sociopolitical and sociolinguistic ramifications that arise from bilingual education provide the medium to break from established social inequity constructs. That is, the use of the native language and
culture in the curriculum catapults minority students from their subjugated positions by sharing the power with the dominant group. Macedo (2006) conurs in that “educators must develop liberatory and critical bilingual programs informed by a radical pedagogy so that the minority language will cease to provide its speakers the experience of subordination . . . . [T]he students’ language is the only means by which they can develop their own voice, a prerequisite to the development of a positive sense of self-worth” (133). Ruiz adds that often “the inclusion of the language of a group has coincided with the exclusion of their voice . . . . [V]oice is the central ingredient of critical pedagogy; without its consideration, there is no radical reform in curriculum” (321).

Education for ELLs in the United States is provided in one of two instructional media: bilingual or English-only instruction. English-only instruction presents the academic curriculum through immersion in English with no native language support, while bilingual instruction offers the academic curriculum in students’ mother tongue while they are learning English through English as a second language (ESL) instruction. Bilingual education is used to refer to numerous types of program designs that pursue divergent linguistic goals (bilingualism vs. monolingualism), differences in length of implementation (short term vs. long term), variations in amount of use of each language, and distinctions in programmatic composition (Soltero 2004). Whether schools offer bilingual education or ESL depends of several factors:

- sufficient numbers of students from the same language group for bilingual education;
- availability of certified bilingual teachers;
- state and local policies that dictate whether the native language can be used for instruction;
- local perspectives and philosophies regarding native language or English-only instruction.

Bilingual education falls under two paradigms: additive vs. subtractive models. In additive programs the goal is to develop full bilingualism, biliteracy, and biculturalism by adding the second language (English) and developing the first language. Additive program
models include maintenance, developmental bilingual, heritage language, and dual language or two-way immersion. In subtractive programs the goal is to become monolingual in the majority language by abandoning the native language (Soltero 2004). Subtractive models include transitional bilingual education, which uses the native language for temporary support, and several programs that use only English as the language of instruction: newcomer programs, structured English immersion, and English as a second language (ESL).

**Bilingual Education History, Legislation, and Policy**

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) stipulates that all students and all subgroups of students must meet the state’s academic targets and make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). AYP is measured by state assessment scores on reading and math as well as graduation rates. The law specifies that schools that do not make AYP for two consecutive years are designated as needing improvement and are subject to sanctions under the law. Once schools have been identified for improvement, they must meet the proficiency targets for two consecutive years before they are removed from “improvement” status. Subgroups are defined as students from major racial and ethnic groups, economically disadvantaged students, students with disabilities, and students with limited English proficiency. According to Owens and Sunderman (2006):

> At the core of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) are relatively simple but controversial accountability provisions: all schools and districts must meet state standards by 2014. When NCLB was enacted, researchers and state education officials projected that a high percentage of schools would fail to meet the law’s tough accountability provisions, creating a crisis in public education and overwhelming the capacity of state education agencies to help low performing schools. (1)

Federal and state legal mandates require that all children residing in the United States have access to quality education, including children who are not proficient in the English language and who may or may not be legal residents. In 1982 the US Supreme Court decision in *Plyler v. Doe* held that undocumented children have the same right as citizens and
legal permanent residents to receive a free public education. The education of ELLs is related
to the sociopolitical context of anti-immigration movements, xenophobic sentiments, and
assimilationist ideologies. Because the majority of immigrants are from Spanish-speaking
countries, anti-immigrant sentiment toward Latinos and more specifically Mexicans
continues to affect educational policy and practice. Two well-established stances fuel the
ideology of anti-immigration: eliminate bilingual education and make English the official
language.

Following the US Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of 1954
abolishing school segregation, as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin, the federal government passed
the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. This legislation provided federal funding to encourage
local school districts to implement native language instruction and other types of support
services for students not yet proficient in English (Crawford 2004). The Bilingual Education
Act was enacted as Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act until 2002 when
it was replaced by the English Language Acquisition Act under the new federal law NCLB.
Title VII became Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which no longer
gave funding priority for native-language instruction and instead turned the choice of how
to spend federal funds for ELLs over to the discretion of each state. The NCLB Act requires
that schools address the educational needs of students who are not yet proficient in English
regardless of whether they are documented or not. The law defines limited English
proficient students as “ages 3 to 21, enrolled in elementary or secondary education, often
born outside the United States or speaking a language other than English in their homes, and
not having sufficient mastery of English to meet state standards and excel in an English-
language classroom.” Specific provisions regarding ELLs in NCLB require that schools
improve the ELLs performance on assessments in reading and math starting in 3rd grade.

In the 1974 Lau v. Nichols case, the US Supreme Court ruled that “there is no equality
of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers and
curriculum, for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education” (Baker 2006). The court’s decision in Lau v. Nichols required schools
to take “affirmative steps” to overcome language barriers impeding children’s access to the
curriculum. Congress immediately endorsed this principle in the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act of 1974. Neither the Bilingual Education Act nor the *Lau* decision requires any particular method for teaching students who are not yet proficient in English. That is, there is no federal mandate for bilingual education (although a few states mandate it under certain circumstances). What civil rights laws do require are educational programs that offer equal opportunities for ELLs.

**Language Policy**

Administrative, judicial, and legislative policies tend to favor bilingual programs that are remedial, compensatory, and transitional in nature—those that try to “fix” the deficiency of not knowing English—over those that are additive and enrichment-oriented by adding English while maintaining the native language. According to Wiley and Wright (2004) the failure of schools to meet the needs of language minority students coupled with education ideologies to force “a rapid shift to English has often been the source of language problems that has resulted in the denial of language rights and hindered linguistic access to educational, social, economic, and political benefits even as the promoters of English immersion claim the opposite” (144). Interwoven in the debate on how to meet the academic and linguistic needs of ELLs in schools have been basic ideologies and beliefs about linguistic diversity, immigration, and immigrant rights. Ruiz (1997) delineates three broad orientations on language diversity that have driven policy and politics in the US:

- *Language as a Problem Orientation*, which views language diversity as a catalyst for social conflict, divisiveness, and ethnic strife;

- *Language as a Right Orientation*, which views language as a basic human right challenging language prejudice and discrimination;

- *Language as a Resource Orientation*, which considers the diverse linguistic capital of a society as a cultural, social, personal, and national resource, both for its economic potential and for fostering social unity.

Using language as an instrument of social control has been an integral part of US history beginning with the systematic extermination of indigenous languages and
continuing with coerced linguistic assimilation of non-English speaking groups spanning both world wars to the present (Galindo and Vigil 2004). Claims about the ineffectiveness of bilingual education coupled with the media’s predisposition against it have allowed for the dissemination of inaccuracies and misinformation (Crawford 2000). The inadequate implementation of many bilingual programs has further cultivated the notion that bilingual education is a failure. Low performance for most bilingual education programs is closely correlated to the lack of adequate funds, scarcity of qualified educators, large class size, and the absence of proven teaching methodology (Dicker 2003). Solidly designed bilingual programs that address these fundamental factors have proven to be highly effective for linguistically diverse students. Numerous studies (August and Hakuta 1998; Ramírez 1992; Thomas and Collier 2002) have demonstrated that students who participate in well implemented programs that use the native language for instruction for more than three years show better academic performance, mastery of English, and lower drop-out rates.

**Second Language Acquisition Theories**

The difficulties that some culturally and linguistically diverse groups experience in adopting a new culture and language have been attributed to cultural conflict in relation to language use (Garcia, Skutnabb-Kangas, and Torres-Guzman 2006). In the United States English is a fundamental tool for achieving success in school and society. However, the loss of the home language and culture is often seen as necessary for the appropriate development of English. Hence, linguistic minorities not only experience rejection from the mainstream society, but also loss of personal identity and emotional bonds with their communities. Bartolomé (1994) points out a contradiction in language instruction in the United States: “[W]hile we discourage the maintenance of linguistic minority students’ native language throughout their education, we require English-speaking students to study a foreign language as a prerequisite for college” (207).

Many popular fallacies about bilingualism have given rise to the notion that the use of two languages causes cognitive, social, and emotional damage (Cummins 1984). The language deficiency premise describes language minority children as nonverbal, alingual or semilingual, often suffering learning disabilities and speech impediments. Research on the
metalinguistic aptitude of bilinguals, which is the ability to think about language in a flexible and abstract manner, refutes the notion of language deficiency (Butler and Hakuta 2004). Other misconceptions about bilingualism have perpetuated the implementation of inappropriate educational programs for Latino ELLs. The English exposure premise maintains that ELLs must be exposed to great amounts of English to become proficient in that language. Moreover, instruction in the native language has been erroneously considered a hindrance for the acquisition of English.

Research evidence unequivocally rejects this premise. ELLs who receive instruction in the native language develop the second language more efficiently than students who are immersed in the second language (Wong Fillmore and Valadéz 1986). Moreover, cognitive skills are best acquired through the primary language and then transferred to the second language. The use of the home language helps learners develop critical thinking abilities and cognitive skills. This cognitive structuring is not only shaped by linguistic knowledge, but also by cultural knowledge and the context in which that knowledge is obtained (Trueba 1991). However, researchers caution that the negative or positive effects of first- or second-language instruction depend considerably on the context in which it takes place (Hornberger 2006). That is, the context of language use, rather than the language itself, is the deciding factor in whether initial instruction in the first or second language is more conducive to overall academic success.

Research and theories on language development have advanced a deeper understanding of the processes involved in the acquisition of a second language. In an attempt to answer questions about the persistent academic underachievement of some linguistically diverse groups, the complex issues of second-language acquisition must be viewed in the context of sociocultural and political frameworks. The connection between language and culture offers an insight into the problems that language minority children often face in adjusting to a new culture and language.
EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS

US Latinos: A Brief Demographic Backdrop

Considering the broader demographic conditions and shifts across the United States enhances our understanding of the current state of Latinos and education in the Chicago metropolitan area. In 2005 racial or ethnic minorities made up 33 percent of the US population of nearly 300 million. Latinos have become the largest and fastest growing minority group in the United States, rising from 12 percent of the population in 2000 to 15.4 percent in 2008. In that period the Latino population grew 32 percent, from 35.3 million to 46.9 million (US Census 2000, 2008). In 2004, 43 percent of public school students nationwide were considered to be part of a racial or ethnic minority group, up from 22 percent in 1972. This increase is largely due to the growth in the proportion of Latino students, from 6 percent in 1972 to 19 percent in 2004 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.
Proportion of Racial or Ethnic Minority Public School Students in the US

![Proportion of Racial or Ethnic Minority Public School Students in the US](Source: US Census 2008.)
National Origins and Geographic US Residency

Between 2000 and 2006 Latinos accounted for one-half of the nation’s growth and their growth rate (24.3 percent) was more than three times the growth rate of the total population (6.1 percent) (see Figures 2 and 3). In 2004 about 80 percent of all Latinos in the United States lived in nine states, with five states accounting for nearly two-thirds of all Latinos: California (30 percent), Texas (19 percent), Florida (8 percent), New York (7 percent), and Illinois (4.3 percent). The other states with large numbers of Latinos were Arizona (3.9 percent), New Jersey (3.2 percent), Colorado (2.1 percent), and New Mexico (2.0 percent; American Community Survey Reports 2007). The largest Latino group in the United States is of Mexican origin, accounting for 64 percent of the total Latino population with nearly 26 million people. Puerto Ricans (3.9 million) were the second-largest group and made up almost 10 percent of the Latino population. Other sizable Latino groups included Cubans (1.4 million) and Dominicans (1.1 million). Central Americans constituted 2.9 million Latinos, including 1.2 million Salvadorans, the largest group from that region. Of the 2.2 million people of South American origin, Colombians, with a population of 686,000 were the largest (American Community Survey Reports 2007).

Figure 2.

Percent of Population Hispanic or Latino in 2000

Latinos and Education in the Chicago Metropolitan Area

Figure 3.

**Percent of Population Hispanic or Latino in 2006**

![Map showing percentage of Hispanic or Latino population in 2006, with varying shades indicating percentage ranges from 0 to 24.9%.]


**Latino Chicago**

Latinos are the fastest growing ethnic group in metropolitan Chicago, accounting for almost all of the population growth between 2000 and 2006 (the Chicago metropolitan area includes Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will Counties; see Figure 4). In 2006 one out every five people in the region was of Latino origin, accounting for 20 percent of the total population, with 1.7 million people (Alejo and Puente 2007). According to the US Census Bureau 2000, the Latino population of City of Chicago grew substantially from 535,000 people in 1990 to 755,000 in 2000, while Latinos outside the city more than doubled, from 360,000 to 745,000.

The majority of Latinos in the Chicago metropolitan area (55 percent) now live in the suburbs of Chicago and 56 percent of Latino school-age youth (5–17 years of age) attend school in the suburbs. In 2000 more than 90 percent of all Latinos in Illinois lived in the Chicago metropolitan area. In 1990 there were 97,000 Latinos age 16 to 24 in Chicago, growing to 133,000 by 2000. In the metropolitan area outside Chicago there were 70,000 Latinos age 16 to 24 in 1990, but by 2000 that number grew to 122,000. Projections by the US
Census Bureau indicate that by 2025, the Latino population of Illinois will grow from 1,530,000 to 2,275,000—an additional 50 percent increase—and over 90 percent of Latinos in state will live in the Chicago metropolitan area.

Figure 4.

According to Paral (2006) “the Latino population of metropolitan Chicago has become arguably less ‘Latino’ and increasingly more ‘Mexican’” (105). According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs report A Shared Future: The Economic Engagement of Greater Chicago and its Mexican Community (2006), of the 1.6 million Latinos in the Chicago metropolitan area, about 1.3 million, or 80 percent, are Mexican or of Mexican origin, followed by 149,000 Puerto Ricans and 17,000 Cubans. In 2004 Mexicans accounted for 41 percent of all immigrants in the City of Chicago and 16 percent of the surrounding area. Metropolitan Chicago has the largest Mexican population in the United States outside the Southwest. Mexicans constitute the largest ethnic group in the Chicago metropolitan area and their numbers are expected to double by 2030. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs report, the role of the Mexican community in the Chicago and Illinois economy is critical because “Mexicans constitute 80% of the Chicago Latino community… Mexico is Illinois’ second largest trading partner… Mexicans’ bilingual and bicultural capabilities represent opportunities for business and cultural exchanges with the $2.4 trillion market of the world’s Spanish-speaking countries” (11).

In the 2007 Metropolitan Mayors Roundtable Report Alejo and Puente (2007, 7) cite the 2004 and 2006 American Community Survey to highlight the integration patterns of Latinos in the Chicago metropolitan area:

- Two-thirds of Latinos in the Chicago region are citizens.
- 76 percent of all Latino households are bilingual in English and Spanish.
- Most Latino growth is due to births rather than immigration (between 2004 and 2006 72 percent of the Latino population growth was due to increase in births).

The report also addresses the legal implications for schools that enroll immigrant students, stressing the urgent need for school and district staff to be informed about the unconstitutional nature of denying access to undocumented students to public education and using unlawful practices of requiring confirmation of citizenship or legal residency as proof of residency or legal custody of a child.

Citing the Beal and O’Connor presentations to the Metropolitan Mayors Roundtable, Alejo and Puente add that “without the Latino population Illinois would have lost a
Congressional seat; Latinos constitute 15% of the labor force; Latinos have household incomes in excess of $20 billion in the region” (8). The authors draw attention to the potential cultural and linguistic capital that Latinos can bring to bear on the $2.4 trillion market represented by the 21 Spanish-speaking countries, remarking that “building on Latinos’ bilingual capabilities fosters the region’s global competitiveness” (8).

**Latino Education in Metropolitan Chicago**

Illinois total school enrollment during 2007–2008 was 2,378,081, with 1,676,002 students in PK–8 and 702,444 in grades 9–12 (88 percent are enrolled in public schools while 11.2 percent in nonpublic schools). During the same time period 53.8 percent of the student population in PK–12 were white, 19.9 percent Latino, and 19.4 percent African American (Illinois State Board of Education 2008; see Figure 5).

**Figure 5.**

**Illinois Students by Grade Level, Race/Ethnicity, and School Type, 2007–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>2007-2008 Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PK-8</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th to 12th</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Public</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly half of all Latino students attending public school in Illinois attend Chicago Public Schools (CPS). According to CPS data, the total number of students enrolled in the city’s public schools was 407,955 in 2008–2009: 23,325 students in PK; 28,975 students in K; 242,489 students in elementary; and 113,166 students in secondary. Of the student population 46.2 percent are African American, 41.2 percent Latino, and 8.9 percent are white. CPS has 84.3 percent students from low-income families. Of the CPS student population 13.3 percent were ELLs. In 2007–2008 there were 593 principals: 53.8 percent African American, 26.6 percent white, and 17.9 percent Latino. In the same academic year there were 23,727 teachers in CPS: 31.4 percent African American, 49.0 percent white, 15.1 percent Latino (see Figure 6).

The Chicago metropolitan area reflects the challenges faced by school systems across the United States. The Chicago metropolitan area has one of the largest and fastest-growing populations of students of Latino origin. Latino children under 18, who are mostly born in
the United States, make up 35 percent of the total Latino population in the Chicago metropolitan area. Between 1990 and 2004 every county in the Chicago metropolitan area, except Cook County, experienced more than 150 percent increase in the population of Latino school-age children (see Figure 7). Chicago Public Schools, the third largest public school system in the United States after New York City and Los Angeles, educates 430,000 students in total; 38 percent of these students come from Latino backgrounds—mostly from Mexican families. Mexicans have the lowest educational attainment of any Latino group, while Puerto Ricans have the lowest economic status. Central and South American Latinos are most likely to be immigrants.

Figure 7.

Percent Change Latino School-Age Children in Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1994–2004

The Effects of School Funding Formulas on Latino Students in Illinois

Students who come from families living in poverty require twice as much to educate than those from wealthier backgrounds, yet low-income school districts in Illinois receive less public funding than more affluent districts and experience persistent budgetary shortfalls (Community Renewal Society and the Center for Tax and Budget Accountability
School funding disparities in Illinois have negatively affected high-poverty areas, especially those with high concentrations of minority groups, and rural areas. The Community Renewal Society and the Center for Tax and Budget Accountability released data regarding Illinois’ school funding system showing a direct correlation between minimum funding and poor academic performance. Key findings include:

- A strong correlation between increasing instructional expenditures per student (by $1,000 to $2,200) and academic achievement in both high-poverty and low-poverty schools.

- Schools in more affluent areas spend significantly more on teacher salaries and employ more teachers with master’s degrees than high-poverty areas. Quality teachers are shown to have the biggest impact on student learning than any other factor.

- 96 percent of more affluent districts make their adequate yearly progress (AYP) on test scores, but only 29 percent of high-poverty districts meet these standards.

- Property-poor communities must tax homeowners at a much higher rate than wealthier communities, exacerbating the effects of poverty. The 83 school districts with property tax rates in 2005 of less than 2 percent generated an average of $12,717 per pupil—more than twice the $6,063 generated by the 112 districts with property tax rates of 5 percent or more.

- Nearly all of the highest-spending districts are in the six-county metropolitan Chicago region, while nearly all of the lowest-spending districts are downstate.

In 2005, of the 876 operating school districts that reported for that year, operating expenditures per pupil ranged from $4,281 to $28,285, with a state average of $9,099. High school districts’ spending ranged from $6,766 to $18,001 per pupil. Elementary school districts’ spending ranged from $4,281 to $22,508. The high per pupil spending for elementary districts is also an anomaly as the next highest per-pupil expenditure was $16,004 (see Figure 8).
Early Childhood Services for Latinos in the Chicago Metropolitan Area

High-quality early education has been linked to improved educational attainment in elementary and high school, resulting in economic and social benefits later in life. The educational benefits of enrolling children in preschool programs include higher academic attainment in school, lower special education referral rates, higher rates of high school graduation, and increased college attendance. Findings from the National Task Force on Early Childhood Education for Latinos (2007) indicate that Latino children enter kindergarten significantly behind white children in early literacy skills.

Collins and Ribeiro (2004) cite an Illinois Facilities Fund report (2003) that identifies ten mid- to large-sized cities in the Chicago metropolitan area as most in need of early childhood education services, six of which had large and growing Latino populations: Cicero, Berwyn, Aurora, Elgin, Waukegan, and Chicago. According to the Chapin Hall...
Center for Children, an estimated 15,000 low-income children in Chicago between the ages of three and five are not enrolled in preschool. The most commonly cited parent reasons for not enrolling their children in preschool were “concerns about safety in the area near preschools, a lack of awareness that preschool is available, and a belief that school begins with kindergarten” (Williams 2007).

A study of Latino families and child care in Chicago points to the issues of availability as a critical factor: “Latina mothers needing child care generally viewed child care centers favorably; the fact that few Latinos use child care centers is because affordable center care is not available in their neighborhoods” (Illinois Facilities Fund 2003, 4; as cited in Collins and Ribeiro 2004). Only 35.6 percent of eligible Illinois Latino children participate in preschool (US Census 2000), which is far below the state average of 52.5 percent for non-Latino children. In 2007 Cook County enrollment numbers in child care center showed that only 2.4 child care centers were operating per 1,000 Latino children under the age of five (Latino Policy Forum 2009). The National Task Force on Early Childhood Education for Latinos (2007) reports that over 6,000 Latino children in Chicago are on waiting lists for preschool.

Illinois ranks 10th in the nation in number of ELLs with one-fifth of its residents age five and older speaking a language other than English at home. Latino mothers in metropolitan Chicago reported that it was important for them to speak Spanish with early care and education providers (Illinois Facilities Fund 2003; cited in Collins and Ribeiro 2004). According to the Chicago Metropolis 2020 and Illinois Facilities Fund report on the economic impact of the early care and education industry in Illinois (2005), “both the state’s strong international migration and the increasing number of families who do not speak English increase the need for dual-or multi-lingual early care and education staff and culturally appropriate programs” (30). The report goes on to state:

Affordable, accessible early care and education options help Illinois workers with children to remain in the workforce and enable workers to seek additional education and training to expand their qualifications for the workforce; and quality early care and education programs promote future economic benefits for Illinois by helping to prepare young children for opportunities in the new economy and by reducing future government
expenses on students and adults ill-prepared for school and the new labor market. (4)

Illinois legislation was passed in 1985 that provided prekindergarten programs for children ages three to five who were at risk of academic failure. In 2001 the first Governor’s Task Force on Universal Preschool was formed and in 2003 the Illinois Early Learning Council was established. State funds were used to expand childcare, Head Start, and community-based organizations and by 2006 Preschool for All was established in the state. The Preschool for All program emphasizes the relationships among early childhood education, parent education and involvement, and future success in school. The goal of the Preschool for All program is to provide educational services to all three- to five-year-old children whose families choose to participate. The Preschool for All initiative focuses on providing high-quality educational programs for children who are determined to be at risk of academic failure (Illinois State Board of Education 2009).

Limited availability of early childhood programs, inadequate information about eligibility, high cost, and poor outreach prevent many Latino families from pursuing early childhood education for their young children. According to the recent analysis from the Latino Policy Forum (2009), lower incomes limit a Latino family’s ability to make copayments for early childhood programs, access support services and private healthcare, or purchase educational materials. Longer work days and nontraditional schedules can prevent them from attending activities at school. At home, they may have less time to spend with their children. Latino children may be read to and spoken to less than others. Many parents work second- and third-shift schedules and have multiple jobs. (10)

**Latino High School Drop Out Rates in the Chicago Metropolitan Area**

Capps et al. (2005) report that 77 percent of ELLs in PK to 5th grade and 56 percent of ELLs in grades 6 to 12 are US-born and 80 percent of parents of ELLs were born outside the United States. The share of children who are first-generation immigrants increases in the
upper grades. In elementary grades, 24 percent of ELLs are foreign-born, while 44 percent of secondary ELLs are foreign-born. Capps et al. note the unique challenges faced by US secondary schools which have a larger share of children who are first-generation immigrants. Many foreign-born children enter US schools with limited English proficiency or with relatively few years of formal schooling in their home countries. These foreign-born children often have difficulty making the academic transition into US secondary schools. Moreover, foreign-born children have been raised in a different school system, which may also affect their transition into US schools. (2005, 8)

The EPE Research Center’s Cities in Crisis: A Special Analytic Report on High School Graduation (2008) reports that there are 132 public school districts in metropolitan Chicago with nearly half a million enrolled high school students. The report presents an analysis of the nation’s 50 largest cities and metropolitan areas and found that in the year 2003–2004 Chicago ranked 31 with a 51.5 percent graduation rate, which is comparable to other large metropolitan areas. In 2006 40 percent of Latinos ages 25 and older had graduated from high school compared to 80 percent for non-Latino whites, and only 11 percent of Latinos in Illinois had college degrees compared to 32 percent for non-Latino whites (Alejo and Puente 2007).

Based on 2000 census data, 44,000 Latinos in the city of Chicago (aged 16–24) were high school dropouts and an additional 44,000 Latino youth (35 percent) in the metropolitan area outside Chicago are also high school dropouts compared to 18 percent for African Americans and 5 percent for whites. Some of these students dropped out of schools in the United States while others dropped out in their home country before they came to Chicago. The higher percentage of Latino dropouts, compared with African American dropouts, is due to the large number of Latino youth who left high school before they came to the United States.

However, the Latino dropout rate from Chicago-area schools is also substantial. In the metropolitan area, Latinos made up 25 percent of youth ages 16–24, but 57 percent of all high school dropouts. In the metropolitan area overall, 61,000 Latino youth are both out of
school and jobless while 26 percent of Latinos ages 16–24 in the city of Chicago proper are neither enrolled in school nor employed (35,000) compared to 31 percent for African American youth and 8 percent white youth. In the metropolitan area outside Chicago 22 percent of Latinos aged 16–24 were neither enrolled in school nor employed (26,000) compared to 20 percent for African American youth and 7 percent for white youth. According to the EPE Research Center Perspective on a Population report, only 63.2 percent of ELLs in Illinois graduate from high school, compared to 87.8 percent of the rest of the Illinois students population which is in line with national trends that show that 64 percent of ELLs nationwide graduate from high school compared to 80.1 percent of all students (see Figure 9).

Figure 9.

**Chicago-area Youth Age 16 to 24 by Race/Ethnicity**

In Illinois schools must have a 67 percent graduation rate to meet the law’s performance requirements, and they must reach an 85 percent rate by 2014. If they do not, they face sanctions that range from monetary penalties to school closings. The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) reported that 64,057 Chicago Public Schools high school students dropped out from 1998 to 2002 while 60,814 students graduated. A study conducted by the
Consortium on Chicago School Research at the University of Chicago (Allensworth 2005) found that 54 percent of students who entered CPS high schools in 2000 graduated in 2004. For the same time span, the CPS reported a substantially different outcome. It said about 71 percent graduated in 2004. The difference is because CPS school officials, in tandem with all Illinois school districts, use a method required by ISBE that researchers say is flawed. For example, data reported by CPS does not include alternative programs that serve students who are likely to drop out and sometimes counts as “transfers” those students who already dropped out of school. According to Allensworth (2005), the current means of calculation used in Illinois “produces an inflated estimate of the students who actually graduate.” This highlights a national problem with the accuracy of data reported by school districts.

**ELLs in the Chicago Metropolitan Area**

According to the report *Perspectives on a Population: English Language Learners in American Schools* (2009), Chicago had the third largest population of ELLs in 2005–2006 with 66,479 students, after Los Angeles and New York, and has the sixth largest numbers of ELLs in the Chicago metropolitan area (including Naperville and Joliet) with 162,271. ELL enrollment rose by nearly 30 percent from 126,430 in 2000 to 161,734 in 2005 whereas the total non-ELL enrollment only rose by 2.5 percent in the state. ISBE’s 2007 ELL statistical report shows that out of a total of 186,484 ELLs in Illinois, 151,676 ELLs are from Spanish-speaking backgrounds representing 81 percent of the total ELL population of the state. Approximately two-thirds of ELLs in Illinois were enrolled in Transitional Bilingual Education (TBE) programs (67.4 percent) while the remaining 32.6 percent were enrolled in Transitional Program of Instruction (TPI) programs receiving instruction through ESL only (see Figure 10). In CPS 85.8 percent of ELLs were enrolled in TBE programs in contrast to 55.9 percent of ELLs receiving TBE in the rest of the state. The majority of ELLs in Illinois are enrolled in grades PK-8th grades accounting for 88.6 percent of the total ELL population.
Chicago Metropolitan Area Segregation Trends

According to a recent analysis of data from the National Center for Education Statistics, Fry (2009) shows how the segregation and isolation patterns in metropolitan Chicago have moved toward higher segregation than suburban schools nationwide since the mid 1990s. The isolation measure is the extent to which Chicago suburban students go to schools with students of the same race/ethnicity as themselves. Latino students enrolled in schools in suburban Chicago 15 years ago that were 34 percent Latino, whereas now the typical Latino student enrolls in a suburban school that is about 49 percent Latino. In comparison, the typical suburban Chicago black student went to a school 15 years ago that was 51 percent black but today is 53 percent black. Fry ranks the 25 districts with the highest Hispanic segregation in 2006–2007 and reports that Chicago had 5 districts on this list. No other metropolitan area in the country had more total districts named.
United States v. Chicago Public Schools Consent Decree

In 1980 the US government entered into a desegregation Consent Decree with the Chicago Public Schools to create greater educational opportunities for Chicago’s African American and Latino students. According to Orfield (1996), “the existing patterns of distribution and residential segregation make it almost impossible to disentangle the problems of race and poverty in American schools” (56). Segregation is prevalent for Latino students across the country but most severe in the states of Texas, California, New Jersey and Illinois, with metropolitan Chicago having the highest segregation of any urban metropolitan area. The relationship between district size and severity of segregation is connected to the breakup of urban housing markets causing fragmentation of school district zoning. According to Orfield (1996) in the Chicago metropolitan area scored much higher in math standardized tests in comparison to Chicago city school students. The relationship between race, community wealth, and academic achievement is well attested by persistent underachievement of students who come from ethnic and poverty backgrounds.

Under the consent decree CPS agreed to remedy the present effects of past segregation of black and Latino students. Addressing the academic needs of ELLs was a major portion of the settlement. Compliance with the CPS desegregation consent decree was monitored by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the ACLU, and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights. According to MALDEF:

In February 2008, the US filed a Motion to Enforce provisions of the consent decree as it related to ELLs in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The United States alleged that the Chicago Board of Education repeatedly failed to comply with multiple terms of the Second Amended Consent Decree, all of which related to the provision of services to ELLs. Expert reports revealed that three major problems had reoccurred in multiple years, including: the failure to assign model numbers to special education ELL students, indicating a failure to provide services; a failure to timely enroll students in ELL programs, including the failure to enroll approximately 280 students by April of the school year; and a failure to provide adequate native-language instruction to ELL students.
Later in 2008, Judge Kocoras of the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois called for a hearing to consider terminating the Consent Decree (MALDEF 2009).

Despite being under this consent decree for almost 30 years, CPS has yet to provide adequate and quality education opportunities or implement effective district-wide programs for Latinos and ELLs. According to a 2005 report by the Consortium on Chicago School Research, only 51.6 percent of boys and 65.9 percent of girls who enrolled in ELL programs graduated from high school (Allensworth 2005). The graduation rates for Latinos not enrolled in ELL programs fared even worse: only 48.6 percent of boys and 64.4 percent of girls who started in ELL programs graduated. In her review of CPS implementation of the bilingual education requirements under the Consent Decree, Marler (2007) found that ELLs—most of whom are Latino—were still taught in hallways or auditorium stages, were pulled from their classes in order to translate for other students, were denied sufficient reading material or were provided unapproved reading material, and even lacked textbooks. In addition, approximately 2,292 ELLs were being denied special education services while at least 289 ELLs were provided no services for extended periods of time. CPS failed to provide ELL services to approximately 3,000 ELLs. The report also reveals that some Spanish-speaking children were being taught by Polish-speaking teachers while some courses identified as native language instruction (bilingual education) were in fact a combination of translation and ESL methodology. Responding to a Department of Justice court order in 2008 to provide information regarding the provision of services to ELLs, many CPS school principals attested to classrooms that lack books and students who lack qualified bilingual teachers.

CONCLUSIONS

Enacting more effective instructional practices for Latino students, calls for a paradigm shift in policy and praxis. This shift must move from “a narrow and mechanistic view of instruction to one that is broader in scope and takes into consideration the sociohistorical and political dimensions of education” (Bartolomé 2002). This perspective should compel educators to analyze critically the sociocultural and political realities in which subordinated students find themselves at school and the implicit and explicit
antagonistic relations between students and teachers, as well as among communities and education systems. Critical and culturally responsive education and transformative modes of teaching and learning enable students and teachers to break away from these adverse relationships and negative beliefs and would allow for the creation of learning environments that are informed by both participatory action and critical reflection. Educating children of culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds is an inescapable challenge for school systems across the country. Demographic changes coupled with more stringent legal requirements and continued academic underachievement of language minority students requires urgent attention from educators and policy-makers alike.

For Latino students to benefit from their education and succeed in the society at large, educators and policy-makers must recognize the complexities that encompass the life experiences of this population. The National State Boards of Education recently published report (2007) on the education of language learners recognizes the urgency to address the “unprecedented challenge for today’s education leaders to simultaneously improve the quality of public education while accommodating the largest number of ELLs the nation has ever seen” and speaks to the “widespread recognition that ELLs have long been marginalized and too often segregated into programs that suffer from inadequate attention” (8).

**Research-Based Recommendations for Improving Latinos’ Academic Attainment**

Extensive research over the past thirty years has contributed to the body of literature related to Latino student academic achievement. Theoretical constructs and empirical research studies have sought to determine what forces and factors influence educational outcomes for Latino youth while also attempting to identify concrete approaches and actions to reduce the persistent Latino achievement gap.

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs report *A Shared Future: The Economic Engagement of Greater Chicago and its Mexican Community* (2006) offers four recommendations to improve the academic achievement and educational attainment of the Mexican community and enable them to play a vital role in strengthening our regional economy.
Even though the report focuses on the Mexican population of metropolitan Chicago, many of the recommendations are relevant for other Latino groups in the area.

- **Recommendation 1:** Understand the needs of the growing Mexican population in suburban and city schools, and develop plans that increase the education assets available to support their academic achievement and educational attainment. City and suburban school districts in the six county areas should review, improve, or replace their bilingual education programs to ensure that students achieve fluency in reading and writing in English, and expand dual-language programs that develop second-language capability for all students from kindergarten through high school. Chicago Public Schools, suburban school districts, and the Illinois State Board of Education should continue to fund efforts to build and staff schools in neighborhoods with growing populations.

- **Recommendation 2:** Expand the pool of trained and qualified bilingual and bicultural teachers and administrators for early childhood education and elementary and high schools. Schools and university departments of education should collaborate with community-based organizations to recruit and support local Mexican teacher and principal candidates from traditional and nontraditional backgrounds. Departments of education in local colleges and universities and the Illinois State Board of Education should partner with Mexican educational institutions to implement a teacher training and certification program enabling teachers from Mexico to work in Chicago and suburban school districts.

- **Recommendation 3:** Raise expectations for high academic achievement among Mexican students, their parents, teachers, guidance counselors, and principals, and provide resources to assist in meeting these expectations. Latino leaders, foundations, business leaders, and educators should support programs from middle school through high school that prepare Mexican students to complete college. Programs should focus on educating parents and students on the importance of a college education and provide assistance with navigating the
college application process. Chicago Public Schools should collaborate with business, foundations, and other philanthropic organizations to implement a longer school day and longer school year, allowing for more academically rigorous curriculum and enrichment programs, including sports and the arts, with priority given to schools with high Mexican populations.

- **Recommendation 4: Strengthen parent and community participation and leadership in city and suburban schools to improve educational outcomes for Mexican students.** School districts should partner with Mexican and other Latino community organizations to develop a Latino leadership school action network, beginning with members of local school councils and suburban school boards, to help create leaders in schools by training parents, teachers, administrators, and guidance counselors. Mexican hometown associations, Spanish-language media, and Mexican-owned businesses and community-based organizations should strengthen the active participation of parents in the schools and support Mexican students from preschool to college. Local business leaders, including retirees, should collaborate with schools to provide expertise in organizational development and mentorship and internship activities for students, and to fund innovative academic and after-school programs, low- or no-interest loans, and scholarships at colleges and universities.

The Metropolitan Mayors Roundtable Report *Forging the Tools for Unity: A Report on Metro Chicago’s Mayors Roundtable of Latino Integration* (Alejo and Puente 2007) identified two strategies to improve the education of Latinos in the Chicago metropolitan area:

- **Understanding Language Acquisition and Proficiency:** The dramatic growth of ELLs in the Chicago region, especially outside of Chicago in areas that have been traditionally white, has posed significant challenges for school districts. Developing a solid understanding of the complexities of second language acquisition, the interrelationship between the native language and the acquisition of English as a second language, the differences between academic and conversational language, and the sociocultural factors that influence the development of a second language, are necessary to developing sound culturally
and linguistically responsive programs for Latino ELLs. Their principal recommendation is for schools to offer additive bilingual programs such as dual language education.

- **Encouraging Parental Involvement:** Research findings are consistent in pointing to the critical role that parent and family involvement has on students’ academic achievement, attendance, school engagement, and attitudinal behaviors. The attitudes and actions of schools toward parents were found to be the key predictors of parent involvement rather than the parents’ income, educational level, race, or previous experience with parent involvement. Hence, critical to parent involvement in their children’s education are school programs that focus on parents’ personal formation (i.e., that foster self-confidence and improved relations with the school) and civic engagement (i.e., that focus on increasing parents’ sense of ownership and responsibility in their children’s education).

The National Association of School Boards of Education report *E Pluribus Unum: English, Language Education, and America’s Future* (2007) reviewed research on the education of elementary and secondary ELLs, explored fundamental policy issues, and reported the following findings:

- Language acquisition is a long-term process. Numerous factors affect how long it takes any individual student to become proficient in English. Arbitrary timelines are not in students’ best interest.

- There is an important distinction between “social English” and “academic English.” Many groups of students, not just ELLs, have trouble learning academic English.

- Schools with high concentrations of ELLs face difficulties filling teaching vacancies, are more likely to hire unqualified teachers, and are almost twice as likely to rely on substitute teachers.

- Although most of what an ELL teacher needs to know is similar to other teachers, teaching ESL requires proficiency with a specialized body of knowledge & skills.
The report went on to make the following evidence-based recommendations for school districts across the nation:

- Clarify language education goals.
- Standardize how ELLs are identified and tracked.
- Recruit and prepare adequate numbers of specialized, highly qualified ESL and world language teachers.
- Require that all educators learn basic ESL concepts and techniques.
- A large body of credible research is conclusive that strengthening native language literacy skills improves students’ ability to become proficient in English. The “best practice” literature suggests that most ELLs should be helped to maintain and develop high levels of proficiency in their native language at the same time they are mastering English.
- Select, develop, and administer a comprehensive system of valid and reliable assessments to hold schools accountable for students’ English language proficiency and mastery of academic content.

Differences in the orientation to minority education may explain some of the variation in students’ academic outcomes. Because schools are often organized and shaped by Euro-American, middle-class ways of interacting, students from impoverished homes and/or from culturally and linguistically diverse groups are more likely to experience difficulties in school (Heath 1983; Wells 1986). Educators, policy-makers, and Latino families and community must attend to existing empirical research findings and demographic data that reveals the overall experience of Latino students in metropolitan Chicago schools. In so doing, all stakeholders can begin to address more successfully the micro and macro multilayered factors that facilitate or impede the academic achievement of Latino students. Academics, educators, and policy-makers concur that more research on Latino educational attainment is needed to inform policy and educational change that results in improved academic outcomes. The following section delineates a few key areas of further research related to Latinos and education in the United States.
FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH PROJECTS

1. English Language Learners

- What are the trends in ELL Latino education outcomes in early childhood, elementary and secondary school? What factors contribute to their success or failure?

- Is bilingual education more effective than English-only instruction for ELLs? What is the impact of language and cultural maintenance on the academic outcomes of Latino ELLs?

- What are higher education institutions doing to increase the bilingual and ESL teacher workforce?

- How do language policies negatively affect the education of students who are not yet proficient in English? How can language policies related to education be changed to improve the outcomes of Latino ELLs?

- What is the percentage of Latino ELLs that have interrupted schooling or do not have any schooling from their home countries? What types of school programs address the needs of students with interrupted schooling or no schooling?

- What is the likelihood that late-entry secondary school Latino ELLs (entering in 10th or 11th grade) will be able to develop proficiency in English and graduate from high school? How many alternative high schools are available for late-entry ELLs and what is the quality of the academic and language services they offer? What is the graduation rate of these alternative high schools?

- What is the impact of exit exams on ELL completion rates from high schools?

- How have ISBE and Chicago metropolitan area school districts implemented the NCLB accountability and testing provisions with respect to ELLs?

- What policy steps should occur in Illinois to improve the education of secondary ELLs?
2. High School Dropout Rates

- Multi-pronged approach to identify issues related to Latino high school dropouts: individual factors (self-image, aspiration, absenteeism, truancy, disability, resiliency, language, misbehavior, disengagement, teenage parent, etc.); family factors (education levels, language, employment patterns and mobility, income, immigration status, one- vs. two-parent home, parent involvement, etc.); structural school factors (class size, student-teacher and staff-teacher ratios, bureaucratic orientation, tracking techniques, number of administrators and resource allocation, disciplinary practices, etc.); societal factors (community violence, health care, school isolation, federal and state education policies, funding formulas).

- What is the relationship between school funding and academic success and how does this affect Latinos? How does poverty affect school outcomes for Latino students?

- What factors affect the different rate of school dropout between urban and suburban Latinos in the Chicago metropolitan area?

- What is the difference between ELL and non-ELL Latino student graduation rates and what are the factors that promote ELL Latino graduation?

- What are the pathways to high school graduation for Latino students?

- How does weak adult authority, a climate of truancy and low expectation, large school size, absence of caring adult relationships and of stimulating curriculum contribute to Latino high school dropout?

- How do poverty and the need for youth to earn income for the family affect academic outcomes for Latinos?

3. Early Childhood Education

- What is the extent of limited access/availability of early care and early education programs for Latinos families? What factors contribute to this limited
availability? How can early education opportunities for Latino young children be increased?

- What contributes to Latino families choosing or not choosing to enroll their children in early education?
- How does language of instruction (English or Spanish) influence academic success or failure?
- What is the impact of the use of inappropriate linguistic/cultural screening assessment tools for ELLs on placement and services?
- What are the differences in academic outcomes for children who participate in programs with culturally and linguistically responsive curricular vs. assimilationist approaches?
- To what extent does the early childhood field encourage the increase and integration of culturally and linguistically competent qualified teacher workforce? What is the impact of having a more culturally and linguistically competent teacher workforce on academic success?
- What are higher education teacher preparation programs doing to address the need for more culturally and linguistically competent educators?
- How is the new ISBE policy regarding the requirement to provide appropriate linguistic services for ELLs in early childhood programs being communicated? What are the provisions by the state to implement and enforce these requirements? What are institutions of higher education doing to address this need?

4. Higher Education

- Why is there a disproportionate representation of Latinos in two-year junior colleges?
- How do two-year colleges and four-year colleges collaborate to improve the pipelines to four-year college completion and beyond?
• What are the transfer rates and opportunities from two-year to four-year colleges?

• What are the completion rates for Latinos and what contributes to their success or failure in earning bachelor degrees? What contributes to dropping out or not enrolling in higher education?

• Compare experiences and outcomes of different Latino groups (Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, etc.).

• What are the rates of Latino graduate school participation and completion? What contributes to these rates?

• What is the likelihood for adult ELLs to attain sufficient English proficiency to move into two- and four-year colleges? What is needed to facilitate this transition?

• How does financial aid affect college enrollment and completion rates? Are Latino students well-informed about their financial aid options for higher education? How does knowledge about financial aid affect Latinos students’ choices to pursue higher education?

• What are the implications of the Dream Act for undocumented immigrant Latinos’ participation in higher education.

**Baseline Data/Social Indicators**

The following is a list of variables to be gathered from high schools in the different school districts, both in the city of Chicago and the suburbs, and coded in SPSS. The unit of analysis is school.

1. Name of school

2. School district in which the school is located

3. County in which the school is located
4. City/suburban area (suburban city) in which the school and school district are located

5. Total number of students registered in the school

6. High school dropout rate (percentage of the high school students who drop out during the year)

7. High school dropout rate of the previous year (percentage of the high school students who dropped out during the previous year)

8. Percentage female students in the school

9. Percentage Asian students in the school

10. Percentage Hispanic/Latino students in the school

11. Percentage black students in the school

12. Percentage minority students in the school

13. Percentage white students in the school

14. Percentage students from poor background families (percentage of students in the school who are in the free lunch program)

15. Percentage over-age students

16. Average school mathematics achievement or GPA (if both are available, make two separate variables)

17. Number of below-algebra math courses

18. Percentage students taking calculus

19. Average student-teacher relations

20. Percentage teachers with teaching certificate

21. Student-teacher ratio

22. Percentage truancy
23. Percentage school student mobility (percentage of students who moved within or without the school during the school year)

24. Percentage absenteeism

25. Percentage suspensions

26. Percentage expulsions

27. Percentage foreign-born students

28. Percentage of parents who attended the open-house (parental involvement)

29. Percentage students who face a learning disability

30. Percentage students in the academic track

31. Percentage students in the vocational track

32. Percentage students who participate in athletic activities

33. Percentage students who participate in fine arts activities

34. Percentage students who participate in the vocational club

35. Percentage students taking the SAT, the college entrance examination, during the current year

36. Percentage students who took the SAT the previous year

37. Average SAT school score of the current year

38. Average SAT school score of the previous year

39. Percentage students who are “Limited English Proficient” (LEP)

40. Percentage students who are “Fluent English Proficient” (FEP)

41. Percentage students who are FEP and bilingual

42. Average school reading/English achievement test
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Chapter 3: Work and the Economy

Latino Engagement and Mobility in the Labor Force and Economy of Metropolitan Chicago

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past 30 years Latinos have played an increasingly important role in the economy of metropolitan Chicago. Their share of the population has increased, as has their presence in the labor force. However, they are still concentrated in only a handful of occupations. Many Latinos work in the low-wage labor market in both the city of Chicago and its surrounding suburbs.

Why do Latinos experience substantial occupational segregation? Why do Latino men earn less than white men and African American men? Why do Latino women earn less than white women and African American women? Is there evidence of systematic discrimination against Latinos in the labor market? If such discrimination exists, has the extent and nature of such discrimination changed over time?

There is not one agreed upon theoretical perspective for explaining the nature of Latino labor market experience in the Chicago metropolitan area. Not surprisingly, analysts disagree. One group of explanations emphasizes the structure of the labor market, including the number and nature of job opportunities and the role played by Latinos in the labor market. Over the past 30 years the Chicago economy has become less manufacturing-based and more service-oriented with an important construction sector. This restructuring of job opportunities together with employer human resource management strategies have led to the development of an “hourglass” economy and the “shrinking middle.” Employers interested in lowering labor costs and having workers bear more of the costs of economic uncertainty have increasingly turned to contingent and non-standard employment relations. Labor markets are segmented and there is occupational segregation by race and ethnicity. Housing discrimination also plays a role in a spatial mismatch with Latinos living far from available high-paying jobs. These structural explanations focus more on the nature of the demand for labor and less on the nature of the supply of labor.

A second theoretical perspective emphasizes the nature of Latinos themselves, their “human capital,” and tries to determine the role of education, language, skills, training, work experience, and immigrant status, for example, on Latino labor market success. While a focus on “human capital” does not negate the possibility of racial, ethnic and gender discrimination in the labor market nor the existence of pre-market discrimination against
Latinos, particularly in the educational system, the emphasis is less on discrimination and more on differences among Latinos in their skills and capabilities. The literature on Latinos in the Chicago labor market only occasionally investigates the roles of class, family, and peer group within the human capital framework to account for their effects on decision-making in such matters as schooling and training. Years of schooling or amount of training are taken as given prior to determining the impact of differential “human capital” on Latino labor market success.

There is a third perspective that is not as well developed. This framework investigates the importance of “place,” not in terms of spatial mismatch between jobs and Latinos, but rather in terms of the role of “ethnic enclaves.” Given that many Latinos live in “ethnic enclaves,” the primary issue is whether living in such enclaves fosters or hinders Latino economic progress.

There has been some work describing the Latino labor market experience in Chicago over the past 30 years relying primarily, though not exclusively, on data from the decennial Census and the American Community Survey. However, the literature is less strong in delineating explanations for the patterns of employment, unemployment, and earnings of Latinos in Chicago.

This report has three sections. The first analyzes the leading theoretical perspectives in the literature on the labor market experiences of Latinos in Chicago. The second discusses the leading empirical findings and links, to the extent possible, the empirical findings with the theoretical perspectives presented in the previous section. We also present data on labor force participation, unemployment, industry and occupational distributions, and commuting practices for Latinos and other racial and ethnic groups. The third section presents a series of research questions and accompanying research projects designed to provide more detailed explanations for the patterns of employment, unemployment, and earnings of Latinos, thereby advancing our understanding of Latino engagement and mobility in the labor force and economy of metropolitan Chicago.
**Present State of Knowledge — Theoretical/Conceptual Frameworks**

In broad terms, the labor market experiences of Latinos depend primarily on two factors: 1) the number, nature, and location of job opportunities, together with the functioning of the labor market, and 2) the treatment of Latinos in the labor market.

**The Structure of Job Opportunities in the Chicago Metropolitan Area**

Betancur, Cordova, and Torres (1993) and Toro-Morn (2001) place the process of economic restructuring of the Chicago economy at the center of their analysis of the incorporation of Latinos into the Chicago economy. For Betancur, Cordova and Torres (1993) the transformation of the Chicago economy from predominantly manufacturing-based to more service-oriented has been destructive for Latinos, while Toro-Morn (2001) has a more balanced view. Both take a historical perspective. Betancur, Cordova and Torres (1993) begin with the Mexican immigration to Chicago in the 1916–1929 period and continue with the later immigration of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and South and Central Americans. Toro-Morn (2001) focuses on Puerto Rican women who began coming to Chicago in the 1950s. Both see Latinos as being explicitly recruited by Chicago employers to fill low-wage positions. The limited opportunities faced by these Latinos over their working lives were, to an important degree, determined by the nature of their recruitment to Chicago.

During the late 1940s manufacturing jobs began to leave the city of Chicago for the surrounding suburbs. Latinos living in Chicago often followed these jobs, experiencing long and expensive commutes. By the late 1960s the overall number of manufacturing jobs was declining in the Chicago metropolitan area. Latinos were tied to low-skilled manufacturing jobs, more so than whites or African Americans, thereby suffering more from the restructuring of the Chicago economy away from manufacturing and toward a more service-oriented economy. For example, in 1970 61.6 percent of Latino workers in the Chicago metropolitan area worked in manufacturing, in contrast to 31.1 percent of white workers and 31.3 percent of African American workers. With the decline of manufacturing, workers shifted to other industries. Nevertheless, the labor market remained racially and ethnically
segregated with Latinos still being concentrated in manufacturing. In 1980 48.3 percent of Latinos held jobs in manufacturing, as did 24.8 percent of whites and 24.1 percent of African Americans. Within manufacturing Latinos were concentrated in low-paying operative positions. With the disappearance of jobs in manufacturing, Latinos found work in low-paying jobs in the growing service sectors. Being weak politically and facing discrimination in the labor market, Latinos were unable to benefit from the opportunities for upward occupational mobility available in the growing service economy. Rather, the process of economic restructuring reinforced their role as a cheap labor pool (Betancur, Cordova, and Torres 1993).

Toro-Morn (2001) accepts the overall analysis of economic restructuring found in Betancur, Cordova, and Torres (1993) but has a different evaluation of its implications for Latinos, at least for Puerto Rican women, the subjects of her analysis. Puerto Rican women were also initially concentrated in manufacturing. In 1970 62.0 percent of Puerto Rican women employed in Chicago worked as operatives. By the 1990s, operatives accounted for a far smaller share of Puerto Rican women employees. Only 17 percent were holding such positions. Rather, Puerto Rican women workers were more likely to be holding white-collar positions. Approximately one-third of employed Puerto Rican women were clerical workers in 1990, in contrast to only 18.4 percent in 1970. For the most part, these were low-paying white collar jobs with little chances for advancement. Having low levels of education and facing discrimination in the labor market, many Puerto Rican women already living in Chicago were not able to move to higher paying positions with opportunities for upward mobility.

This appeared to change during the 1980s when many middle-class and educated women left Puerto Rico and moved to Chicago to find jobs in the growing fields of high-tech, education and health care. Toro-Morn (2001) implies, but does not convincingly demonstrate, that they were the ones holding better paying professional and managerial positions, and an increasing proportion of Puerto Rican women were found in these positions in Chicago. The share of employed Puerto Rican women working in professional and technical jobs rose from 3.2 percent in 1970 to 14.0 percent in 1990 and the share of employed Puerto Rican women in Chicago working as managers and administrators rose from 0.8 percent in 1970 to 7.8 percent in 1990. Though Toro-Morn does not systematically
address the growing presence of Puerto Rican women in professional and managerial positions, she does point to self-employment as a possible avenue for economic advancement.

Both Betancur, Cordova, and Torres (1993) and Toro-Morn (2001) use decennial Census data. They focus on the broad Census occupational and industrial categories and investigate Latino presence in these categories over time. They find a labor market segmented along gender, racial, and ethnic lines. Had they used the more finely defined Census occupational categories, the evidence of Latino occupational concentration would likely have been even stronger since the broad Census categories are very heterogeneous. The decennial Census data are very useful for describing racial, ethnic, and gender differences in the labor market at a moment in time. However, these authors do not exploit the data appropriately to draw conclusions about the operation of local labor markets over time and the careers of workers in those labor markets. They do not follow age cohorts over time. Furthermore, Toro-Morn (2001) does not separate out the newly arrived more educated Puerto Rican women from the Puerto Rican women living in Chicago for a more extended period of time. Thus, she can merely assert rather than demonstrate that the longer term Puerto Rican women residents of Chicago were not achieving upward occupational mobility and the better jobs were being held by the newly arrived more educated Puerto Rican women.

The more recent analyses of Latinos in the Chicago labor market better utilize the decennial Census data together with the American Community Survey to analyze the careers of Latinos. While not all Latinos in the Chicago area labor force are immigrants, many are foreign born. Koval (2004, 2006) analyzes the labor market experiences of Latinos by focusing primarily on Mexican immigrants. He, too, emphasizes the negative impact of economic restructuring on Latinos. His analysis is more developed, both theoretically and empirically, than the earlier studies.

He utilizes a segmented economy framework emphasizing a duality in the structure of the economy. The Chicago economy is segmented into “core” and “periphery” industries and firms, resulting in “core” and “periphery” jobs. There are core and periphery industrial jobs, core and periphery information and technology jobs, and a service sector that administers to the core and periphery of the economy. While Koval does not extensively
develop the characteristics of “core” and “periphery” jobs, positions in the “core” of the economy are typically characterized by relatively high wages, relatively good working conditions, relative employment stability and opportunities for advancement. Jobs in the “periphery” pay relatively low wages, have relatively poor working conditions and provide minimal job security and few opportunities for advancement.

With the economic segmentation and the labor market segmentation which flows from it, an individual’s earnings at a moment in time and career prospects over time are strongly influenced by where a worker is located in the structure of the economy. As a result, an individual’s “human capital” may be less important in determining pay and career prospects. Two individuals with the same skills and capabilities holding similar jobs have very different earnings and career prospects depending on whether they are working in a “core” or “periphery” industry or firm.

Not only is the economy segmented but the ongoing restructuring is leading to an “hourglass economy” in the Chicago area. The job structure is becoming more bifurcated with job growth at the top and bottom of the occupational structure. Jobs in the middle, often in manufacturing, are shrinking in relative importance. The “hourglass economy” with its two-tiered reward structure does not bode well for individuals with low levels of education, limited job training and job skills, and less than complete proficiency in English. They will be restricted to low paying, dead-end jobs in the periphery of the economy. Latinos, African Americans, and the white working poor dominate these positions while more affluent whites and Asian workers are more likely to be employed in the upper-tier of the “hourglass economy.”

Koval points out that Mexicans are concentrated in a few industries and occupations. In 2000 more than half of foreign-born Mexican men and women worked in manufacturing and food service. Construction is another important source of jobs for Mexican immigrant men while many Mexican immigrant women work in education, health, and social services. Mexicans born in the United States find jobs in a wider range of industries. Men are less concentrated in manufacturing and food service and much more likely to be working in retail trade. US-born Mexican women are much less likely to be employed in manufacturing than Mexican immigrant women and much more likely to be working in education, health, and social services. Food service is not an important source of employment for US-born
Mexican women. Rather, finance, insurance, and real estate is an important job destination for them. The differences in employment patterns of immigrant and US-born Mexicans notwithstanding, Koval (2004, 17) concludes that “most Mexicans live in and work in a service and blue-collar occupational world.”

Not only are there Mexican occupational and industrial niches in the Chicago labor market, over time Mexicans appear to be losing economic ground in Chicago. Lacking explicit longitudinal data, Koval (2004) performs a cohort analysis. Mexican immigrants aged 25 to 34 who came to Chicago between 1970 and 1979 represent the 1980 cohort. Given this cohort’s age, the 1990 cohort includes Mexican immigrants aged 35 to 44 who had come to the United States more than 10 years before and the 2000 cohort includes Mexican immigrants who had come to the United States more than 20 years before. These cohorts of Mexican immigrants are compared to similar aged whites, African Americans, and foreign-born Asians. From 1980–2000, the total personal income differentials between Mexican immigrants and whites and foreign-born Asians widened substantially. Furthermore, the total personal income of African Americans increased somewhat more rapidly than the total personal income of Mexican immigrants.

Koval’s (2004) analysis of personal income differentials by racial and ethnic groups over time, while provocative, is ultimately only suggestive and not conclusive. First, only one cohort of Mexican immigrants is analyzed, making it difficult to reach conclusions about Mexicans as a whole. A more extensive study of the entire Mexican population in Chicago would be required prior to concluding that Mexicans are losing ground in Chicago. Second, median total personal income in Illinois is used as the measure of relative economic standing. Given that the analysis is of Mexicans in Chicago, it would have been preferable to use personal income measures for Chicago, not Illinois. Third, total personal income includes both labor and non-labor income. Given that this is an analysis of the Mexican labor force, a measure of labor income alone would have been more consistent with the focus of the study. Fourth, explicit longitudinal data would be more useful for determining the extent to which Mexicans are reaching economic parity with individuals from other racial and ethnic groups as well as for determining the factors fostering or hindering the achievement of income parity.
Data from the decennial Census do not lend insight into employer human resource management policies. Yet the increased use of contingent and non-standard employment relations is one of the factors causing the development of an “hourglass economy,” particularly the “shrinking middle” and the growing low-wage sector of the labor market. Large numbers of Latinos are said to find employment, albeit short-term, through temporary agencies, day-labor hiring halls, and by lining up on street corners waiting for potential employers to drive by.

Peck and Theodore (2001) and Theodore (2003) analyze the role of temporary agencies and day labor agencies in regulating and restructuring Chicago’s contingent labor markets. By generating a suitable labor force, these labor market intermediaries enable employers to transform jobs that were once long-term and stable into positions that are more short-term and contingent. They allow firms to locate in the suburbs while still having access to underemployed individuals living in low-income urban areas willing to work for lower pay than people living in the suburbs. Given the extent of racial and ethnic segregation in housing, temporary and day labor agencies help to further rigidify the racial and ethnic balkanization of the Chicago labor market by locating in Latino neighborhoods and explicitly targeting Latino workers. They worsen conditions for workers in the low end of the labor market and transform jobs that were thought to be “dead end” into even worse positions. Since Latinos comprise a large share of contingent employment in general and temporary work in particular, the operation of temporary agencies and day labor hiring halls serves to worsen the long-term employment opportunities for Latinos.

These articles, while provocative, provide minimal empirical data to support their analyses of the role and impact of these labor market intermediaries. They do not provide convincing data on the share of the Latino labor force in Chicago working under such contingent arrangements. Nor do they investigate whether Latinos can use low-paid temporary work as stepping-stones to more long-term, better-paying jobs. Here, too, longitudinal data would be needed to determine the role of temporary work in the careers of Latino workers in Chicago.
Latino “Human Capital” and the Labor Market Experiences of Latinos in Chicago

A second approach focuses more on the “human capital” of Latinos, rather than labor market structure and the dynamics of economic restructuring, to analyze their employment and earnings. “Human capital” is a broad term encompassing education, training, work experience, skills (both “hard” and “soft”), and language proficiency among other factors postulated to influence labor market success. Latinos have less “human capital” than other racial and ethnic groups. Given that they have completed fewer years of schooling, have less US labor market experience, and weaker English language proficiency than whites, for example, they would be expected to earn lower wages, work in lower status occupations, and be less likely to experienced substantial upward occupational mobility than whites. While Latinos may face discrimination in the labor market, the fact that they earn lower wages and are more likely to be unemployed than whites is not necessarily evidence of discrimination.

Stier and Tienda (2001) is the most extensive treatment of Latino labor market experiences in Chicago using primarily the “human capital” approach. However, their findings are not fully consistent with the expectations of human capital theory. With data from the Urban Poverty and Family Structure Survey, a survey of people living in low-income neighborhoods in Chicago in 1987, they take a life-course perspective to human capital accumulation and its impact on labor market success. It is a cross-sectional survey taken at one moment in time and includes a series of retrospective questions used to generate information over the life course.

While Stier and Tienda place their study in the context of the economic and social transformations affecting the Chicago metropolitan area in the 1970 to 1990 time period, they argue that demand-side stories emphasizing economic restructuring are inadequate for explaining the large racial and ethnic differences in the Chicago labor market. Rather, they begin with a supply-side story, one focusing on human capital differences, which they supplement with a theory of employer discrimination.

Education is a primary component of “human capital.” Latinos living in low-income neighborhoods were less likely to complete high school than were African Americans and whites. Family background has an influence on educational attainment. Even after
controlling for family structure, number of siblings, mother’s education, and family poverty status, Latinos still had higher high school dropout rates. Thus, Latinos enter the labor market with fewer years of education completed than whites or African Americans.

Once in the labor market Mexican men had higher labor force participation rates than whites, Puerto Ricans, and African American men (Stier and Tienda 2001). Labor force participation rates encompass those who are employed and those who are unemployed. Mexican men were most likely to be employed and they had the lowest unemployment rates. Given their higher high school dropout rates, this is contrary to what theories of human capital would predict. While the unemployment rate of Puerto Rican men exceeded that of whites, it was substantially less than the unemployment rate of African American men.

The labor force participation rate of Mexican women was slightly below that of white women and somewhat higher than that of African American women. Puerto Rican women were much less likely to participate in the labor force than women in the other racial and ethnic groups. Mexican women were almost as likely as white women to be employed and much more likely than African American women to be holding a job. Puerto Rican women were much less likely to be employed than the other women. Latinas had lower unemployment rates than white or African American women.

Family background, family status, and human capital may influence the likelihood of labor force participation. While there are differences in labor force participation along racial and ethnic lines, after controlling for family background, family status, and human capital, there are no significant differences in labor force participation among Mexican, Puerto Rican, white, and African American men and women. Thus, most of the differences in labor force participation reflect group differences in human capital, family background, and family status.

If employed, many people living in low-income neighborhoods in Chicago have relatively short job tenure. For example, after 5 years only 30 percent of African American, white, and Puerto Rican men and 40 percent of Mexican men remained in the same job. Women had shorter job tenure than men. After 5 years only 25 percent of African American,

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2 Many Mexicans immigrated to the United States after completing their formal schooling in Mexico. The analysis of high school dropout rates does not account for location of schooling. The factors influencing educational attainment in Mexico may differ from those in the United States in general, and Chicago in particular.
white, and Puerto Rican women and 35 percent of Mexican women remained in the same job. These findings imply that the day-labor hiring halls and temporary agencies said to be located primarily in Latino neighborhoods (Peck and Theodore, 2001; Theodore, 2003) only account for a small share of the Mexican labor force. If they represented a major element of employers of Latino labor, then the job tenure of Mexicans would likely not exceed the job tenure of whites, African Americans, and Puerto Ricans.

If unemployed after having held a job, there are racial, ethnic and gender differences in the likelihood of being reemployed. Women have much more difficulty finding a job than do men. African American men have longer jobless spells than their white and Latino counterparts. Puerto Rican women have the most difficulty being reemployed. If unemployed, residents of low-income neighborhoods in Chicago have difficulty finding work. This is not because they do not wish to work (Tienda and Stier 1991) or because their reservation wage is too high (Stier and Tienda 2001). It is due to a lack of job offers. For African Americans and, to a lesser extent Puerto Ricans, the primary issue is discrimination. Employers seem to prefer Mexican and white workers (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Stier and Tienda 2001).

Since Stier and Tienda (2001) focus on low-income areas in Chicago, they cannot speak to the relative economic standing of Latinos in the Chicago metropolitan area. Given their higher relative incomes, whites are less likely to be living in these low-income areas than are African Americans or Latinos. Furthermore, even though they develop a life-course analysis from cross-section and retrospective data, they are not able to address in detail long-term trends in Latino labor market experiences. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that they would agree with Koval (2004) that Latinos as a whole are falling further behind in their relative economic standing. Instead, they seem to emphasize the difficulties facing African Americans and, to a lesser extent, Puerto Ricans living in low-income neighborhoods in the city of Chicago.

The “Ethnic Enclave”

A third perspective acknowledges that Latinos live in ethnically segregated neighborhoods in Chicago. Latino immigrant “barrios” have rich social and ethnic capital
and strong informal economies. Immigrant workers are very likely to use neighborhood contacts and networks to locate jobs. Within ethnic enclaves, there are likely to be many small businesses able to provide employment comparable to jobs in the more mainstream economy to recent immigrants and those who do not speak English. Furthermore, ethnic enclaves may provide opportunities for entrepreneurship for recent immigrants from the ethnic group’s homeland. They may create businesses designed to meet the needs of the people living in the ethnic enclave. In short, ethnic enclaves can provide immigrants with alternative paths to economic success.

On the other hand, living in ethnic enclaves may hamper immigrants’ abilities to assimilate into the mainstream economy where over the longer term there are better employment opportunities available than in the ethnic enclave. Furthermore, if the ethnic enclave is located far from the areas with dynamic economies and plentiful employment opportunities, living in the ethnic enclave may result in a spatial mismatch with a resulting geographic barrier to employment.

Tienda and Raijman (2000, 2004) and Raijman (2001) analyze Mexican immigrant entrepreneurship in Little Village, a Latino neighborhood in Chicago. Half of the Mexican population in Little Village reported wanting to start a business. Social ties linked to business foster the desire to be an entrepreneur. Household savings affect the desire to start a business since these economic resources can be a source of start-up capital. The lack of financial capital and inadequate social capital serve as barriers to starting a business. Many did not know of organizations that would be able to provide them with training, technical assistance and useful business contacts. Thus, many remained latent entrepreneurs rather than actual entrepreneurs.

Those who became entrepreneurs typically created very small businesses. During the 1980s and 1990s there was a rapid growth in the number of Latino-owned businesses. However, these businesses were typically very small and very economically precarious. In 1987 Latino-owned and operated firms accounted for 19 percent of the total sales generated by minority-owned enterprises in the Chicago PMSA. In 1997 there were three times as many Latino-owned businesses. However, these businesses accounted for only 21 percent of the total sales generated by minority owned businesses. Firms owned and operated by Asians increased their share of sales generated by minority-owned businesses from 46.1
The share of minority firm sales produced by African American owned businesses declined from 34.6 percent in 1987 to 15.7 percent in 1997 (Tienda and Rajman 2004, 6). Latino-owned businesses in Little Village were primarily self-started rather than bought or inherited. Approximately 25 percent of these businesses were begun in the informal economy. More than half of these were home-based businesses. The rest began in flea markets or on the street.

**EMPIRICAL FINDINGS**

The previous section presents three theoretical perspectives on Latino employment and earnings in Chicago. In this section we examine descriptive data taken largely from the decennial Census supplemented by the American Community Survey on the Latino employment experience in Chicago and its suburbs.

**Labor Force Participation**

Generally, Latinos have shown since 1970 through 2006 a consistently strong attachment to the labor force in the Chicago metropolitan area at rates that are generally higher than those for whites and African Americans and, in 1990 and 2006, higher than those for Asians as well. This suggests that Latinos are not obviously excluded from participating in the labor market relative to other racial and ethnic groups. The only anomaly appears in the year 2000, when Latino labor force participation dropped below the rate for whites and by nearly 10 percentage points from the 1990 level. Although the rates for Latinos rebounded by slightly less than 8 percentage points by 2006 and did not reach the level in 1990, the overall participation rate for Latinos pushed them ahead of whites, African Americans and Asians.

These persistently high rates of labor force participation by Latinos are remarkable when one considers that:

1) The composition of Latinos shifted from being predominantly Puerto Rican in 1970 to one that is comprised of large numbers of Mexican-born workers in 2006, with many of the Mexican-born working age residents not
authorized to work in the United States. We could not find any study that could guide us as to whether the legal status of workers has a material effect on whether they are reported in either the count of people who are working age or in the count of people in the labor force. This is significant because, assuming that the true numbers of Mexican-born working residents (irrespective of status) and of labor force participants remain proportionate to the official counts (a very large assumption), Latino participation rates grew and remained relatively high in the face of legal barriers to entry in the labor force. But if no such assumption can be made, then, in the absence of credible estimation methodologies, the validity of the labor force participation rate calculation is somewhat suspect for groups with large immigrant populations.3

2) The rate of growth of the Latino population far exceeded the rates of growth of all other major racial and ethnic groups. This is significant because the overall rate of growth in the size of the Latino population might lead to a dilution in the take-up rate that would be seen in the participation numbers. Instead, the participation rate for Latinos generally trended up during the period 1970 to 2006. Here, again, the issue is whether the data capture the full picture of the Latino labor force. If it does, then the rates are relatively robust despite significant barriers for those who are not authorized to work. If the size of the labor force is understated and the raw participation number is not, then the participation rates are somewhat smaller.

These data also do not explain the causes of these phenomena. If the participation rates are accurate, the relatively high rates seen for Latinos may be due to a fundamental restructuring of the economy where job growth and opportunity is at the low end of an income and skills continuum where a large number of Latino immigrant workers tend to pool. Also, the growth of ethnic enclaves has created formal and informal economies separate from the mainstream. There are currently no estimates regarding the size of these

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3 The data on labor force participation and on unemployment are not adjusted to take full account of unauthorized immigrant working age adults, employed workers, or unemployed workers. Jeffrey Passel at the Pew Hispanic Center has developed methodologies for making these estimates, but, to our knowledge, they have not been independently validated, nor have these methodologies been applied to areas on the scale of the Chicago metropolitan area or smaller.
enclave economies in Chicago and their capacity to absorb new workers. Given the size of the Latino community in Chicago, it is reasonable to test the hypothesis that it is able to sustain a growth cycle that encourages high rates of labor force participation within the community.

Finally, while these data indicate that Latinos are actively engaged in the labor market, it is by no means clear that they do not face discrimination. For instance, Latinos may not be afforded a real means of advancement. Employers may take advantage of the unauthorized status of some immigrant workers by underpaying them or placing them in dangerous working conditions.

Figure 1.

Percent of Persons Participating in the Civilian Labor Force,
Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1970–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>69.1%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labor force participation rates are lower in the City of Chicago than those outside of the City of Chicago (Figures 2 and 3), but the inter-racial and ethnic patterns generally remain the same. Except in 2000, Latinos in the suburbs have equivalent or higher rates of participation compared to other groups between 1970 and 2006. In Chicago Asians eclipse Latinos in 1970, 1980 and 200, but show lower labor force participation rates in 1990 and 2006. These city/suburban differences may be due to the relative differences in the overall rate of job growth or decline by industry or occupation. Another explanation is that more jobs are being created in the suburbs that attract a high proportion of workers who perceive themselves as having fewer employment options (e.g., immigrants who will work in low wage, low skills jobs). These differences, however, do little to favor the argument that the growing number of ethnic enclaves is creating a second labor market that has a large effect on participation rates. If this were the case, then city of Chicago labor force participation rates should be higher for Latinos since the highest population concentrations of Latinos exist in city of Chicago neighborhoods.
Figure 2.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid.
Figure 3.

Percent of persons participating in the civilian labor force,
Chicago suburbs, 1970–2006

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Figure 4 shows that labor force participation rates for women in metropolitan Chicago in the same years were lower than those of men. Among all ethnic and racial groups, however, the gap was greatest between Latino males and females. Latino women are much less likely to participate in the labor force than Latino men.

Throughout this period Latino men generally show higher labor force participation rates relative to the other ethnic and racial groups. Asian males have a higher rate in 1970 and white and Asian males have higher rates in 2000 (consistent with Figure 1). Throughout this series of years African American males exhibit consistently lower participation rates.

The data for Latino women, however, display a very different pattern. In addition to the sharp differences in rates between Latino males and females, Latino females often exhibit

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lower participation rates than any other ethnic or racial group. In 1980 and 1990 Latino women show slightly higher participation rates than African American women, but the situation is reversed in 1970, 2000 and 2006.

While these data do not explain the underlying reasons, they are consistent with the view that Latino men may perceive more or different work opportunities than African American men and are therefore more likely to remain active in the labor force. By the same token, Latino women are much less inclined to be active in the labor force, although this is changing so that Latino women are becoming much more like women of other ethnicities. These data do not speak to the quality of work opportunities for each group, the compensation received by different groups, or the long-term career paths.

Figure 4.

Civilian Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1970–20067

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1 Ibid.
Unemployment

Labor force participation quantifies those who are employed or unemployed and who remain engaged in the labor force (actively seeking work, engaged in re-training, etc.). The unemployment rate focuses on those who are out of work but remain in the labor force. Taking the Chicago metropolitan area as a whole (Figure 5), African Americans have experienced the highest unemployment rates throughout the decades. Latinos, too, have experienced unemployment rates persistently much higher than those for whites and for Asians, but they have fared much better than African Americans. Latino unemployment rates are consistently far lower than those of African Americans and the gap in unemployment rates between African Americans and Latinos has grown over time.

Figures 6 and 7 tell similar stories. The unemployment rates for Chicago, which are higher overall for the city when compared to the suburbs, show that Latinos have experienced unemployment levels higher than whites and Asians but lower than African Americans. The suburbs also show a similar pattern of relatively high unemployment for African Americans, somewhat better rates for Latinos, and still better rates for whites and Asians.

These data suggest that whites and Asians have an advantage over Latinos and African Americans in the labor market, but do not provide illumination as to the underlying causes. It would be a mistake to conclude that since Latinos and African Americans show persistently higher unemployment rates that the reasons for these relatively higher rates are the same. In addition, the reported unemployment rates for Latinos may not adequately account for Latino immigrants who are not authorized to work in the United States. Official statistics may not account for the portion of the unauthorized workforce that is employed as either day laborers, contingent workers or as informal workers, and the same is true for the unauthorized workforce that is seeking work. Furthermore, the data track relative differences by ethnicity and race, but as the literature show, it is not clear whether these differences in the Chicago metropolitan area are the result of racial or ethnic preferential advantage.
Figure 5.

Unemployment Rates by Race/Ethnicity
Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1970–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid.
Figure 6.

**Unemployment Rates by Race/Ethnicity,**

**City of Chicago, 1970-2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid.
Figure 7.

Unemployment Rates by Race/Ethnicity,

One possible way of understanding the extent to which contingent or day labor employment may play a role in the overall employment experience is to examine the splits between part-time and full-time employment by race over time. Figure 8 displays employment status in five periods from 1980 to 2008 subdivided by full-time/part-time and by race/ethnicity. In each of the five periods, a higher percentage of employed Latinos worked full-time than African Americans, Asians or whites. However, the proportion of part-time workers increased over time for all groups. Assuming that there is no significant undercount in the sample of unauthorized workers within the Latino community and that the undercounted portion of the Latino workforce exhibits the same proportional splits between part-time and full-time employment, these data suggest that Latinos exhibit a

\[10\text{ Ibid.}\]
strong attachment to full-time work and are consistent with the data showing strong labor-force participation rates.

**Figure 8.**

*Employment Status by Race/Ethnicity, Chicago MSA, 1980 – 2008*

**Industry Concentrations**

Table 1 shows the percentage distributions by gender for whites, African Americans, and Latinos in each of four industries in which whites are most concentrated. Table 2 shows the actual counts. In both cases, the four industries with the highest concentration of white males or females in 2008, respectively, were selected.

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Overall, the pattern that emerges is that foreign-born Latinos are much more concentrated in manufacturing than in any of the other three industries. For example, in 2008 26 percent of all foreign-born Latino males were employed by manufacturing businesses. In 2008 US-born Latino males were also somewhat concentrated in manufacturing (16.8 percent), but in recent years they were more concentrated in retail (20.3 percent). In addition, foreign-born Latino males are more heavily concentrated in construction than the other groups. Both male Latino groups were more heavily concentrated than whites or African Americans in retail, and US-born Latino males had a growing concentration in professional and related services, which include waste management services such as janitorial services.

Table 1.

Industry Presence by Race, Ethnicity, and Place of Birth
for Males and Females (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Related Services</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In Tables 1 through 6 “FB” signifies “foreign-born” and “USB” signifies “US-born.”

While the share of US-born Latinas working in manufacturing has dropped substantially between 1970 and 2008, the actual number of US-born Latinas working in this industry has remained relatively constant. US-born Latinas have become increasingly likely to work in professional and related services, retail, and FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate). We cannot determine from these data the distributions across sub-industry sectors within the broad industry categories. For example, US-born Latinas have become more

---

heavily concentrated in professional and related services, but it is not clear from these data whether the much of this growth has been in waste management services or some other industry.

Table 2.
Industry Presence by Race, Ethnicity, and Place of Birth
for Males and Females (numbers)\textsuperscript{13}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>FB Latinos</th>
<th>USB Latinos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Related Services</td>
<td>159,400</td>
<td>204,420</td>
<td>225,203</td>
<td>209,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>53,100</td>
<td>48,740</td>
<td>36,103</td>
<td>230,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>237,400</td>
<td>238,090</td>
<td>231,609</td>
<td>218,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>305,400</td>
<td>141,300</td>
<td>153,400</td>
<td>163,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>FB Latinos</th>
<th>USB Latinos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Related Services</td>
<td>298,300</td>
<td>373,190</td>
<td>447,846</td>
<td>530,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>311,650</td>
<td>301,261</td>
<td>254,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>320,600</td>
<td>301,261</td>
<td>254,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>338,000</td>
<td>263,620</td>
<td>160,702</td>
<td>147,874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Industry Presence by Race, Ethnicity, and Place of Birth for Males and Females (numbers)\textsuperscript{13}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The proportional distributions within a given group need to be seen within the broader context of the overall numbers. In each industry white men and women remain the majority groups even when one combines foreign-born and US-born Latinos. In the case of males, the primary distinction is that by 2008 no more than 18 percent of white men and 19 percent of African American men are concentrated within one industry. In the same year more than 20 percent of foreign-born Latino men were employed in manufacturing and retail, respectively, and more than 20 percent of US-born Latino men were employed in retail. This is especially troublesome given that Latinos are concentrated in two industries that are being hit especially hard by the current recession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the case of females, white, African American, and US-born Latino women are heavily concentrated in professional and related services. Foreign-born Latino women, however, are more concentrated in manufacturing and both foreign- and US-born Latino women are more concentrated than either their white or African American counterparts in retail trade and manufacturing—both industries that are harshly affected by the current downturn.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
In addition, there have been large shifts in the mix of industries in which both foreign- and US-born Latino men and women are employed. In the case of men, there have been large proportional shifts into retail trade and construction and away from manufacturing. In the case of Latino females, there are increasing concentrations in retail trade and service industries, and for US-born Latinas, in FIRE. These data, therefore, suggest that the Latinos diversified into several industries in 2008 and that there is no single prototypical industry in which most Latinos are concentrated (unlike manufacturing in the 1970s, for example). These data do not, however, indicate whether there is greater diversification in the skill levels of the jobs in which Latinos are employed, whether there are differences in the quality of jobs in which US-born Latinos are employed compared to the foreign born, or whether some industries offer greater opportunities for economic advancement than others.

**Racial/Ethnic Composition by Industry**

Whites are the dominant group in the Chicago metro area overall, but Latinos comprise the largest group in key industries in the City of Chicago. Tables 3 and 4 display the racial and ethnic composition of males and females respectively in selected industries by geographic area for each of three periods: 2000, 2006 and 2008. In Chicago in 2000, Latino men were dominant in manufacturing. In 2006, foreign-born Latinos alone became dominant also in retail trade. By 2008, the combined Latino totals for men exceed those for whites and African Americans in wholesale trade, and eclipsed the totals for African Americans in business and repair services. In all three periods, they comprised a substantial proportion of the construction industry and their numbers nearly equal those of whites by 2008.

While Latino men comprised significant proportions of several industries in the suburbs including manufacturing, construction, and retail, they do not dominate any industry like they do manufacturing in the City of Chicago. This same pattern of dominance is not repeated in either suburban Cook or in the collar counties, although there are similarly relatively high numbers in manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, entertainment and recreation services, and business and repair services in which foreign
born Latinos alone exceed the numbers of African Americans in these industries by 2008, and for some industries, dating back as early as 2000.

Table 3.
Demographic Distributions across Industries (males)\(^\text{14}\)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>USB Latino</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Latino women have become prominent in retail and professional services in the city of Chicago. In all three periods Latinas were dominant in manufacturing. Foreign-born Latino women alone outnumbered white women in 2000, but their margin and dominance dwindled by 2008 as manufacturing employment overall has declined. One possible explanation is that Latino women, especially the foreign-born, are concentrated in low-wage, low-skill manufacturing and assembly jobs that are vulnerable to being outsourced or off-shored to lower-cost operations. While the production work may remain in the Chicago area, and even on-site, it is often performed by workers employed by companies not classified as manufacturing businesses. Therefore, some of the job “losses” in manufacturing may actually be the result of how they are classified. Undoubtedly, however, the number of workers performing manufacturing production tasks has declined in the region and it appears that foreign-born Latino women have experienced the greatest losses as a result.

Suburban Latino women, unlike the men, do not dominate any particular industry in any of the three periods, although they outnumber African American women throughout in wholesale and retail trade, business and repair services, personal services and in finance, insurance and real estate in both suburban Cook and in the collar counties. In 2006 and 2008 Latino women also outnumbered African American women in professional and related services in the collar counties.
Table 4.
Demographic Distributions across Industries (females)\textsuperscript{15}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Suburban Cook</th>
<th>Collar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>26,766</td>
<td>17,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation, Communications, and other Public Utilities</td>
<td>13,707</td>
<td>27,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>7,241</td>
<td>3,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>45,987</td>
<td>46,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate</td>
<td>28,785</td>
<td>24,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business and Repair Services</td>
<td>28,039</td>
<td>20,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Services</td>
<td>13,104</td>
<td>12,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional and Related Services</td>
<td>117,700</td>
<td>113,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td>10,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>16,090</td>
<td>12,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation, Communications, and other Public Utilities</td>
<td>13,888</td>
<td>22,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>8,776</td>
<td>2,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>39,179</td>
<td>42,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate</td>
<td>30,832</td>
<td>21,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business and Repair Services</td>
<td>27,936</td>
<td>20,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Services</td>
<td>13,734</td>
<td>9,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional and Related Services</td>
<td>119,866</td>
<td>112,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>7,507</td>
<td>17,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>16,660</td>
<td>10,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation, Communications, and other Public Utilities</td>
<td>9,584</td>
<td>9,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>6,011</td>
<td>2,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>42,280</td>
<td>40,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate</td>
<td>33,904</td>
<td>20,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business and Repair Services</td>
<td>24,890</td>
<td>20,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Services</td>
<td>16,840</td>
<td>11,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional and Related Services</td>
<td>122,030</td>
<td>115,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>16,176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

Occupational Distributions

Table 5 displays the ethnic and racial distribution of male workers across thirteen occupations and by region for each of three years 2000, 2006, and 2008. Table 6 accomplishes the same for female workers across eleven occupations.

Latino men have emerged as the dominant group in several occupations. In each of the three years, foreign-born Latinos alone outnumbered whites and African Americans, respectively, in precision production and machine operation. Latinos as a group also outnumbered whites and African Americans, respectively, in other services and as mechanics and repairers. In 2006 and 2008 Latinos eclipsed African Americans in
transportation and material moving occupations, and were essentially even with African American in sales in both those years as well.

Whites are the unequivocal leaders as jobholders in both Suburban Cook and the collar counties. In these areas, the story is more focused on the comparisons between Latinos and African Americans, where foreign-born Latino men outnumber African Americans across a range of occupations. By 2008 more foreign-born Latinos in suburban Cook County were employed as technicians, other service providers, mechanics and repairers, construction workers, precision production workers, machine operators, and transportation and material movers than African Americans. In 2008 foreign-born Latinos in the collar counties also outnumber African Americans in executive, administrative and managerial occupations, administrative support, other services, mechanics and repairers, construction, precision production, machine operation, and in transportation and material moving. It is noteworthy that Latinos are not generally confined to the least skilled occupations, and in several occupations the foreign born are eclipsing African Americans. It is not clear whether the experience of Latino immigrants matches the experience of other immigrant groups.
Despite relatively low labor participation rates, Latino women, especially those who are foreign-born, have dominated as machine operators in Chicago compared to whites and African Americans. By 2008 the combination of foreign- and US-born Latinos also held the plurality of precision production, transportation and material moving, and private household jobs. In suburban Cook and the collar counties, foreign-born Latino women consistently outnumber whites and African Americans respectively as machine operators.

In the collar counties, Latino women outnumber African American women in several occupations, although both lag significantly behind white women. The occupations now filled by more Latino women than African American include executive, administrative and managerial occupations, specialty professions, management related jobs, technicians and

16 Ibid.
related support jobs, sales, administrative support, private household, other services, precision production and transportation and material moving.

Table 6.
Occupation Distribution (females)\textsuperscript{17}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Chicagoland</th>
<th>Suburban Cook</th>
<th>collar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>PR\textsuperset{1}</td>
<td>USR\textsuperset{1}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these data show changes in the demographic composition of the workforce for each occupation, the underlying reasons remain unclear. Is one group displacing the other groups? Or is one group entering the labor market in larger numbers than others at times when new jobs are opening, especially in the suburbs? While we cast employment data in terms of race and ethnicity, other factors such as education, occupational skills, English-language proficiencies, housing and transportation also play important roles in determining who fills the available jobs. For example, Latinos are filling jobs across the social hierarchy, including high-precision, high-wage occupations and, in the case of collar-county women, to a small degree in executive and managerial positions. Is this because Latinos are gaining

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
more preferential treatment in hiring? Or has the community engaged in more advanced training and education leading into these occupations? And has this engagement been the result of policy or simply encouraged through social networks? These data are inconclusive and the current state of the research in Chicago does not go deeply enough to provide an adequate set of explanations.

Figure 9 shows the mean income by race and ethnicity for the Chicago metropolitan area. While the occupational and industrial data point to Latinos working in a wider variety of jobs, on average their income from work (wage and business income) remains low. In fact, the real income of Latinos in 2008 was below that of African Americans and only 50 percent that of whites. Over the 1980 to 2008 time period Latino real income stagnated. Whites experienced a sharp growth in real income while African Americans experienced a small increase in real income. However, these data, being mere averages, are limited in that they cannot address the issue of income mobility over a working career. And given the sharp growth in the Latino population in the Chicago metropolitan area, the stagnation in real income may reflect more the entrance of newly arrived Latinos into low-wage jobs at the bottom of the labor market rather than the stagnation of Latino income over a working career.
Quality of Work, Work Opportunities, and Other Empirical Issues

While unemployment is certainly a problem facing Latinos, the nature of their employment is also problematic. While the share of Latinos earning high wages has increased significantly (Ready and Brown-Gort 2005), many other Latinos are numbered among the “working poor.” Many Latinos are not able to find full-time employment throughout the year, and many who work full-time, full-year do not earn enough to support a family. Between 1990 and 2000 there was a sharp increase in the number of working poor families in the city of Chicago and in the Chicago metropolitan area as a whole. Latinos were more likely to be among the “working poor” than were whites, African Americans, or Asians and their probability of being among the “working poor” increased from 1990 to 2000. In 2000, 20.3 percent of all Latino working adults in metropolitan Chicago were working poor in contrast to 18.9 percent in 1990. The same held in the city of Chicago. In 2000 23.2 percent of all Latino working adults were working poor, compared to 21.2 percent in 1990.
Latino workers were over-represented among the working poor in 2000. In metropolitan Chicago Latino adults comprised 16.4 percent of the employed but 37.0 percent of the working poor. In the city of Chicago Latino adults comprised 25.8 percent of the employed but 39.4 percent of the working poor (Chicago Urban League, Northern Illinois University, and Roosevelt University n.d., 14–17). Latino working poor adults were most likely to be working in manufacturing and accommodation and food service activities and in production occupations. Latino working poor adults were much more likely to be full-time, full-year workers than other working poor adults. More than 80 percent of working poor Latino adults worked 35 hours or more per week though they did not necessarily work full-year (Chicago Urban League, Northern Illinois University, and Roosevelt University n.d.). In short, Latinos predominate in jobs paying low wages.

Not only do many Latinos work in low-paying positions, Latinos may be more likely to face dangerous working conditions. Work-related deaths among Latinos in Illinois are high. Buchanan, Nickels, and Morello (2005) report on the results of a survey of day laborers at one street-corner hiring site in Chicago. While the sample size was very small, only 21 men, 90 percent were Latinos. Most worked construction jobs, and more than 50 percent of them had been injured in the previous year. Mehta, Theodore, Mora, and Wade’s (2002) extensive survey of documented and undocumented immigrants living in the Chicago metropolitan area reported that Latinos were significantly more likely to experience a serious injury on the job than were other immigrant workers. Whether a worker was documented or undocumented did not seem to influence the likelihood of a serious injury on the job.

While educational attainment is not the only factor influencing labor market opportunities, it is likely that the low educational attainment of Latinos restricts their employment options. Latinos are the least well educated of the four major racial and ethnic groups in the Chicago metropolitan area. Over three-fourths of Asian adults, two-thirds of non-Latino whites and over half of African Americans aged 25 and over have some college level education or higher, but less than one-third of Latinos have attained the same level of post-secondary education. Over one-third of Asian adults, one-fourth of white adults, and one-ninth of African American adults have obtained a bachelor’s degree. Only 8 percent of Latinos have graduated from college. Latinos with some post-secondary education were
very unlikely to be part of the working poor. Furthermore, 45 percent of working poor Latino adults in the Chicago metropolitan area had poor English language ability (Chicago Urban League, Northern Illinois University, and Roosevelt University n.d., 38–41).

Employer discrimination might also limit the job prospects of Latinos. Kenney and Wissoker (1994) report findings from an audit study of young Latinos in Chicago and San Diego. Matched pairs of white and Latino male job seekers between the ages of 20 and 24 were created. They responded to a random sample of newspaper advertisements for entry-level jobs. White job seekers were significantly more successful than Latino job seekers, obtaining 30 percent more interviews and 52 percent more job offers with the audited firms relative to their Latino counterparts. Even when they both received interviews, white job seekers were more likely to receive job offers than Latino job seekers. The evidence of discrimination against Latinos was strong.

Living in an ethnic enclave might also influence the job prospects of Latinos. Liu (2008) compares the employment accessibility of low-skilled immigrant and US-born Latinos (those with less than a high school degree) between the ages of 16 and 65 living in and out of ethnic enclaves in the central city, inner-ring suburbs, and outer-ring suburbs of Chicago, Los Angeles and Washington DC. The study uses data from the 2000 Census to determine the extent to which there is an ethnic enclave effect and a spatial mismatch effect. A majority of low-skilled Latino workers in Chicago reside in the central city with many living in ethnic enclaves. Latinos in the Chicago suburbs were less likely to live in ethnic enclaves. US-born Latinos are less likely to be employed than those who are foreign born in the city of Chicago and in the suburbs. This holds whether or not they are living in ethnic enclaves. Residents of Chicago have longer commutes than suburban residents. Ethnic enclave residents in the suburbs have longer commute times than non-enclave workers. There are no differences in commuting times between enclave and non-enclave workers in Chicago. Living in an ethnic enclave does not increase the probability of being employed. In fact, foreign-born Latinos are negatively affected by living in a central city ethnic enclave. Furthermore, living in ethnic enclaves in Chicago’s central city and outer-ring suburbs actually decrease Latino women’s employment probability. In addition, living in an inner-ring suburban enclave or an outer-ring suburban enclave increases commuting time for women. Overall, it appears that women are more disadvantaged by living in an enclave than men in the Chicago area. Finally, the
tendency cited above that Latinos living in the city tend to rely more heavily than others on car pooling suggests the possibility that the enclave extends to the place of work. That is, people from the same neighborhood also commute to the same geographic area.

Ethnic enclaves in Chicago do not seem to foster Latino entrepreneurship. Herring (2004) uses the Urban Poverty and Family Life survey to study the determinants of entrepreneurship in low-income neighborhoods in Chicago. He distinguishes between two types of entrepreneurship. “Entrepreneurship or self-employment” refers to whether a person was self-employed in their own business. “Nominally self-employed” refers to more informal self-employment activity. Six percent of Latinos were self-employed while 18 percent were nominal entrepreneurs. Controlling for a variety of factors likely to influence entrepreneurship such as sex, education, immigrant status, marital status, experience with job training programs, language skills and age, Latinos were significantly less likely than comparable whites to be either self-employed or nominal entrepreneurs. Contrary to ethnic enclave theory, working in an ethnic enclave significantly decreases the likelihood of being self-employed and of being a nominal entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship is unlikely to be able to reduce levels of poverty. For Mexican-Americans, self-employment results in a decrease in personal earnings greater than $4,000.

Tienda and Raijman (2000) disagree with Herring (2004). Using Little Village as a case study, they find that self-employment rates of Mexican immigrants are higher in neighborhoods where they are residentially concentrated (“ethnic enclaves”). In fact, self-employment might be thought of as a second job for some. Taking account of multiple job holding leads to the conclusion that self-employment is quite pervasive. Rather than resulting in lower incomes, for families involved in informal self-employment, the additional income generated often enables them to live above poverty.

**CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH**

Since 1970 Latinos have played an increasingly important role in the economy of metropolitan Chicago. Their share of the labor force has grown both in the city of Chicago and in the surrounding suburbs. Initially, they found work primarily in manufacturing. Eventually, they became more likely to be employed in other sectors of the economy.
Nevertheless, even though Latino employment is no longer primarily associated with a single industry, Latinos are still concentrated in only a handful of occupations and industries. Many Latinos appear to work in the low-wage labor market of the Chicago metropolitan area, and, on average, the real income of Latinos has stagnated since 1980 while whites experienced sharp growth African-Americans a small increase in real income.

The data on average real income of Latinos suggest that Latinos are not making any progress in the Chicago economy. In fact, they point to a relative deterioration in the position of Latinos relative to members of other racial or ethnic groups. However, the data, being mere averages and not longitudinal, are limited in that they cannot address the issue of income mobility over a working career. The stagnation in Latino real income may reflect more the entrance of newly arrive Latinos into low-wage jobs at the bottom of the labor market rather than the stagnation of Latino income over a working career.

Not surprisingly, the literature is inconclusive regarding Latino progress, with Paral and Ready (2005) being relatively optimistic and Koval (2004) providing a more pessimistic evaluation of Latino progress. Furthermore, the literature is not conclusive concerning the barriers to Latino labor market progress. The relative importance of “human capital” deficiencies” as opposed to labor market structure, employer policies, and labor market discrimination is still at issue. The labor market impact of immigration is also a particularly contentious issue, specifically whether Latino immigrants positively or negatively impact native workers (Rosenfeld and Tienda 1999).

Future research that more clearly delineates Latino income and occupational mobility and the factors impeding or fostering Latino economic progress is necessary, though not sufficient, for effective policymaking.

There are four primary questions for future research. First, are Latinos progressing in the Chicago area labor market and economy? Second, if they are progressing, what are the factors facilitating that progress? Third, if they are not progressing, what are the primary barriers they face? Fourth, do Latino immigrants positively or negatively impact native workers?

The literature is not conclusive regarding Latino progress. While Paral and Ready (2005) argue that the “evidence is mixed” (3), their overall perspective is one of optimism. They state the “gains in the status of Mexican immigrants during the 1990s are impressive”
(16). Koval (2004) provides a more pessimistic evaluation of Latino progress. From 1980 to 2000, the relative economic status of Mexican immigrants “has not improved over time; it has gotten worse” (24). These authors are using the same data, the decennial Censuses. However, their methodologies are different as are the questions they are asking. Nevertheless, the extent and nature of Latino progress in Chicago is still an open question.

Microdata from the 1980 to 2000 Censuses supplemented by data from the American Community Surveys for more recent years, the annual Current Population Surveys, the New Immigrant Survey covering authorized immigrants, the Mexican Migration Project database, and other data sets can be used to analyze Latino employment, earnings, work hours and unemployment. It is possible to compare the labor market experiences of immigrants and those born in the United States. While the data are not explicitly longitudinal, they do allow for approximations of career employment and earnings patterns. The economic status of first-generation, second-generation and third-generation Latinos can be studied as well as the role of education and English language proficiency in fostering Latino economic progress.

Analysts disagree on the role of ethnic enclaves in fostering or hindering Latino economic progress. Social networks evolving from ethnic enclaves may play the role of labor market intermediaries and help Latino immigrants find employment. On the other hand, ethnic enclaves may serve to “ghettoize” Latinos. The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program at the US Census Bureau has created a database that provides information on demographic variables, employment, earnings, place of residence, and employer. This database can be used to analyze the labor markets for different Latino enclaves in Chicago and the metropolitan area. Transportation map overlays may be used to assess whether and to what extent each mode of transportation is associated with employment patterns.

Koval (2004) theorizes that the Chicago labor market is segmented along industrial and occupational lines, with many Mexicans trapped in low-paying, dead-end jobs in the periphery of the economy. He is unable to convincingly demonstrate that this is, in fact, the case. Occupational and industrial data can be used to determine the jobs in each segment of the labor market. Longitudinal data are needed to determine the extent to which Latinos have tended to spend their working lives in low-paying, dead-end jobs and the factors
causing this to occur. Current longitudinal data on Latinos in Chicago does not seem to exist. A survey should be taken of Latinos and other members of other racial and ethnic groups living in Chicago and the suburbs and differentiating low-income areas and wealthier communities. The questions should be structured to generate information about workers’ careers, including positions held, pay levels, job tenure, spells of unemployment, unionization, training (both on-the-job and off-the-job), education, language proficiency, entrepreneurial activities, job search techniques, and time and patterns of travel to work. A survey of employers would complement a survey of individuals and would generate information about any changes in occupational structure, employer hiring, training, and promotion practices as well as possibilities for upward mobility within and across firms.

The labor-market impact of immigration is a particularly contentious issue. Within the Chicago area, the issue is the extent to which Latino immigrants compete with African Americans for similar jobs. Rosenfeld and Tienda (1999) investigate this issue for the 1970 to 90 time period and find support for two different views of the impact of immigration. The first is that immigrants take low-skilled jobs formerly held by native workers. The second is that immigrants help push native workers up the occupational hierarchy. Their work, while interesting, would have been strengthened by a more careful analysis of the nature of segmentation in the labor market. Occupational and industrial data can be utilized to determine the jobs in each segment of the labor market. Data from the 2000 Census together with the American Community Survey for more recent years can be used to determine the extent and nature of labor market competition between Latino immigrants and native workers more recently.
REFERENCES


Chapter 4: Civic Participation

Politicizing the Civic and Socializing the Political: Latino Civic and Political Engagement in Chicago and the Metropolitan Area

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Vanessa Guridy
Nawojka Lesinski

Amalia Pallares
Joanna Schmit
María de los Ángeles Torres

University of Illinois at Chicago
INTRODUCTION

In this white paper we examine the underlying issues that frame our understanding of Latino political incorporation, suggesting that an exclusive focus on political institutions will miss the rich interplay among robust grassroots organizing, distinctive political strategies, and activism in a variety of organizations that have begun bearing fruit as the civic and political engagement of Latinos in Chicago has increased. Part One examines the state of existing knowledge arising from studies on Latino politics. Part Two traces the history of Latino political incorporation and notes some of its unique features at the local level. Part Three explores Latino political activism in a variety of organizations.¹⁸

LATINO CIVIC ENGAGEMENT: THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE

While studies addressing Latino civic engagement have proliferated over the past two decades, there is no common agreement about what such engagement actually entails. Many scholars have focused exclusively on electoral participation and related partisan activities, considering voting to be the most important political act. While this research has offered important insights into patterns of Latino voting behavior it rarely highlights non-electoral activities or the ways in which electoral and non-electoral behavior may mutually shape each other. New research has increasingly pointed to many other types of activities that are non-electoral but certainly civic and political. While some of these non-electoral activities may fall within the realm of formal social institutions such as schools, churches, unions, and social movement organizations, others, such as youth networks or cultural activism, fall outside of these institutions yet frequently rely on networks and coalitions with more formal groups to organize effectively. The electoral and non-electoral divide will be used here to help explain two main approaches to Latino civic engagement.

¹⁸ Special thanks to Luis Rivera for research assistance.
Electoral Engagement

Latino levels of electoral participation are low when compared to general levels of participation among the US population. As Table 1 illustrates, while Latinos represent 14.7 percent of the US population, they only represented 7.4 percent of the electorate in 2008.

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of voters who were Latino</td>
<td>83,098</td>
<td>110,826</td>
<td>88,903</td>
<td>125,736</td>
<td>96,119</td>
<td>131,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages based on total population of voters; numbers in thousands.19

The disparity is also evident when we consider eligible Latino voters as a percentage of the total Latino population. In Table 2 we find that while 58.2 percent of the US population was registered to vote in 2008, only 31.6 percent of the Latino population was.

Table 2.
Percentage of Population Registered to Vote in Election Years, 2000–200820

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Total Population Registered to Vote (includes all races)</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Population Registered to Vote</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Latino Population Registered to Vote</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, the fact that one-third of Latinos of voting age are not citizens significantly lowers the number of voters. However, lower voting-age citizenship rates alone do not entirely account for the difference between Latino registration and voting levels and those of the non-Latino population. Table 3 indicates that while Latinos were 9 percent of the citizen population in 2008, they were only 5 percent of the voting population.

20 Ibid.
Even when controlling for citizenship (by including only the voting-age citizen population), Latino voting rates still lag behind non-Latino whites by 16 percent and behind blacks by 9 percent. Many scholars of Latino politics have attempted to explain this lag primarily by focusing on two sets of factors: socioeconomic status and mobilizing factors. Additionally, in recent years, more attention has been paid to the specific circumstances of new immigrant voters.

Consistently, multiple studies have found that younger age, lower education, and lower income levels negatively affect Latino voting participation, although there are significant variations and mitigating factors among Latino groups. One study found that four major socioeconomic factors almost entirely account for the difference: age, educational attainment, family income, and residential stability. Positive influence of older age is significantly greater for Latinos, suggesting the “socialization process that accompanies

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Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>198,228</td>
<td>202,609</td>
<td>210,421</td>
<td>215,694</td>
<td>220,603</td>
<td>225,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Citizen Population</td>
<td>183,450</td>
<td>186,366</td>
<td>192,656</td>
<td>197,006</td>
<td>201,073</td>
<td>206,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total Population Who Are Latino</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>63.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of All Citizens Who Are Registered to Vote</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of All Citizens Who Voted</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Citizens Who Are Latino</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Citizens Registered to Vote Who Are Latino</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Citizens Who Voted Who Are Latino</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages listed are percentages of the total citizen population in that year; numbers in thousands.

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21 Ibid.
aging is especially important to them.”

One additional factor that has increasingly been found to be positively related to voting is amount of time spent in the United States, which suggests the importance of immigrant socialization and integration as important preconditions for participation. Gender and national origin appear to matter in some instances and not others. For example, in some studies women have lower electoral participation rates when compared to men, whereas in other instances there is no meaningful difference. Moreover, differences among national origin groups appear to be highly correlated to socioeconomic differences between the groups. While these relationships reveal propensity to vote or not, it is very difficult to determine causality in most instances.

In addition to socioeconomic status factors, scholars of Latino politics have been underscoring the importance of mobilization in increasing Latino voter turnout. A broad ethnographic study of electoral politics in several cities found that stark differences in voting rates between cities were the consequence of concurrent intense mobilization in Florida and non-mobilization in Los Angeles during the 1992 elections. Moreover, this and other studies have found that the most intense mobilization is conducted by local groups or individual politicians, and not necessarily by partisan leadership. A survey conducted by NCLR and NALEO in 2006 showed that most Latinos contacted about the elections were contacted by local groups, whereas “only about one-third recalled being contacted by either political party.”

A study of efforts to mobilize Latino youth concluded that efforts to mobilize young nonvoting Latinos may in the long run have a significant effect in turnout through the transformation of individuals from nonvoters into regular voters. Another study compares the effect of live phone calls, direct mail and robotic phone calls on voter turnout and finds that only live phone calls produced a statistically significant increase in

turnout of Latinos with a low propensity to vote. In sum, direct and more personal contact has been found in every instance to make a significant difference in Latino electoral engagement. And, when comparing Latinos to blacks, scholars find that different means are required to integrate them into the electoral process, as Latinos are less integrated into the electoral system.

**Immigrant Voters**

The current Latino electorate has a large immigrant component. In 2002 41 percent of Latino voters were foreign born, while 59 percent were US born. Moreover, several studies have shown that once naturalized, immigrants are at least as likely to vote as native-born Latinos. However, what does seem to impact the propensity to vote, as illustrated earlier, is the length of stay in the United States. Simply put, those who have lived here longer vote more often. One Chicago survey found that likelihood to vote increases for those who had been registered for more than 4 years.

The importance of socialization that leads to immigrant voting has been interpreted differently by scholars. Some scholars use an assimilation model to argue that differences in linguistic, educational, and general assimilation account for participatory differences across Mexican American and non-Hispanic whites and that equalizing these factors closes the chasm in participation. That is, if socioeconomic inequalities are ameliorated as well, language education and time spent in the United States level the playing field between Mexican Americans and non-Hispanic whites—all socialization factors which occur by second or third generation in the United States. According to the assimilation model, then, Mexican Americans should participate like the rest of the population in two or three generations.

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Barreto, by contrast, questions this model by suggesting that foreign-born voters are more politicized and motivated than native-born voters. Rather than seeing immigrants as a group that is unengaged, Barreto claims that immigrants renew the system and that exposure to the system in itself is a positive and mobilizing factor. He finds that immigrant voters are very engaged and that in the 2002 election in California’s “naturalized immigrants voted at much higher rates than native-born Latinos and almost equal to non-Latinos.”

Furthermore, he claims that while native-born citizens have been socialized into uncompetitive elections, negative candidate images, and low levels of political efficacy in an electoral system in decline—in essence encouraging a “non-voting” ethic—naturalized citizens are not and may bring new enthusiasm, especially since they are at receiving end of new outreach to voters. Additionally, Barreto claims that new immigrants are becoming politically “baptized” when stakes are higher, that is, in the context of anti-immigrant sentiment during the past decade, which may serve as an additional motivating factor to vote.

Another area of research investigates the factors that shape the propensity to naturalize as perhaps the most important linkage between immigrants and the electoral system. While we know that there are differences in rates of naturalization by national origin (for instance, Mexicans are less likely to naturalize), the reasons for these differences are not known. Main motivators in seeking naturalization appear to be opportunity, security, stability, and right to petition other family members, whereas main barriers appear to be the cost, English ability, intimidation, and discrimination. Additionally, as home countries pass legislation that guarantees dual citizenship, immigrants’ reluctance to naturalize diminishes. Furthermore scholars have coined the term “defensive naturalization” to describe the response of immigrants seeking to retain their rights in the wake of federal immigration policy passed in the mid-1990s that restricted the rights of non-citizens. Finally,
naturalization rates have increased dramatically in the past two years\textsuperscript{43} and this increase appears to be positively correlated to social movement activism that has been channeled in many instances toward massive naturalization drives. The decision to naturalize is driven by a complex set of individual, collective, structural home-country and US factors.

A third major concern among studies of immigrant electoral participation is the relationship between transnational engagement and political participation. While previous research posited an inverse relation between ties with home country and assimilation into the United States,\textsuperscript{44} more recent research suggests a more complicated picture in which there is a strong and positive correlation between participating in the home country and participating in the United States.\textsuperscript{45} On study finds that, with the exception of non-citizenship, attachment to one’s native country does not diminish the probability that Latinos will participate in a range of political activities and that retention of ties to friends and family may increase the likelihood that Latinos will be active participants in the American political process.\textsuperscript{46}

De Sipio presents a more tempered perspective, arguing that transnational engagement has little impact on US organizational participation.\textsuperscript{47} According to De Sipio, the exception—home-country organizational behavior—tells not a story of transnationalism, but of political socialization. Looking at Dominicans, Pantoja found that belonging to an association concerned with events in the DR and participation in the politics of the DR exerted a powerful positive influence on US political participation, and concludes that being engaged in political groups such as hometown association provides political skills to participants that can be transferred to US politics.\textsuperscript{48} As exemplified in these studies of transnationalism, however, the preponderance of the research supports the conclusion that that electoral participation is not a sufficient measure to understand the depth and breadth of Latino engagement. This brief look at immigrant participation and integration suggests

\textsuperscript{43} Fox, Jonathan. “Understanding Immigrant Civic Engagement: Context Matters,” unpublished manuscript.
\textsuperscript{46} Felix 2008.
\textsuperscript{47} De Sipio 2003.
that socialization and politicization can happen both through electoral and non-electoral participation.

Non-electoral Participation

Increasing attention to non-electoral forms of participation reveals that Latinos are indeed engaged civically along a number of fronts. Participation of Latinos has been broadly documented in the realms of community engagement (broadly defined) and social movement activism. More recently, scholars have begun to analyze the process of citizen education and socialization as forms of participation. Most of these analyses show that a) different Latino forms of engagement are interrelated and mutually reinforcing in complex ways that defy standard categorizations and conceptualizations; b) because of the fluidity and complexity of these interrelationships this engagement is not always easily visible or considered political; and c) while non-electoral participation and electoral participation can shape and even constitute each other, lack of electoral participation cannot be equated with lack of engagement.

Community Engagement

Community engagement among Latinos is a broad concept that can refer both to the activities of geographically delimited communities for neighborhood survival and improvement and to a wider set of activities linked to participation in religious, work-related, educational, cultural, and transnational spheres. An individual’s engagement activities may include organizing for neighborhood improvements, being a member of a school board, participating in a rally organized by a labor union, and attending a cultural event organized by a hometown association. When these activities fall within the same neighborhood, “geo-ethnicity” may be mediating the specific modes and content of engagement. Geo-ethnicity is the set of ethnically articulated attitudes and behaviors grounded in a specific temporal and spatial situation. The concept means that along with ethnicity, the physical location of the community and the networks within that community

49 Felix 2008.
will produce a specific brand of geo-ethnicity that will have an “effect on individuals’ neighborhood engagement.” Yong-Chan Kim et al. found significant variation among neighborhoods, after controlling for socioeconomic variables, asserting that neighborhood context matters. However, these activities may not all fall within the same neighborhood; instead social, familial, transnational, and work networks may facilitate the transition of individuals from one neighborhood to another or pursuing many activities concurrently. Mexican hometown associations, for example, are frequently based in a high-density Mexican neighborhood but have members from many other urban and suburban neighborhoods.

One common characteristic found among different forms of Latino community engagement is the reliance on collective, people-centered methods of outreach and mobilization. In fact, changes in levels of engagement can fluctuate significantly when key people exit the scene. One study following Latino engagement in a housing project for two decades found that cohort was very indicative of community participation, since decline in participation was due to a difference in cohort as young adults active in the 1970s were not replaced by likewise engaged young adults in the 1990s. Research on Latino community activism in Boston found that Latinas were more likely to generate a broader participatory politics than Latino males, because while women were more likely to be directly involved in the community, men relied more on formal political structures and tended to be more hierarchical. Importantly, both Hardy-Fanta’s study and our review of Latino political history in Chicago in the next section, describe how community-centered engagement has been the birthplace of electoral activism and empowerment as a collective strategy that establishes direct links between community demands and changes in electoral participation and representation and enables the creation of inter-Latino and inter-ethnic/racial coalitions with others. These historical experiences point to the need for future analyses that go beyond studying how an aggregate of individual actors are socialized into voting and that instead explain how collective processes of engagement and mobilization can lead to strategic additions of electoral engagement to non-electoral engagement.

51 Ibid., 422.
However, despite this connection, one should not assume that electoral and non-electoral forms of engagement can be explained similarly. One pioneering study that focuses on non-electoral forms of participation among Latinos finds that there is no significant difference in the political participation of Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants, and that there are no statistically significant predictors of participation (although age and levels of education do have a high correlation).\(^{54}\) Most interestingly, in contrast to electoral participation studies, the percentage of life that a person has spent in the United States is not a significant predictor, and there is no significant relationship between English fluency and political participation.\(^{55}\) In sum, both ethnographic studies and a new generation of quantitative studies that analyze non-electoral participation suggest that the level of participation is much higher and the pool of participants and sites of participation are much broader than studies that focus exclusively on electoral participation have suggested.

### Social Movement Activism

Perhaps the most important challenge to the claim that Latinos do not participate stemmed from the massive immigrant marches held in 2006, in which 3.5 million to 5 million participated.\(^{56}\) Recent scholarship on these marches has provided some important insights, including the role of key institutions such as labor, churches, NGOs, schools, and the media in facilitating and promoting massive mobilization; the emergence of new actors into the national political scene, most importantly hometown associations and youth; the use of new political frames such as family and workers rights; the importance of coalitions between Latinos and immigrants, as well as among Latinos of different national origin, and the convergence of immigrant and non-immigrant Latinos around immigration issues as they faced a common racialization.\(^{57}\)

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\(^{55}\) Ibid.


Key distinctions between this activism and the everyday politics of local engagement include not only the scale of mobilization, the shared goal of immigration reform, and the length of sustained resistance, but also the reliance on local, national, and transnational coalitions and alliances among very different institutions, networks, and organizations that include, but go far beyond, immigrant and immigrant-serving organizations. While the marches were best able to display the results of years of networking among different social, political, religious, and cultural actors, they also enabled new connections and ties that may have the potential shape both the substance and style of Latino civic engagement for many years in the future.

Furthermore, a Chicago survey of marchers revealed that immigrant activism is not only carried out by non-citizens, as 74 percent and 69 percent of the marchers in 2006 and 2007, respectively, were US citizens. This confirms the strong linkages between native-born and immigrant Latinos of all statuses that stem not only from familial and social networks that motivated people to march, but also from neighborhood, associational, faith-based, work-related, and hometown networks that will be described in richer detail below.

**OVERVIEW OF LATINO POLITICAL INCORPORATION IN CHICAGO**

In this section we trace the history of Latino incorporation into traditional Chicago political institutions and consider the distinctive features of how this process unfolded, including the formation of racialized ethno-political identity, coalitions, and political agendas that include neighborhoods and homelands.

**Population without Representation**

In the last century a unique phenomenon occurred in Chicago. Latino communities from multiple Latin American countries emerged in a deeply racially polarized and

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machine-controlled political setting. Mexican workers were the first Latinos to make their presence felt. Agreements between the Mexican and United States governments brought thousands of Mexican workers to the steel mills to replace American labor that was off at war.60 Despite massive deportations, the emerging communities would continue to grow, fed both by spillover agricultural migrants and direct immigration from Mexico. In the 1950s Puerto Ricans also settled in the area61 and the 1960 federal relocation program of Cuban exiles brought another major wave of Latinos. The Central American war in the 1980s spurred immigration from that region to Chicago. In the early 1980s changes in the economy leading to the creation of an unprecedented number of low-end service jobs became a magnet for immigrants, mainly from Mexico, looking for work.62 From 1960 to 1980 the Latino population had quadrupled becoming 14 percent of the total population of the city. Surpassing the national average of 58 percent growth, the Latino population increased by 69 percent from 1990 to 2000.63 In all, over 1 million Latinos lived in the metropolitan area with distinct communities not only in seven geographic localities in Chicago, but also increasingly in suburban areas as well.64 All along, Latinos from all parts of Latin America continued immigrating to Chicago.

It was not until the late 1970s that Chicago began to take note of the presence of Latinos. A 1978 report on the state of Latinos in Chicago commissioned by Chicago United, a network of corporate and civic leaders, estimated the Chicago Latino population as being between 600,000 and 650,000 for the entire Chicago metropolitan area.65 It also noted that despite these significant numbers, no Latinos held elected office in Chicago or the suburbs except for two judgeships, a Cook County Commissioner, and a Trustee of the University of Illinois as a state-wide elected official. Those who had tried to run for city office did so unsuccessfully, with 11 candidates running for alderman between 1963 and 1975. The report concluded that there was a glaring under-representation of Latinos in the electoral and public arena. They also added that this under-representation was pervasive across civic

63 Data from the census count as processed by IULR’s Census Project at iuplr.nd.edu.
64 For the location of the Latino labor force in the city see Betancur, Cordova, and Torres 1993.
Chicago as there was hardly any presence of Latinos in the media, universities, philanthropy, or major arts organizations. Ten years later, the Latino Institute, the first Latino city-wide research and advocacy group, also concluded that despite demographic and political conditions that facilitated the entrance of greater numbers of Latinos into political offices and positions of visibility in civil institutions, representation still lagged far behind its potential.

Many reasons have been cited for this lag in Latino presence throughout Chicago’s civic and political community. Chicago is a city defined along clearly demarcated black and white racial lines and groups outside this great divide do not easily find a place in the city’s narrative. Chicago also has had a very diverse Latino community spread out throughout the city, even as some single nationality groups were concentrated in particular neighborhoods, making it difficult to consolidate an ethnic base and find a place at the table of Chicago politics made up of ethnic neighborhood representatives. There were also many Latinos who were not citizens. For instance, even though Mexicans were the majority of the Latino population in the Chicago, the majority of registered voters were Puerto Ricans. Indeed even today, Luis Gutierrez, the only Latino in the Illinois Congressional delegation, is Puerto Rican. An additional factor is the domination of “machine” politics interested in garnering votes. The first Latino Alderman elected since 1915, for example, was supported by the northwest side’s political machine. In contrast, the political machine largely ignored newly arrived immigrants in Mexican neighborhoods. In part because of these obstacles, Latinos have had to develop unique strategies in their quest for meaningful voice and representation.

In general, Latino representation in public office in Chicago has improved from the 1970s. The National Association for Latino Elected and Appointed Officials releases a directory listing the presence of Latino elected officials in the United States. According to its recent 2009 directory, there are a total number of 29 Latino elected officials in Chicago and 120 for the State of Illinois.

66 The Latino population on the US mainland is composed of Mexican Americans (64 percent), Puerto Ricans (9 percent), Cubans (3.4 percent), Salvadorans (3.1 percent), and Dominicans (2.8 percent). The remainder is composed of Central American, South American, or other Hispanic or Latino origins (17.7 percent). US Census Bureau, “Facts for Features, Hispanic Heritage Month 2008: Sept. 15–Oct. 15,” http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special editions/012245.html (accessed July, 2008).
Table 4.
Latino Political Representation in Chicago, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Total Aldermen</th>
<th>Total Latino Aldermen</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Total % of Latinos in Universe*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aldermen (Chicago)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28.1% (Chicago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL State Rep.</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL State Senators</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.78%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of Latinos in universe is taken from US Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2005–2007).

Latinismo: Creating a New Political Identity

Although the Latino communities of Chicago and its surrounding areas were predominantly of one or another Latin American or Caribbean country of origin, Latinismo became a way in which to organize politics.\textsuperscript{67} Unlike other regions of the United States in the 1970s—most notably California, Texas, and Florida—where a single nationality Latin American group dominated, Chicago’s Latino population includes a diversity of national origins.\textsuperscript{68} According to earlier population data,\textsuperscript{69} the Chicago Latino population in the 1970s was distributed as shown in Table 5:

Table 5.
Chicago Latino Population, 1970\textsuperscript{70}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>168,000–178,500</td>
<td>252,000–273,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>160,000–170,000</td>
<td>240,000–260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>28,000–29,750</td>
<td>42,000–45,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latino</td>
<td>44,000–46,750</td>
<td>66,000–71,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>400,000–425,000</td>
<td>600,000–650,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{68} Latino Institute. 1986. \textit{Al Filo/At The Cutting Edge: The Empowerment of Chicago’s Latino Electorate}. Chicago: Latino Institute, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{70} These are estimates made by Chicago United based on assumptions made from initial Census data. The lower number represents the Latino population of the city of Chicago, while the higher end of the range includes estimates from the Chicago metropolitan area (adding approximately 200,000–225,000).
In this context, “Latinismo,” the “ethno/political category” Felix Padilla explored in his groundbreaking work *Latino Ethnic Consciousness* (1985), emerged as a vehicle to bring together the various communities in the city and form a political block. Padilla documented how a group of Puerto Rican and Mexican community service providers came together to form the Spanish Coalition For Jobs. “Latinismo” emerged as a strategic move to leverage numbers of people from communities that have a common linguistic and historical past based in an understanding of the ethnic/racial basis of Chicago’s political language. It can be said that Latinismo is a political identity unique to a US urban experience born of immigration, racialization, and the need to coalesce. The trend seems to be continuing, as the percentage of Latinos identifying themselves as such grew from 9 percent in 1990 to 12.5 percent in 2000. Respondents to a 2005 National Science Foundation survey conducted in Pilsen easily moved between national origin identification and the pan-ethnic labels of “Latino/Hispanic,” even though more recent figures show a dominant Mexican origin, but include a clear indication of continued Latino diversity (see Table 6).

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72 Ibid.
75 People in the Pilsen survey who chose “Latino” and/or “Hispanic” (out of a total of 402 respondents): A. Alongside their national identity (e.g., “Mexican” and “Hispanic”) = 30; B. In lieu of (e.g., “Hispanic” and/or “Latino”) = 84 (including 2 “Latin American” responses); C. Only national (e.g., “Peruvian”) = 212 (excluding the 76 respondents who either did not answer, or who identified with non-Latin American nationalities).
La Red Latino Americana was another such example that combined “Latinismo” with transnational concerns. By the late 1970s, a coalition of various Latino organizations with political engagements in both home and host countries organized a network. La Red Latino Americana/Latin American Network brought together Cuban-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Colombians, Mexicans, Argentineans, and Chileans. Some of the organizations had

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roots in the various Latino communities in the city. For instance, Central Acción Social, y Hermandad General de Trabajadores (CASA-HGT), an organization dedicated to advocating for the rights of the undocumented, had an extensive grassroots project. Others, like the Pablo Neruda Cultural Center, were more focused on promoting home-country culture in the United States. Their combined efforts were aimed at promoting another way of thinking about the Latino communities in Chicago, one that understood their linkage to their homeland. This network of progressive Latinos would become one of the bases of support for broader city-wide coalitions, including one with African Americans.

**African American/Latino Coalition: The Doors to Representation are Opened**

Another unique feature of initial Latino political incorporation in the city of Chicago was a strong coalition with African Americans in search of independent political voices. Richard J. Daley’s mastery of machine politics preserved the Chicago Democratic Machine long after the demise of similar machines in other large American cities. During much of that time, the city administration found opposition mainly from a liberal “independent” faction of the Democratic Party, which included African Americans and Latinos. The first Latino to announce an aldermanic bid against a Daley loyalist was Jose “Cha-Cha” Jimenez, founder of the Young Lords. The group ran the 1975 aldermanic campaign for Cha-Cha Jimenez, which garnered 39 percent of the vote against Mayor Richard J. Daley’s machine candidate. Prior to 1980 there had only been one Latino elected official in Chicago. Gerrymandering of electoral districts had ensured that not a single Latino sat on the Chicago City Council.77

In 1979 Jane Byrne defeated Michael Bilandic with a successful grassroots campaign that incorporated African Americans, Latinos, and independent white liberals. But early in her term Byrne opted for a strategy of privileging business sectors and several community organizations, even as she shut the doors to the grassroots organizations and to the African American community in general that had been critical to her electoral success. For instance, despite the fact that most residents of the Chicago Housing Authority were African American, Byrne refused to name an African American to its board. In addition, her promises of a more equitable distribution of city resources went unfulfilled. By this time, the

numbers of African American and Latino elected officials in other cities had increased dramatically. Major cities such as Los Angeles, Detroit, Cleveland, Atlanta, San Antonio, and Miami had elected African American and Latino mayors.\textsuperscript{78} This contributed to African American and Latino Chicago’s search for electoral power.

In the summer of 1982 a coalition of community organizations from across the city came together to demand a boycott of the Taste of Chicago, an annual summer fair that highlights Chicago’s restaurants, since few minority-owned establishments invited to participate. The backlash served as a basis for the formation of the Rainbow coalition, a citywide network of community and grassroots peace groups, independents, Latinos, and African Americans.

The groups continued to work together but reset their sights on running candidates for the upcoming state elections. The Black/Hispanic Alliance was formed to challenge unfair districts and support African American and Latino candidates.\textsuperscript{79} Elections in newly redistricted state districts provided a test run for independents. In Pilsen and Little Village CASA-HGT decided to launch one of its members to the state legislature. Immigration lawyer Juan Soliz was chosen as the candidate. The political machine outmaneuvered him and his name was kept off the primary ballot. Nonetheless, Soliz garnered an impressive 30 percent of the vote as a write-in candidate. These races laid the groundwork for the precinct organization that would run the independent mayoral campaign the following winter.

In the African American community grassroots efforts to reach consensus on a candidate resulted in drafting Harold Washington, at the time the congressional representative from the Southside, who only agreed to run if new 100,000 voters could be registered.\textsuperscript{80} He in turn reached out to newly formed community/electoral networks in Latino neighborhoods. In the primary the white and Latino votes were split between Richard Daley, the son, and Jane Byrne, allowing Washington to win by a slim margin provided by the overwhelming turn out of African Americans voters, 15 percent of white independents, and 13 percent of Latinos.

Many from Chicago’s political machine, like Congressman Lipinski and Alderman Vito Marzullo, the dean of the City Council, publicly bolted from the Democratic Party and


switched to support Bernie Epton, the white Republican candidate. A few like Michael Madigan gave quiet but important support to Washington. However, white support for Washington remained the same during the general election, as did the percentage of the African American vote. The critical turn-around came from the Latino vote which increased from 13 to 75 percent, which translated into 50,000 votes, the same number of votes by which Washington won the election. Unfortunately, the city-wide success did not translate into aldermanic representation for Latinos. Both in Pilsen and in Little Village the independent candidates lost to the machine. In Pilsen Juan Velazquez, a long-time community organizer, brought in a losing 40 percent of the vote, and Rudy Lozano, Sr., lost by 22 votes in the 22nd ward.

In the same year as Washington’s victory, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) sued for violations of the Voting Rights Act, claiming that the ward map drawn after the 1980 Census had unfairly dispersed black and Hispanic voters. The 1981 ward remap deliberately kept Latinos from achieving “supermajorities” in the 22nd, 25th, 26th and 31st wards. At that time, whites were about 40 percent of the city’s population, African Americans were also about 40 percent, and Latinos were about 15 percent, but there were 33 white aldermen, only 16 blacks, and just 1 Latino. The courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered a redrawing of the boundaries of aldermanic wards in question and ordered special elections. By 1986 four predominantly Latino wards had been reconstituted and saw the election of four of Chicago’s first Latino aldermen: Jesus Garcia (22nd ward), Luis Gutierrez (26th ward), Miguel Santiago (31st ward), and Juan Soliz (25th ward). The Washington Reform Coalition achieved a partial coordination of the previously balkanized Puerto Rican, Mexican, and black electoral constituencies. This marked the end of the Chicago “Council Wars,” a racially-polarized political conflict among the city council members that frequently resulted in political deadlock, as the opposition of 29 aldermen had a majority but not enough votes to override the mayor.

In 1987 Harold Washington ran on a platform that included his commitment to the creation of a Latino Congressional District. For Latinos his victory was accompanied by gains in official representation, with the number of Latino-elected officials rising at both the city and state level. The Latino presence throughout government and civic Chicago grew under Harold Washington’s administration. Washington’s election had set the stage for a new governing coalition that could incorporate both the new immigrant communities and the African American community.

The cause of Latino political empowerment had found an ally. Harold Washington had a governing style very different from the old machine. He incorporated neighborhood-based agendas and governing structures. He relied on community advisory boards to hold city bureaucrats accountable. Indeed, in the case of Latinos he gave the community the opportunity to institutionalize an advisory committee within his cabinet that responded not to the mayor, but rather to a board of commissioners. The Mayor’s Advisory Commission on Latino Affairs had a broad-based representation of Latinos throughout the city, including the various nationalities and interest groups. Through the Commission, an agenda was set that included community and home-country issues. During Washington’s term Mexico City was chosen as a sister city. In addition, the Mayor visited Puerto Rico and supported a community-initiated referendum asking the governor not to send the National Guard to Central America. The city also supported cultural organizations involved in exchanges with countries in Latin America. While Washington’s politics were grounded locally, he had begun to develop a more national and global perspective in his policies.

The mainstreaming of Latino activists created a presence in the city. Others also took note of the growing numbers. The Chicago Tribune named its first Latino board member and increased the number of Latino reporters. Major news channels hired and put on the air Latino anchors. Local corporations promoted Latinos. The political arena also felt the effects of the new electoral activism in increasing numbers of registered Latino voters as well as an increase in actual votes cast. “Differences in the 1984 and 1986 voter turnouts among the top

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14 Latino wards indicate the varying strength of political participation across the city. In both primaries, there is a wide range of Latino participation, from 42 to 67 percent in 1984, and from 34 to 59 percent in 198687 with higher turnout in wards where Mexican communities predominated (see Table 7).87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1986</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latino Voters</td>
<td>Turnout in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>6297</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>9476</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>3023</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>2203</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentage of registered Latino voters who turned out to vote.
** Percentage of registered non-Latino voters who turned out to vote.

By 1986 Miguel del Valle was elected the first Hispanic Senator in the Illinois General Assembly (where he served for 20 years), in addition to the four Hispanics elected to the City Council mentioned above. Jesús Garcia was elected to the Illinois State senate (1st district) in 1992.

The New Machine and Latinos: Rise of the Hispanic Democratic Organization

Following Harold Washington’s death on November 25, 1987, the progressive coalition fell apart under Eugene Sawyer’s administration. Washington’s tenure had

88 Ibid., 18.
culminated in the creation of a coalition of minority and progressive council members who were poised to enact a program of reforms. That coalition had chosen another Washington lieutenant, Timothy Evans, to replace him. The opposition, mostly white old-guard conservative machine politicos, convinced Sawyer to oppose Evans, with their backing, and the progressive coalition was broken. By the time Sawyer ran against, and subsequently lost to, Richard M. Daley the latter had already come to recognize the integral role played by the Chicago Latino community in the election of Washington.

Although the Hispanic Democratic Organization (HDO) had officially started in 1993, the wheels were already in motion prior to the 1989 election, as Tim Degnan, Victor Reyes, and Al Sanchez banded together in 1988 to help Richard M. Daley win his first mayoral election. As a political action committee, the HDO’s purposes were clear: to aid political power for Mayor Daley and his allies and to disempower Latino independents in a divide-and-conquer effort in Chicago and throughout Illinois.

Perhaps nowhere else is the destructive role of the HDO better illustrated than in the story of Jesus García’s political career and his subsequent electoral loss of the state senate seat in 1998. García’s political career began during Harold Washington’s mayoral bid. García and other progressive Latinos and community residents had built the 22nd Ward Independent Political Organization (IPO). García picked up the torch following Rudy Lozano’s death in 1983, continued the work of the IPO, beat Frank Stemberk the following year for 22nd Ward committeeman, and two years later won the alderman’s seat, defeating Latino candidates Stemberk put up. García became the ranking Latino in Harold Washington’s City Council coalition, and in 1992 he ran for the state senate and ultimately won, while in the following spring Rick Muñoz became the aldermen of 22nd ward.

Garcia and his allies in the IPO were committed to community needs as defined by a conglomeration of neighborhood organizations. Their focus was on the needs of local working-class people. García proposed immigration reform, contested development and gentrification, and generally put the needs of residents above private interests. This independence did not settle well with Daley, particularly the group’s advocacy of

community input into the University of Illinois expansion and its request that redevelopment plans include affordable housing for the neighborhood. In 1998 Daley unleashed his forces and García was defeated. Latino leaders loyal to Daley and an army of Latino patronage workers organized by the HDO had joined forces with white party bosses to bring out the vote for Antonio “Tony” Muñoz, a Chicago political officer who was a relative unknown up until that point. García lost the election by 960 votes out of nearly 13,000 cast. He was defeated in three precincts in Ed Burke’s 14th ward that had turn-out of over 90 percent in an election in which the average turnout was 35 percent. García went on to found the Little Village Community Development Corporation (now Enlace) and became an active leader of Durango Unido, one of the first hometown associations created in Chicago, thus continuing a practice of combining local and home country issues on a broader political agenda.

In short, the problem shifted from the Chicago political machine insuring the election of non-Latinos to determining which Latino was elected. Initially focused on the South Side of Chicago, HDO expanded across the city, made inroads into the suburbs, and helped corrupt non-Latino regimes in Cicero. Aside from Mayor Daley, HDO was a major force in electing aldermen, state representatives, and state senators.

Aside from Muñoz, other machine-backed Latino candidates included Cook County Commissioner Joseph Mario Moreno—slated for state central committeeman from Gutierrez’s Fourth Congressional District—who was running against incumbent Miguel del Valle, the progressive Puerto Rican state senator from the Second District. On the east end, state representative Edward Acevedo, a Chicago cop, was running for re-election against García-backed Guillermo Gomez. Susana Mendoza, the 26-year-old press secretary of 12th Ward alderman Ray Frias, was put up to challenge independent Sonia Silva on the west end of García’s district (ultimately the only independent the machine did not beat).

Daley’s incorporation of Latinos into the machine is a legacy of the strength of Washington’s Rainbow Coalition, albeit a twisted one. In 2006 Mayor Richard M. Daley’s cabinet contained seven African Americans (17 percent), 24 whites (59 percent), 7 Latinos (17

92 Ibid.
percent), and 3 Asians (7 percent). So while whites continue to vastly outnumber everyone else, African Americans and Latinos are represented in the highest positions.

As much of the Daley Machine’s strength has come from the ability to dole out contracts and secure jobs for its supporters, the numbers of said patronage paint an interesting picture, illustrating the recognition of an electorate rising in importance, possibly at the expense of another. In city jobs and contracts African Americans have hit a plateau, while by contrast the Latino numbers have increased. While, with 28 percent of Chicago’ population, Latinos remain underrepresented in the Chicago City Council with only eight Latino aldermen (16 percent), they have been given a large increase in jobs and contracts—which critics have observed as an indicator of HDO’s success in strong-arm tactics. While under Mayor Washington, Latinos received for the first time 4 percent of city contracts and 5 percent of city jobs by 1987, they have increased under Mayor Richard M. Daley to 14 percent of contracts and 11 percent of jobs. Daley has received more than 80 percent of Latino votes in every election.

In 2006 a Federal investigation was launched into hiring practices at Chicago City Hall. HDO and other political groups allegedly had influence over the city’s hiring system and political workers allegedly were rewarded with city jobs and promotions. This investigation culminated in convictions of Angelo Torres, head of the Hired Trucks Program, on corruption charges, George Prado’s for drug dealing, and John Resa, Al Sanchez, and Aaron Del Valle for perjury and fraud in employment practices. This was the beginning of the end for HDO, and it has since ceased to exist in an official capacity. The question now remains whether another institution will fill its place, or whether it even should. As many critics have pointed out, the HDO never actually empowered Latinos so much as harness large segments of the population to garner votes and empower Daley instead. Still in the context of Chicago Latino politics, the Daley Machine remains a defining element important

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94 “During Mayor Richard M. Daley’s reign, despite having roughly 36% of the population and 40% City Council membership, and providing an increasing level of electoral support for the mayor, African Americans have averaged only 12% of the city contracts throughout his term, and in the last year, dropped to an all-time low since 1987 of 9%. While Blacks have increased their vote for Daley from 10% in 1989 to 57% in 2003, Black jobs have dropped slightly, from 33.25% to 32%” (Simpson 2006).

95 Ibid.

96 Dan Mihalopoulos, Laurie Cohen and Todd Lighty have been covering the City Hall hiring scandal via the *Chicago Tribune.*

to understanding the advances in representation and the simultaneous cooptation of Latino community groups that have striven to make political gains.

Still, the number of elected Latino elected officials has continued to grow. At the state level Latinos formed the Latino Legislative Caucus in 2002. As it stands, the current number of Latino elected officials is undoubtedly much higher than it was in the 1970s.

Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Senators</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Representatives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Executives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Senators</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Representatives</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Officials (Board Member, Commissioner, Treasurer)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Officials (Aldermen, Trustee, Assessor, Clerk)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial/Law Enforcement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/School Board</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special District Officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The history of Latino political incorporation and representation has been characterized by waxing and waning. Latinos first made gains when the political system was relatively open during the brief break in machine politics under Harold Washington's administration. This was a moment when independent groups and community activists were able to speak up as well as speak out. However, this tolerant atmosphere was short-lived and soon replaced by a closed system dominated once again by machine politics, which succeeded in co-opting the Latino electorate through the influence of the HDO. Some see the current political environment possibly leading to an open playing field, one in which independent and uncoerced actors from within the communities they represent have an opportunity—to turn the Chicago saying on its head—to play without paying. The election of Anita Alvarez, an independent candidate who ran for State Attorney General, as well as the

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98 Source: NALEO Directory.
election of independent state representatives like Cynthia Soto, speak to fact that perhaps the political arena has opened again.

In the meantime, the Latino population has continued to grow. Much of this growth has been among immigrants mainly from Mexico, although other countries like Ecuador are also contributing to this flow. Though, once again, many cannot participate in traditional forms of political incorporation, there is a significant rise in other forms of engagement. In the next section we turn our attention to non-traditional avenues toward the political incorporation of Latinos in Chicago.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BEYOND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

As we have seen, the participation of Latinos in electoral politics has been steadily, albeit slowly, evolving in the last three decades. After the demise of the HDO, the political landscape seems relatively open for new Latinos and the current immigration debate has invigorated Latino immigrants in the city who want their voices heard in the decision-making political arena. In September of 2009 Jorge Mújica, a prominent Latino immigrant leader, announced his decision to seek nomination for the Third Congressional District. Mújica is co-founder of the March 10th movement, an ad-hoc coalition of organizations fighting for immigrant and labor rights established in Chicago in 2006. Mújica’s diverse organizational roots and political affiliations include membership in a local chapter of the left-wing Mexican Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution). The unifying theme of his campaign was the fight for immigrant rights and increased representation of Mexican immigrants in the political arena. Mújica attempted to reach the widest possible audience of voters while remaining loyal to his core base of supporters. Mújica could comfortably cross language lines; however, thanks to the growing city-wide visibility and use of the Spanish language, he chose to launch his campaign in Spanish to announce his political platform to his base: foreign-born Latino immigrants who could participate in get-out-the-vote campaigns even if many were ineligible to vote. While Mújica may have lost his bid for nomination, the votes he received after a very modest
campaign with minimal funding is an inspirational sign of the power of grassroots campaigning that drew upon the Latino community base.

This is only one example that illustrates the vibrant scene and increased visibility displayed by Latino-led organizations in the past decade in the city of Chicago. The landscape of Latino organizations has grown rapidly in the Chicago metropolitan area and reflects this sudden demographic change. For example, there has been a recent surge in nonprofits that address the needs of Latinos in areas where the Latino population has increased. In 2000 the Illinois Ethnic Coalition published a list of only 14 Mexican American organizations, most of them funded in the 1990s with just one organization surviving from the 1940s (see Table 9).\textsuperscript{99} The Mexican and Latino-led organizations from the suburbs and the hometown associations are largely absent from this list, despite the existence of a growing directory of Mexican organizations compiled by the Mexican Consulate since the mid 1990s. However, by 2008, 205 Latino-led and Latino-serving active organizations had been included in \textit{The Latino Landscape: A Metro Chicago Guide and Nonprofit Directory} prepared for the Chicago Community Trust and published by the University of Notre Dame.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{99} For an interesting historical contrast, in 1928 there were at least 21 organizations serving the Mexican community in Chicago.

\textsuperscript{100} Alejo, Berenice, and Roger Knight. 2008. \textit{The Latino Landscape: A Metro Chicago Guide and Nonprofit Directory}. Notre Dame, IN: Institute for Latino Studies. The hometown associations (HTAs) are excluded from this list because they do not have a formal non-profit status, but it is estimated that there are approximately 255 HTAs in the region.
Table 9.
Mexican-American Ethnic Organizations in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year of founding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centro Sin Fronteras</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Young Mexican American Voters of Illinois</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Village Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Village Community Council</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican American Chamber of Commerce of Illinois, Inc.</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican American Police Organization</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Civic Committee</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Civic Society of Illinois, Inc.</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Community Committee</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Fine Arts Center Museum</td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resurrection Project</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a social network study aimed at understanding the bridging and bonding capabilities of Mexican organizations in Chicago, researchers concluded that hometown associations, faith-based initiatives, schools, and arts and culture organizations represent an important socialization space where key information is shared about leadership skills, institutional networks, employment opportunities, financial literacy, and legal advice, among other important information needed for successful socialization. In these linguistically and culturally sensitive spaces, Latinos are invited to increase their engagement in diverse spheres of action. Regardless of the organizational type, participating in any formal or informal Latino non-profit seems to function as a catalyst for further engagement in other civic arenas, including transnational activities.

The spheres of action in these organizations are quite diverse in nature. In particular, faith-based initiatives, hometown associations, schools, and worker centers have become important outlets to foster increased civic engagement among Latinos in the city.

Faith-Based Organizing in the Latino Community

Faith and religiosity are important values in Latino immigrant lives, and religious institutions consistently play a key role in the immigrant integration process. Many foreign- and US-born Latinos share a deep religious commitment, which is shown through high levels of church attendance and volunteerism. For instance, in an analysis of the 2004 National Survey of Latinos, researchers found that churches are the largest single recipient of volunteer time among Latinos, thus playing “a critical role in creating social resources and community bonding in the Latino community quite possibly because they provide a place in which Latinos/as make social connections, gain skills, and receive encouragement to become involved in other sectors of their communities.”

According to survey data, religiously connected Latinos account for more than 50 percent of the non-church-oriented volunteer activities in the Latino community. Therefore, for Latinos, participating actively in a church is a great predictor of civic engagement in different spaces such as school or tutoring programs, neighborhood organizations, business or community groups, and ethnic organizations. According to a Pew Hispanic Center phone survey conducted in late 2006, foreign-born Catholics were almost twice as likely to say they participated in a protest or demonstration, compared with their native-born counterparts (31 percent vs. 16 percent). This survey also finds that “regardless of religious tradition, foreign-born Latinos indicate they participated at higher rates compared with the native born. Among foreign-born evangelicals, for example, almost one-in-four (24 percent) say they participated, compared with 13 percent among the native born.”

Regardless of religious affiliation, being active in a religious congregation seems to encourage further civic engagement among Latinos. In the city of Chicago, we find several overlaps among participation in churches and other areas of civic engagement among foreign- and native-born Latinos. Church support for promoting Latino immigrant incorporation and civic engagement at the local level within the pews largely depends on the capacity of migrant-led community organizations to take those demands to church leaders.

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and on the maturity of their organizational structures for building pro-immigrant ecumenical alliances and coalitions.

At the national level, the Catholic Church has shown great institutional support for a comprehensive immigration reform. Inspired by a pastoral letter about migration issued jointly by the Catholic Bishops of Mexico and the United States in 2003, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops launched the Justice for Immigrants Campaign in 2005, a national strategy to promote immigrant integration across all dioceses. The local support for this initiative has been uneven so far, but in Chicago some Catholic parishes with Latino congregations have supported the movement for immigrant rights and encouraged people to engage in peaceful protests. A case in point is offered in the first immigrant rights protest against the Minutemen organized in Chicago in 2005. In July 2005 Marco Cárdenas, a priest at Our Lady of Fátima Church, and El Pistolero, a local Mexican radio disc jockey, launched an invitation to mobilize against the actions of Minutemen groups in the Back of the Yards neighborhood. The march attracted about 50,000 protesters and was the first organized attempt to promote a legalization campaign after the events of September 11.105 For Latino immigrants, support from priests can be crucial in their decision to volunteer or engage in non-church-related activities.106

The Latino religious landscape in Chicago has been dominated by Catholic churches that have been influential mobilizing agents for Latinos. The church has also been a unifying force among Latinos, bringing together people from various nationalities. One such example is the Second Tepeyac Church in Des Plaines, Illinois. Although it is not in Chicago, many Chicago residents make the annual pilgrimage on December 12 for the Virgin de Guadalupe celebration. Elaine Peña observed activities at this church over a two year period (2002–2004) and describes how its “religious principles exceed secular nationalist identifications.” The space of the Second Tepeyac Church also serves as a place for the political as well as the religious. Peña describes it as being a “political sanctuary in which devotees may learn about immigration legislation and future mobilization opportunities.” The church holds

106 In an analysis of the organizational structure of 32 cities participating in the immigrant mobilizations of 2006, Gustavo Cano suggests that institutional support from the church or lack thereof was crucial in motivating people to attend rallies and marches in small cities with limited organizational infrastructure and limited possibilities to advertise massively through Spanish speaking radio and local media. See Gustavo Cano, “Political Mobilization of Latino Immigrants in American Cities and the US Immigration Debate.” Institute of Latin American Studies, Columbia University. Working Paper Series (online), 2009. http://ilas.columbia.edu/images/uploads/workingpapers/Gustavo_Cano-
citizenship workshops and also serves as a starting location for those traveling to rallies in downtown Chicago or the state capital. The political events emphasize social justice, and the shrine itself conveys the same message.107 The Second Tepeyac Church is also a common shared space for many hometown associations. Since 2004 the Federation of Michoacano Clubs inaugurates the Michoacano cultural week with a mass at Cerrito del Tepeyac in Des Plaines. They usually bring a bishop from Michoacán to offer the mass in Spanish and in the summer of 2009 the organizers of the cultural week requested the priest’s permission to address thousands of Latinos right after the mass. The priest offered the microphone to one leader who announced the newest immigrant rights campaign recently launched by the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights.

Similar observations have been made by Karen Davalos in her field work in Pilsen, Chicago. She observes that the Via Crucis Good Friday procession in Pilsen, while it is a religious event, also has political significance as Mexicans take to the streets and claim their right to live and worship within the city of Chicago.

They elevate their claim to space by addressing social justice in Christ’s name. Mexican Catholics connect Christ’s suffering to local situations, events, and people. Each state is a moment to reflect upon Pilsen’s social conditions, poverty, underemployment, racial harassment, domestic violence, an anti-immigrant atmosphere, gang problems, poor educational facilities, and the public school curriculum that does not acknowledge the history, culture, and science of Mexicans.108

Despite the prevalence of Catholicism among Latinos in the United States, the structure of the Catholic Church has put very few Latinos in positions of power.109 Recently the New York Times ran an article on the newly appointed Irish priest to lead the Archdiocese of New York. While Latinos account for at least half of the Roman Catholics in New York and are mainly responsible for the renewal of the Catholic Church in recent years, they did not appoint a Latino priest. The article cites the lack of Latino bishops being appointed by

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the Catholic Church and the shortage, in general, of priests who speak Spanish or understand Latino culture but yet are leading Latino congregations. The same is true in Chicago where only one of the seven bishops is Latino. There are no other Latino bishops in the State of Illinois. The shortage of priests may well be the reason for the growing trend of Latino Catholics converting to evangelical Christian churches like the Pentecostals.

Catholic churches are not the only ones engaging Latinos. There has been a recent trend of Latino conversions from Catholicism to Protestant churches that also encourage civic participation among their congregations. For instance, Saint Adalberto Methodist Church is a good example of a non-Catholic Latino congregation actively involved in comprehensive immigration reform in the pews, either supporting the sanctuary movement or organizing rallies and protests to keep the movement for immigrant rights visible. The rise of Latino Evangelical and Protestant congregations is a significant trend. If we limit our study of Latino religious participation to only the Catholic Church we will be missing a growing population of Protestant/Pentecostal Latinos. Andrea Althoff has been studying this trend and her hypothesis to explain the recent wave of conversion to non-Catholic denominations is that the act of immigrating to the United States contributes to the attraction of converting to a Pentecostal church. It seems the specific characteristics of the Pentecostal church are in line with the North American values the immigrants are adopting. She claims that the Pentecostal religion is much more individualistic with an emphasis on one’s relationship with God, in contrast to the hierarchical, communal structure of the Catholic Church. The act of conversion is “about choosing and creating consciously a new common Christian identity.”

Exact estimates of the numbers of Latino Protestants and Catholics in Chicago are not available but the Chicago Latino Congregation Study led by sociologist Edwin Hernández offers an important glimpse into the presence of Protestant churches in Chicago. Of the 606 Latino churches identified for inclusion in the study, the denominational identity is as follows: 20 percent Catholic, 13 percent Mainline Protestant, 21 percent Evangelical, 33 percent Pentecostal, and 14 percent unknown.

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Religion plays an important role for civic engagement in several arenas besides only the fight for comprehensive immigration reform. Faith-based organizations in Chicago have addressed labor and housing issues. Notable examples include the Inter-faith Worker Justice Network (IWJ), an ecumenical national organization established in 1996 to support labor rights in Chicago. Among its many accomplishments, the network founded an independent Latino Worker Center in the city and appointed a young Guatemalan immigrant as the first director of this center. In less than a decade, the IWJ has managed to recruit 59 local affiliates and a full time staff of ten people. In 2006 IWJ sued the Department of Labor (DOL) to obtain the names of migrant agricultural workers who had been victims of unpaid overtime. The demand came after IWJ received a $10,000 grant from the Chicago Community Trust to work closely with the DOL to develop a database to help migrants recover unpaid wages and the DOL refused to release the names of workers owed back pay arguing privacy concerns.112

In the area of affordable housing, the Resurrection Project in Pilsen is an excellent example of faith-based community empowerment. This Latino-led project started in 1990 with $30,000 in donations from parishes in Chicago and by 2007 the organization had leveraged over $146 million in community reinvestment in the neighborhoods of Pilsen, Little Village, and the Southwest Side. Karen Davalos notes how this faith-based organization is “one of several spiritual engagements that can be used to illustrate the profound integration of faith, daily life, and culture.” 113 The Resurrection Project strives to eliminate poverty and oppression by bringing the sacred into daily life through homeownership services, including the construction of new homes and the renovation of abandoned buildings for rental housing. This organization builds affordable and high-quality apartments for low-income residents because it values and dignifies human life and the relationships among its neighbors.114

In the suburbs the Interfaith Leadership Project (ILP) has focused on several community issues affecting low-income Latino residents in the towns of Berwyn/Cicero and Stickney since 1989. They are a membership-based ecumenical organization including ten local institutions: six interdenominational congregations, a steel company, a bank, a

114 Ibid.
community health center, and a hospital. Their organizational style is based on Saul Alinsky’s model of empowering people through addressing their everyday life struggles. ILP’s organizing efforts include focused house meetings with area residents and conventions to find shared concerns with concrete potential to trigger collective action. Their areas of community action include education, foreclosures, immigration, public safety, health care, citizenship classes, and voter registration. Among their most recent accomplishments, they formed a coalition with the Latino Union of Chicago to demand a safe space resolution to the township of Cicero. On November 12, 2008, the township enacted a safe space resolution to provide increased protections and alleviate the fear faced by immigrant communities living in Cicero. In 2009 ILP’s member organizations conducted protests against the township’s street cleaning policies on first time violations and were able to obtain an agreement for a new policy with less harsh consequences for first time offenders. The organizations in ILP belong to several coalitions such as the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) and United Power for Action and Social Justice, a 300-member institution in the Chicago metropolitan area that works on statewide issues of immigration and education.

In sum, Latino immigrants are actively engaged in their US churches and this participation subsequently motivates them to become civically engaged in different local issues affecting their new communities of residence, sometimes creating ethnic faith-based advocacy organizations to promote immigrant integration. In the long term, Protestant and Catholic institutional commitment to support civic and political integration programs and strategies will be very important to keep Latino immigrant communities civically engaged in the city and the suburbs.

**Latino-led Labor Organizations**

In the last decade organized labor attitudes towards immigrants have changed drastically. Before 2000, labor unions were often at odds with Latino immigrant workers, finding them responsible for depressed wages and breaking strikes. However, since the early 2000 this attitude has slowly changed and the American labor movement has demanded an

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end to employers’ sanctions and an amnesty for undocumented immigrants.\textsuperscript{116} The organized labor movement has since experienced some structural transformations, but they have kept a unified voice in favor of some form of legalization for undocumented workers already living in the country and some unions have devised special programs to help their members become naturalized US citizens and encourage voter registration and electoral participation.

In Chicago, unions have gradually increased the Latino representation both in their rank and file and leadership positions while independent workers have expanded their presence in labor sectors where traditional unions are not able to defend workers’ rights, such as day labor, domestic work, temporary labor, constructions, and agriculture. Worker centers are community-based mediating institutions that provide support to low-wage, primarily immigrant workers through service delivery, advocacy, and organizing to improve conditions at the workplace.\textsuperscript{117} In 1992 there were only five worker centers in the United States, but by 2007 there were at least 155 worker centers spread across the nation. Many of them have been established by Latino and other immigrant workers and the City of Chicago offers several examples of Latino-led worker centers interested in promoting civic participation among their members along with traditional unions. For example, in the last decade Latino-led worker centers in Chicago, SEIU, the UE, the Teamsters, UFCW, and AFSCME, among others, have provided support and resources to promote Latino immigrant integration and worker rights. For example, the United Electrical Union has a strong relationship with the Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), one of the few Mexican independent unions. In 1989 the UE and the FAT organized the creation of a binational mural through an artistic exchange. Two murals were created, one inside FAT’s headquarters in Mexico City depicting scenes of the labor struggle in North America and the second one outside UE’s building on Ashland Avenue, suggesting an interracial message of workers’ empowerment across borders.

Some independent worker centers have been created by Latino grassroots organizations. A good case in point is illustrated by the Economic Development Center (EDC), a migrant worker center established by the Latino Organization of the Southwest


\textsuperscript{117} For more on worker centers, see Janice Fine’s \textit{Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream}, Cornell University Press and the Economic Policy Institute, 2006.
located on the Southwest side of Chicago. According to Nik Theodore, one of the leading experts on non-traditional labor organizing in Chicago,

including the EDC, there are five worker centers in Chicago, all of which are located in predominantly immigrant neighborhoods. The EDC has focused its activities on assisting low-income Latinos on the Southwest Side secure better outcomes in the labor market. They help educate newly arrived immigrants on their rights to avoid workplace abuses. They have trained staff from other organizations to conduct outreach to the community at large through weekly sessions at the Mexican consulate. They also help in workplace conflicts.\footnote{Theodore, Nik. 2007. “Migrant Worker Centers: Contending with Downgrading in the Low-wage Labor Market.” \textit{GeoJournal} 68:155–165.}

On the north side of the city, the Latino Union of Chicago has actively engaged in several campaigns to defend day laborers and other vulnerable workers since 2000. Established by day laborer women who were also active in hometown associations, the Latino Union of Chicago became a founding member of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, a national coalition of worker centers led by Pablo Alvarado, a Salvadoran immigrant from California. They have led successful campaigns in Cicero and they have operated a worker center for day laborers in Albany Park since 2004. In 2003 tensions had been building with neighborhood residents and businesses as migrant workers gathered daily at a worker’s site in Albany Park. The Latino Union of Chicago was instrumental in pressuring the city to engage in dialogue with day-labor organizers to find a solution by establishing a place where migrant workers could seek employment free from harassment. In December 2004 the Albany Park Workers’ Center was established and still operates without interference from the city. Nik Theodore notes that this worker center represents a tangible victory of community organizing, political mobilization, and direct action. Despite the absence of widespread support from politicians and city officials, migrant civil society, led by the Latino Union of Chicago, mounted a sustained campaign to improve the working conditions of day laborers in Albany Park. Emerging out of social movement activism, the worker center represents the institutionalization of labor standards for a
largely migrant workforce that has endured demonstrably exploitative conditions. Moreover, the establishment of the worker center marks the creation of a movement resource that can be the foundation for future action.\textsuperscript{119}

Another important step in the establishment of migrant worker centers in Chicago was the passage of the Day and Temporary Labor Services Act in January of 2000. This ordinance does not apply to worker centers that do not charge a fee, but for those that do the ordinance is helpful in preventing workers’ rights abuses. The ordinance estimates that there are about 300,000 day or temporary laborers in Illinois (2000) and we can assume this number is much higher now due to the recent economic crisis. Due to the frequent abuses of migrant workers’ rights, the ordinance seeks to regulate the worker centers that serve as intermediaries between day laborers and their employers. The work of Latino aldermen in Chicago has also been an important vehicle for change in demanding rights for Latinos and immigrants. Aldermen Billy Ocasio and Manny Flores were important in the passage of Mayor Daley’s Expanded Affordable Requirements Ordinance (ARO) which mandates an affordable housing set aside for the City of Chicago.

Many local unions are founding members of the March 10th Movement and frequently support Latino immigrants in important battles against abusive employers. Some specific cases are worth highlighting. The most visible case of union support to defend basic worker rights is exemplified by the now extinct Republic Windows and Doors factory, which attracted worldwide attention in 2008. When the owner attempted to fire all workers without offering severance pay, the workers discussed a strategy with their representatives at the United Electrical Workers Union (UE) and unanimously voted to occupy the factory in a case that brought headlines and support from then president-elect Obama. The factory’s labor force was mostly immigrant, with 75 percent of workers representing several Latin American countries and one Latino immigrant union representative. However, for these workers this was not the first time they had participated in a solidarity movement. Three years prior to the factory occupation, the workers negotiated permission from the management to march on May 1st to support immigrant rights in Chicago’s downtown.

When faced with the important decision of whether to fight their unjust termination, the union backed the workers’ decision to occupy the factory. In the weeks and months following the occupation, community support was steady with as many as 1,000 supporters who visited the workers, including local immigrant activists, Mexican hometown associations, faith-based organizations, and the Spanish language media. The workers eventually got severance pay and inspired many others to demand lawfully mandated severance packages in similar cases across the nation as well as in Canada, Argentina, and Ireland. A California-based green building manufacturer recently bought the factory and has pledged to reinstate most of the workers respecting union seniority.

Finally, the Chicago Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC) is the latest addition to the list of community-based worker centers serving the immigrant population in the city. Launched in the fall of 2008 as an affiliate of ROC United, the organization is locally represented by José Oliva, a Guatemalan immigrant with a long history of labor organizing among Latino immigrants in Chicago. Chicago-ROC is devising strategies to increase the Latino immigrant membership and for that purpose offers bilingual training in bartending and upscale dining to help workers gain specific language skills helpful in moving towards higher-paying positions within the industry. In the first year they have registered 230 new members. ROC’s model combines research and policy work with “high-road” restaurant worker organizing. Besides educating workers about their rights and promoting workplace justice, ROC is advocating two pieces of legislation: the Healthy Families Act, which would provide restaurant workers with up to seven paid sick days per year, and an increase to the $2.13 federally mandated minimum wage for tipped workers. With support from ROC United, they have commissioned a large sample survey of restaurant workers in the Chicago metro area and they are currently discussing with their members and local advocacy organizations the best strategies to present and disseminate their findings to the media and to local restaurant workers.

As we have seen in the cases described in this section, in cities where they have clout, labor organizations provide crucial support for Latino immigrant civic engagement, as well as increased awareness of their rights as workers regardless of their immigration or citizenship status.
In all, Latino political incorporation suggests multiple paths to success. Traditional avenues, as well as unique community-based religious and labor organizations, provide spaces in which immigrants and US-born Latinos organize, network and coalesce with others to have their voices articulated and heard. Other examples such as hometown associations and cultural institutions also provide similar settings which should be explored in more detail. For now, this white paper suggests the need to broaden the lens through which we look at and understand these processes of incorporation.
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Costas Spirou is a professor of social science at National-Louis University. His scholarly inquiry has centered on political sociology, urban affairs, and community development. Utilizing an interdisciplinary perspective, his research interests include culture industries and the dynamics of cultural policy and (re)development, urban tourism, race/ethnicity and social inequality, sport and the political economy of stadium and convention/entertainment center development. His professional activities have been supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Spencer Foundation, the Library of Congress, the Ford Foundation, and the Sam Walton Foundation. Spirou has published widely on culture policy, urban redevelopment, and urban tourism. He is co-author of It’s Hardly Sportin’: Stadiums, Neighborhoods, and the New Chicago, a book about stadium politics and community development, and is currently completing Urban Tourism and 21st Century Cities (Routledge, 2011) which focuses on the role of urban tourism in economic development. He is also researching the culturally-based restructuring of Chicago under Richard M. Daley.
Jose Soltero, PhD
Associate Professor of Sociology
DePaul University

Jose Soltero received his PhD in sociology from the University of Arizona. He has done work on social stratification in his book *Inequality in the workplace: Underemployment among Mexicans, African Americans, and Whites* (Garland Press, 1995). He has published on the relevance of social stratification dimensions on diverse aspects of immigration from El Salvador and Mexico to the United States. In addition, he has analyzed different factors of social stratification on religious affiliation in Latin America and the United States. More recently, his work has focused on Latinos and education and on “Determinants of remittances to Mexico from Mexican born immigrants in Chicago” (in the *Journal of Poverty*).

Sonia W. Soltero, PhD
Associate Professor of Education
Director, Bilingual-Bicultural Education Graduate Program
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Professor Soltero received her PhD in bilingual-bicultural education from the University of Arizona. She is the author of “Dual Languages: Teaching and Learning in Two Languages” and several articles related to the issues of language and literacy among linguistically diverse populations. She teaches graduate courses on bilingual education, second language acquisition, ESL, and literacy. Her research interests include dual-language education, biliteracy, language planning and policy, and issues related to Latino education. She collaborates with public school districts in New York, Florida and Illinois preparing educators to more effectively work with English language learners (ELLs). Dr. Soltero also serves on several Illinois state commissions that draft recommendations for state law-makers on the education of ELLs, such as the Illinois Early Learning Council. She has been a public school teacher in both Arizona and Chicago, working with Latino, Native American, and African American children.
Elizabeth Robbins
Graduate Student
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Elizabeth Robbins is a Master's of Arts candidate in Social and Cultural Foundations of Education at DePaul University. She recently defended her Master's thesis entitled Teaching to the World: The Internationalization of a College of Education in the United States and will graduate June 2010. As a graduate assistant, she worked with Dr. Sonia Soltero and Dr. Jose Soltero on the education sector of this collaboration with the Institute for Latino Studies. Elizabeth is an English as a Second Language teacher, and has been working with adult English language learners in Chicago since 2007. She has accepted a job in Tianjin, China, teaching English and studying Chinese for a year.

Work and the Economy

Peter A. Creticos, PhD
Adjunct Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration
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Peter Creticos, an ILS visiting fellow, is president and executive director of the Institute for Work and the Economy, a think tank on workforce development. His current interests are in policies and practices in employment and in community economic development. He has a special interest in immigrant and immigrant communities. During 2005 and 2006 he was principal researcher on a yearlong project funded by The Joyce Foundation on the integration of immigrants in the workplace. In 2007 he was principal author of a report on employment challenges and solutions for foreign-educated immigrants.
Samuel Rosenberg, PhD
Associate Provost and Director of the Honors Program
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Civic Participation

Xóchitl Bada, PhD
Assistant Professor
Latin American and Latino Studies Program
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Xóchitl Bada is an assistant professor in Latin American and Latino Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her scholarship focuses on the civic, cultural, and political participation of Chicago-based Mexican organizations from a binational perspective. For the last two years, she has been co-directing an immigrant civic integration study in eight cities in the United States. Her work on Mexican migrant hometown associations has been published by the International Relations Center, the journal Iberoamericana, and in the book Diáspora Michoacana. She is a contributor
to the *Oxford Encyclopedia of Latinos and Latinas in the United States*. Her most recent publications are “Migrant Organization and Hometown Impacts in Rural Mexico,” an article written in collaboration with Jonathan Fox and published by the British Journal of Agrarian Change, and “Invisible No More: Mexican Migrant Civic Participation in the United States,” a report written in collaboration with Jonathan Fox and Andrew Selee.

**Vanessa Guridy**  
**PhD Student, Political Science**  
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Ms. Guridy’s fields of interest lay in comparative politics and urban politics with a focus on gender and immigration. She has served as the political science steward for the Graduate Employees Organization and as the vice president of the Association of Graduate Students for Politics.

**Nawojka Lesinski**  
**PhD Candidate, Political Science**  
**University of Illinois at Chicago**  
Ms. Lesinski’s major field of study is comparative politics with an urban politics subfield. She is interested in comparisons between Latin America and Eastern Europe and has focused her research on issues of democracy, transnational participation, civil society and social capital. Although formally affiliated with the Department of Political Science, she has also worked extensively with the Latin American and Latino Studies Program at UIC.
Amalia Pallares, PhD  
Associate Professor  
Latin American and Latino Studies Program  
University of Illinois at Chicago

Amalia Pallares has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Texas. She studies social movements, ethnicity and race in Latin America and the United States, focusing on the relationship between political activism and identity formation among newly politicized groups. Her book *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: the Ecuadorian Andes in the late Twentieth Century* analyzes the social, economic and political conditions that inform contemporary indigenous activism and identity in Ecuador. Other areas of study in Latin America include rural politics, political protest, and political change. Her work on immigrant communities in the United States studies the ways in which notions of nation, region and race inform immigrants’ social and political attitudes, behaviors, and organizing experiences. More recently, she has focused on immigrant activism in Chicago. She co-edited a book manuscript entitled *Marcha: Latino Chicago and the National Immigrant Movement* (forthcoming 2010), which explores the role played by institutions, collective organizing experiences, political coalitions and public policies in shaping immigrant activism and subjectivities. She is also developing a manuscript on family separation and undocumented immigrant agency in the immigrant rights movement. Dr. Pallares teaches courses on Latin American politics, comparative politics, Latino politics, identity politics, social movements, race, ethnicity and politics in the Americas, and state theory.

Joanna Schmit, M.A.  
M.A. Hispanic Studies  
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Ms. Schmit received her MA in Hispanic Studies from UIC. Her MA focus was on Latino and Latin American cultural studies and literature. She is also interested in Latino civic engagement within Chicago, in non-electoral organizations such as community gardens. She has taught classes and discussion groups at UIC in both the Spanish department and Latino and Latin American Studies department. She has traveled extensively and lived/studied in Spain, Ghana, South
Korea and Mexico. She is now settled in Chicago and plans to begin teaching in the Chicago Public Schools as a bilingual teacher starting in the fall of 2010.

Maria de los Angeles (Nena) Torres, PhD
Director and Professor, Latin American and Latino Studies Program
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Maria de los Angeles Torres received her PhD in political science from the University of Michigan. Her work has focused on Cuba and its exiles as well as on Latino politics in the United States. She has authored two books, *In the Land of Mirrors: Cubans Exile Politics in the US* and *The Lost Apple: Operation Pedro Pan, Cuban Children in the US and the Promise of a Better Future*. She has edited a volume of essays, *By Heart/De Memoria: Cuban Women’s Journeys in and Out of Exile*, and has co-edited a book on *Borderless Borders: Latinos, Latin Americans and the Paradoxes of Interdependence*. She is currently working on two research projects: “Children and Youth’s Politics in the Age of Globalization” and “Comparative Civic Engagement in three Latino Communities.” Other interests include comparative political movements, youth politics in the Americas, and Latin American political thought.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

Since its creation in 1999, the Institute for Latino Studies has played a vital role in fostering understanding of the US Latino experience. The Institute supports interdisciplinary initiatives in Latino studies as a key component of the University of Notre Dame’s academic mission. By advancing research, expanding knowledge, and strengthening community, the Institute is true to the mission, tradition, and distinctively Catholic values of Notre Dame.
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Bringing together and coordinating four research teams from four separate universities to synthesize the present state of thinking and factual knowledge about Latinos in metropolitan Chicago is no small task. And large projects like this one typically have large debts.

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**Latinos in Chicago: Reflections of an American Landscape**

focuses on Latinos in metropolitan Chicago with the goal of locating them within Chicago’s economic, political, and educational context and understanding the critical role that they can play in enhancing the present and future well-being of the metropolitan area. Latinos are on the frontline of a demographic revolution that in all likelihood will transform the social and economic landscape of Chicago and the nation. The white papers in this volume survey the existing state of knowledge, theoretical and factual, about metropolitan Chicago Latinos in four areas: education, work and the economy, civic participation, and urban change. The white papers are designed to be a starting point for decision-makers, stakeholders, CBOs, and other parties interested in digesting the information, understanding its implications, and using it to frame effective policies that incorporate the present reality and future prospects of Latinos within the American landscape.